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Abstract 
I am sad, and you - watching me - can feel this. What does becoming aware of 
someone else's emotions consist of? In this dissertation, I articulate and defend 
the claim that other people's emotions are, in the ordinary case, transparent to 
us. By this I mean that, on the whole, they are not more difficult or more 
problematic to become aware of in the case of others than in our own case - the 
transparency intuition. I argue for this claim against a purported asymmetry, 
existing at many different levels, between feeling one's own emotions and 
feeling other people's emotions, one alleged difference being that one does not 
experience other people's emotions as if they were our own - the ownership 
intuition. First, I set up the problem raised by these (supposedly) incompatible 
claims in the context of early phenomenalist theories of empathy, and suggest a 
way to reconcile them with respect to our awareness of sensations. Second, 
having examined some crucial aspects of the nature of the emotions and the way 
they (may) differ from sensations, I apply the suggestion made concerning the 
latter to the case of the former, and argue that both the transparency intuition 
and ownership intuition can be met if we distinguish between different layers of 
emotional engagement with the world, and in particular, with other people. 
Third, in the context of the recent literature on mind-reading, I assess the 
manner in which my account of the awareness of the emotions in others and 
ourselves bears upon the question of our understanding of other people's 
emotions. Finally, I examine the impact of my account on the possibility of 
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"Are you cold? " his son enquired 
Thefather slowly rubbed his legs. 
"Well, I don't know, I can't tell till Ifeel. 
"Perhaps some one might feel for you, " said the 
younger man, laughing. 
"Oh, I hope some one will alwaysfeelfor me! Don't 
youfeelfor me Lord Warburton? 
Henry James, The Portrait ofa Lady 
1. Motivations 
What does becoming aware of someone else's emotions consist of? I am sad, 
and you - watching me - can feel it. How does that work? There are many 
reasons why one might be interested in such a question and, consequently, many 
ways one might want to approach it. One is to have a description of the physics 
of such episodes. Another is to learn of the role of interpersonal awareness of 
emotions in an evolutionary story. Another is to discover how infants become 
proficient in becoming aware of other people's emotions. And yet another might 
be to know whether and at what point awareness of someone else's emotion is 
also knowledge about someone else's emotion - in which case, one will be 
interested in descriptive questions only insofar as this bears. on one's normative 
preoccupations in epistemology. 
Of course, answers to any one of these interrogations are likely to borrow 
from answers to the others and many more. And although I am interested in all 
of these questions, and shall touch upon them when the time comes, I shall be 
primarily concerned in this thesis with the more descriptive aspects of the issues 
raised by them. How is it that ordinary cases of becoming aware of other 
people's emotions are so easy? How is it that in the ordinary case, it seems that 
it is no more difficult to feel your emotions than it is to feel mine? 
Before I go any further, I should try to dispel the immediate worries, if I 
can, of those who will be unhappy about the assumption implicit in the first 
question I have just asked. I can imagine hearing: "'Do you really believe it easy 
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to feel other people's emotions? " And I agree; the appeal of my earlier question 
lies precisely in this: that, perhaps, it is not so easy. I am not thinking only of 
the philosopher's incredulity towards my claim. For I have been having 
conversations that bear a characteristic pattern for several years now. In it, my 
conversant begins by telling me: "At the end of day, the only emotions I can be 
really certain about are those that I have, ... for the rest, it is only guessing and 
hard work to really know what feelings others go through". 
The first thing to note about this is the epistemological way in which my 
objectors understand the issue. When Julien says: 
- It is 'easy' to see other people's emotions! 
My conversant generally responds: 
- But how can you be certain about what you think you 
see? 
To this I usually reply: 
-I do not mean to say that it is easy to get it right [although 
I do believe this], only that what other people feel comes to 
me easily whether or not I get it right. 
After a moment's reflection, my interlocutors often, though reluctantly, come 
round to my opinion. For a while. Until their fighting spirit comes back: 
- Often, 'actually very often', we have absolutely no clue 
as to what others feel, even when it is quite clear that the 
person facing us is going through distinct and, from our 
point of view, particularly defined feelings. 
Of course, after so many years, I am familiar with this grievance; and this is 
what I now come back with: 
- Of course, we are often clueless as to the manner in 
which we can make sense of what others feel. But, surely, 
there is something that we can see just in front of us- 
actually, that we can feel- and don't you think that it is 
that which we do feel in others, their feelings, which, as 
you might be hinting at, we are clueless at making sense 
of? 
I will typically add: 
Introduction 19 
- It is true that we are often clueless as to what others feel, 
but it is equally true that we are clueless as to what we 
personally feel. In fact, -some are so clueless as to what they 
themselves' feel that it might confuse them for hours, or 
even for days and months. 
At that point my objector is generally confused, and I secretly and 
shamelessly celebrate a small professional victory, not always convinced that I 
have any more substantial grounds for celebration. 
While hoping that you will not think my conversational partner too dense, 
and the ways I engage with her too perfidious, these are, in a light-hearted guise, 
the ideas that I shall try to articulate and defend in this dissertation. In a word, 
emotions are, more often than not, easy to become aware of, whether they are 
experienced by us or by others. When we have time, however, when we are 
philosophers, or when we experience films and literature, or - worse - when we 
are in love, this easiness seems to fade away and may be supplanted by 
uncertainty, and often perplexity. 
In this thesis, I try to explain in what sense there is an 'easy' part to our 
becoming aware of other people's emotions, and in what sense there is a 
'difficult' part to our becoming aware of these same people's emotions. I try to 
articulate a framework in which the 'easy' part relates and interacts with the 
'difficult' part. While doing this, I strive as far as possible to keep the 
phenomenological, conceptual, empirical and epistemological issues separate. In 
particular - and this is addressed especially to the philosophers -I reserve the 
epistemological and normative aspects of the question - "How do you know that 
I am sad? " - for the end. 
This, then, will allow a journey through the vast literature on my topic, 
which I hope will provide the reader with a good idea of who takes what attitude 
to my own questionings. This feature of the thesis is a bonus but is not its 
objective, since I have no credentials and no ambition as an historian of ideas. 
But I shall try to make links between at least four distinct traditions with similar 
concerns to mine. 
Firstly, at the turn of the century early phenomenologists, with Husserl at 
the centre, were preoccupied by, and gave a lot of thought to, the more 
descriptive and conceptual issues relating to the phenomenological aspects of 
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my claim. At that time and in that milieu, the central question to be addressed 
was "What is empathy? " 
Secondly, there is "The problem of other minds" tradition featuring Ayer, 
Austin, Wittgenstein and Malcolm, among others in the middle of the 20th 
century. They were concerned with the epistemological aspect of the topic, if 
not its relevance to scepticism. 
Thirdly, there is the contemporary literature on 'mind reading' that 
consists of a lively debate to which developmental psychologists, linguists and 
philosophers all contribute, with very little concern for phenomenology and 
much concern for the data made available by developmental psychology. 
Fourthly, there is the neurological, neuro-psychological, anthropological, 
evolutionary, and experimental psychology literature on emotion and the 
recognition of emotion. This is generating more and more interest and is 
certainly, at least in principle, relevant to my concerns. 
A fifth tradition merits mention, though discussion of it will have no place 
at all in this dissertation: the contemporary continental approach to the relation 
between Self and Others (e. g. Levinas). I have no particular excuse for this 
omission, except for the fact that one cannot take care of everything, and that 
this thesis will have enough of a continental flavour without a direct 
engagement with the names associated with that outlook on my topic. 
This being said, I believe what is to come to be firmly rooted in the 
analytic tradition, with its concerns and motivations stemming directly from the 
once raging, and today old-fashioned, "problem of other minds". Let me give 
you a feel for the latter (alleged) problem. 
11. Questions of symmetry 
The overarching theme of this dissertation can be introduced via a brief 
exposition of a view that is sometimes called 'the reflection+analogy theory'. A 
partisan of this reconstructs the processes under which we come to ascribe 
mental states to others along the following lines. On each occasion that a subject 
feels a certain emotion, she also experiences some specific movement or 
behaviour in her body. In the long run, she manages to collect an important list 
of generalisations correlating certain specific feelings with certain specific 
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behaviour. When she masters these generalisations, she is ready to use them to 
ascribe emotions to others taking the reverse route. She sees behaviour, consults 
her list of generalisations, and infers the emotions of others on this basis. After a 
while, the subject is so good at the exercise that she successfully goes over this 
procedure without having to think about it. The subject, by analogy with her 
own case on which she has reflected, becomes proficient in ascribing mental 
states to others. 
Discontent with this picture has come essentially from two different 
bastions, Wittgenstein and its followers on the one hand, and Strawson, Evans 
and their followers on the other hand. In both cases, the problem they identify 
with the reflection+analogy view stems from constraints that they believe apply 
to the very possibility of property ascription in general, and to which the model 
just outlined does not conform. The differences in the two respective grievances 
are not obvious, and often they seem to lie in a variation of emphasis rather than 
substance. 
Reconsidering the model under inspection, Wittgensteinians reformulate 
the view under scrutiny in the following illuminating way: while I have a 
privileged access to my emotions by feeling them, I have only an indirect access 
to the emotions of others by inferring them from their manifestations. On this 
view, the application conditions of emotion words are very different depending 
on whether one ascribes an emotion to oneself (i. e. one's feelings), or whether 
one ascribes an emotion to others (i. e. others' behaviour). If, like the 
Wittgensteinians, one is especially preoccupied with the theory of meaning, and 
if, in particular, one rejects as incongruous the idea that a given sentence in 
language might have very different conditions of application when 
circumstances are not wholly dissimilar - i. e. when those differences are clearly 
not explicable by recourse to contextual differences - then one will tend to 
discard the reflection+analogy theory as utterly misguided. The worry driving 
the rejection is that it makes no sense to suppose that I learn to apply an 
emotional concept to others on the basis of the condition of application of the 
concept to me, i. e. a certain feeling. However good I am at identifying my own 
feelings, they will never give me any indication as to what others feel. 
Evans, following up a line of thought first developed by Strawson, has 
argued that thought is subject to what he calls the Generality Constraint. The 
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Generality Constraint appears to entail that it makes no sense to suppose that I 
might have a thought which can be interpreted as involving a given concept, 
without ipsofacto supposing that I have the capacity to exercise this concept in 
other thoughts. If I am capable of thinking that John is angry, I must be capable 
of thinking that, for example, Mary is angry, or that John is, for example, 
famous (so long as I possess the other concepts involved in these latter 
thoughts). The idea is that there is a deep incoherence in the supposition that a 
predicate could be applicable only on a single occasion to just one object. 
Whatever one may think about the Generality Constraint, its truth would place 
the defender of the reflection+analogy model in big trouble. For it would mean 
that I could not have thoughts about myself without ipsofacto being capable of 
having thoughts about other people. If this is correct, then the 
reflection+analogy model which, to recall, consists of building generalisations 
correlating one's own emotions with one's own behaviours - generalisations 
consequently used to interpret other's emotions - is an aberration. If the 
Generality constraint holds, then I cannot have a thought about my emotions in 
the first place without also being capable of having thoughts about other 
people's emotions. 
Beyond the subtle differences between these two families of objections, 
what they have in common is the express requirement that there must be some 
sort of symmetry between first and third person attribution of experience, a 
requirement to which the reflection+analogy model, at least in the bare form in 
which I presented it, does not conform. Now, I believe that the orthodox 
response to this general complaint has been to bite the bullet, that is, to concede 
that there must be symmetry between first and third person ascription of 
experience. However, as a rule, the admission that the general picture had to be 
revised in accordance with the symmetry principle did not coincide with any 
attempt to revise the fundamental assumption underlying the whole discussion, 
that is, with any challenge to the claim that first and third person access to 
experience is radically different. 
A caricature of the acceptance of the need for symmetry in the absence of 
any revision of the fundamentals on which the whole discussion is based, is the 
contemporary 'theory-theory' account of experience attribution. On the latter 
account, the application conditions for psychological concepts are behavioural 
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both in the first and third person case, behaviour being conceived of as the 
effect of an inner psychological cause. The symmetry on the proposal at hand is 
ensured by the fact that psychological terms have the same conditions of 
application in my own case and in yours; but at the same time no revision is 
undertaken to the conception of the inner and outer 'routes' to experience as 
being radically different. This might be thought to be an advantage until it is 
noticed that, in this new and revised picture of experience attribution, the fact of 
having 'first person' kinds of experiences seems to play no role whatsoever. It 
suggests a picture that fails even to take into consideration the possibility that 
there might be interesting differences between a human being attributing 
experiences to herself and others, and a robot doing likewise. This is no 
prejudice against robots, whom we might resemble in many ways. It is just the 
thought that perhaps our own emotions, feelings and sentiments do have a role 
in our resulting competence in treating others as psychological beings, a role 
which might be as significant for philosophy as it obviously is for psychology. 
This is something the reflection+analogy account attempts to do justice to, and 
to which the theory-theory doesn't. 
It might be retorted that the point just alluded to holds, perhaps, against 
the theory-theory, but fails to have -enough scope to really get off the ground in 
the greater scheme of things. I shall argue that this is not so. The worry I just 
expressed applies equally, for example, to Wittgenteinian attempts at, as they 
like to say, 'dissolving' the problem. In order to reach symmetry 
Wittgensteinians emphatically discard private experience as having any 
relevance to language use. Language use is, according to Wittgensteinians, the 
central concern of philosophy and, if private experience is irrelevant to language 
use, then it is no less irrelevant to philosophy. Appeal to the notion of criteria, 
which is the Wittgensteinian positive suggestion in the area, is a contribution to 
the epistemological questions associated with the problem of other minds. That 
is, the problem of the possibility of knowing about the attitudes and contents of 
other people's minds, not a contribution to our understanding of the way our 
own felt experiences might play a part in our becoming competent in treating 
others as bearers of experiences. 
My suggestion, which I shall now formulate cryptically, is the following. 
Symmetry should be understood and cashed out on the model of first person 
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experience. That is to say, I shall examine the possibility that there is indeed 
symmetry because access to other people's experiences is very much the same 
as access to one's own experiences - 'from the inside', as it were. This 
dissertation is an attempt to formulate this claim and, in particular, to say how it 
bears on the emotion case. It is an attempt at examining the conceptual issues 
and problems that it raises, and in particular, at examining how it copes with the 
legitimate concern according to which there is also an asymmetry between 
caccess from the inside' and 'access from the outside', that will also have to be 
accounted for. 
A few more words before I expose in more detail the plan for the thesis. 
My 'first person' symmetry claim might remind the reader of two similar 
approaches in the existing literature. First, McDowell's proposal, according to 
which we can have direct access to other people's experiences, I and second, 
what is known as simulation theory, which is an account of the way one's own 
psychological thought processes might contribute to an understanding of other 
people's thought processes. The former proposal is distinct from mine in the 
essential respect that it is an attempt to make headway towards resolving the 
epistemological problems associated with my question. McDowell's 
examination of the relation between experience and its expression is embedded 
in a project that is aimed at dissolving the sceptical pressures an internalist 
conception of knowledge generates for the question of our awareness of other 
people's psychological states. Although I shall, in the sixth and last chapter of 
this thesis, show what bearing my own theory has on epistemology, my project 
is to give a sound descriptive account of the perception of emotions. As to 
simulation theory, I believe that it is, indeed, an account which rests on 
motivations similar to mine, and I will in due course examine the similarities 
and differences between it and my own account. 
III. The programme 
In the first chapter, I present Husserl's, Scheler's and Stein's theories of 
empathy, focusing on the first two. I use these authors to evoke the two 
I See McDowell (1982) in its original version, rather than its reprint in Dancy (198S) in which 
most people seem to read this paper. 
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intuitions that any account of episodes of our awareness of other people's 
emotional experiences shall have to conform to, if it is to be faithful to the 
phenomenology of such episodes. These intuitions, which I call respectively the 
transparency intuition and the ownership intuition, unfortunately appear to pull 
in opposite directions. That is to say that, for your experiences to be really 
transparent to me, they should, in fact, be presented to me as if they were my 
own experiences - the transparency intuition. Now, if we say that they are so 
presented to me, as, in fact, Scheler would have it, we satisfy the transparency 
intuition at the expense of the ownership intuition. Indeed, if there is no 
difference in the way my own experiences, by contrast with your own 
experiences, are presented to me, then there is no real sense in which I am 
presented with an owned experience, i. e. your experience rather than mine - the 
ownership intuition. This is a trap Husserl is most concerned to avoid, and in 
order to do so he (re-)introduces the notion of awareness "by analogy". Through 
that move, I claim, Husserl ends up satisfying the ownership intuition at the 
expense of the transparency one. I thus suggest that we have to find a middle 
route between Husserl's and Scheler's accounts. 
In the second chapter, I outline a strategy that should allow us to avoid the 
respective pitfalls into which Scheler and Husserl fall. I argue that, by taking 
seriously two key ideas that are confusedly present in the work of both 
phenomenologists, we might succeed in accounting for both intuitions. The first 
idea is that all perceptions are integrated in the following sense. On the one 
hand, every perception consists of the operation of some or all sensory 
modalities operating in unison. In particular, I argue, with the help of Gibson's 
conception of ecological perception and BermAdez's elaboration of Gibson, that 
this integrative feature of perception - which, among other things, forbids us to 
think of proprioception and exteroception. as two different epistemic routes via 
which someone might access properties of oneself - forever precludes the 
possibility of really distinguishing between inner perception and outer 
perception. Consequently, it also precludes the possibility of really 
distinguishing between a capacity sensitive to psychological properties in a 
'psychological way', which would contrast with a capacity indirectly sensitive 
to psychological properties in a 'physical way'. 
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The second idea is that we should distinguish, in our phenomenologists, 
terminology, between the phenomenological and the sensory levels of 
experience or, in my terminology, between the vehicle level and the saliency 
level of experience. Putting the two ideas together, I claim, allows for the 
accounting of our two intuitions. I illustrate the case by focusing on the 
sensation case. In a nutshell, sensations, yours or mine, are transparent in the 
sense that they are presented to me in an integrated perception that is not more 
first-personal than third-personal, and at this level at least, i. e. ownership is not 
salient. If, however, I focus upon or pay special attention to the vehicle of the 
experience, that is to say the sensory basis which reveals the sensation to me - 
makes it salient to me - features of the sensation that were not initially salient to 
me, and among these features the creature who is affected by the sensation, i. e. 
its owner, become salient. 
In the third chapter, I set the scene for a possible application of the line of 
argumentation developed in the second chapter concerning sensation to the case 
of emotions. The question I ask here is: what is the structure of this 'thing', 
emotion, which I claim is transparent in others. The question is particularly 
pressing, I claim, since most theorists of the emotions conceive of them, perhaps 
in contrast with sensations, as highly complex and multifarious entities 
involving propositional content. The worry, therefore, is that the thought that the 
emotions of others can be perceived transparently is simply preposterous. 
Taking this worry very seriously, I encourage the thought that all emotions are 
intentional states with content, but I attempt to show that we have to distinguish 
between basic emotions, which I call emotional valuations, and more complex 
emotions that I call emotional evaluations. In this chapter, I contrast the kind of 
content involved in basic emotions, which I suggest should be conceived of on 
the perceptual model, with the kind of content involved in complex emotions, 
which I suggest should be conceived on the model of belief. This I take to be the 
preparatory work for the defence in the fourth chapter of the claim that basic 
emotions, which we share with some animals and infants, can be perceived 
transparently in others. Complex emotions, however, are not at all transparent 
and are reached via complex mechanism of inference, analogy, comparison, rule 
of thumb, etc. 
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The fourth chapter contains the crux of the thesis. Here I articulate and 
defend the claim that emotional valuations can be perceived transparently, and 
give reasons for thinking that this has to be the case in order to account for our 
capacity to become proficient emotion attributers, i. e. to become competent in 
emotional evaluation. I start by articulating the transparency claim, arguing that 
the claim is not trivial if it involves both a sharing component and a recognition 
component. Perceiving your emotion transparently means that I both share the 
emotion with you and recognise that you have it. Building on a proposal by 
Brewer, who suggests that we should construe the way we perceive emotions on 
a specific indexical model of the way in which we perceive secondary qualities, 
I propose my own model of the perception of emotions that describes and 
explains the kind of triangulation taking place between the perceiver of the 
emotion, the experiencer of the emotion, and the object of the experiencer's 
emotion. The main twist in the argumentation is that I conceive of the 
perception of emotion at the primitive level as being a case of someone else's 
basic emotion being the object of the perceiver's basic emotion. In a phrase that 
the reader will become used to I say that perceiving emotions in others at a 
basic level is a case of emotionally valuating other people's emotional 
valuations. I then argue that this model instantiates the transparency thesis, and 
in virtue of that allows for a non-circular account of the way in which children 
learn to be competent in applying the concepts of the emotions to themselves 
and others, i. e. to be competent in the capacity of emotional evaluation. In the 
process of arguing for this claim, I expand on the contrast I make between 
emotional valuation and emotional evaluation, suggesting, in line with the 
argument set up in the second chapter, that emotional evaluation consists, in 
part, of the capacity to pay special attention to the vehicles of the emotional 
valuation, in particular its sensory basis, thus making what was not salient in the 
first place, notably who it is who is having the emotion, i. e. its owner, salient. 
This is how I reconcile the two intuitions mentioned earlier, for emotion at least, 
if not for all forms of mental attribute. 
In the fifth chapter, I attempt to dispel worries that will have arisen from 
the proposal offered in the fourth chapter. One might object that the way in 
which my model of our perception of other people's emotions instantiates the 
transparency thesis is such that an episode of emotionally valuating someone 
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else's emotional valuation is too "weak! ' or not "rich enougW' to count as a 
genuine case of understanding that someone else is experiencing an emotion. In 
order to answer this legitimate worry, I use as a starting point Goldie's 
conception of what it takes to understand some person's emotion. Reviewing 
with Goldie the different accounts existing in the philosophical and 
psychological market of the ways in which we come to understand ourselves 
and others as subjects whose actions are explained by their emotions, I argue 
that it is only in as far as one has epistemological concerns in mind - as might 
be the case for Goldie - that is, only if one takes the notion of understanding as 
relevantly akin to the concept of knowing, i. e. as implying "success",, that 
emotionally valuating someone else's emotional valuation ceases to count as an 
episode of understanding. I therefore propose an alternative, weaker, non- 
epistemological, but psychologically plausible, conception of understanding, 
which I claim is satisfied by my model of our transparent perception of other 
people's emotion. "Understanding a la Goldie", I argue, is fit for an account of 
how we emotionally evaluate other people's emotions. 
In the sixth and last chapter, having laboured the descriptive and 
phenomenological aspects of my question, I turn to its bearing on epistemology., 
In this chapter I defend two claims. First, I argue that the perception of the 
psychological and the perception of the physical pose the same sceptical threats, 
no more and no less, for epistemology, irrespective of one's own inclinations in 
the theory of knowledge. Second, I argue for the stronger claim that knowledge 
of other people's experiences is possible. I start by contrasting the views an 
internalist and an externalist approach to knowledge are likely to take towards 
perceptual experience of the external world in general. I go on to contrast these 
two views and to show how, with some key externalist assumptions in the 
theory of knowledge, together with some semantic assumptions with respect to 
the individuation of the content of experience, it is possible to defend a non- 
classical fo undationalism with respect to perceptual experience. The foundation 
in question is semantic rather than epistemic, but given the externalism,, I 
suggest it has epistemic consequences as well. Before turning to the application' 
of this epistemological model to the case of emotional valuation of other 
creatures' experiences, however, I argue for my first claim, i. e. that emotional 
valuations of other people's emotions do not pose any special sceptical threats 
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that ordinary perceptions of physical objects do not also pose, whatever 
standpoint one occupies in the theory of knowledge. This is the outcome, I shall 
claim, of construing access to the inner and the outer in a similar fashion, i. e. the 
outcome of the structural parallel we have found to hold in the second and third 
chapters between first and third perspective at the level of emotional valuation. 
In the second half of the chapter, I argue for my second claim, that 
knowledge of other people's emotions is possible. I begin by showing how non- 
classical foundationalism, with respect to experience in general, applies to the 
case of emotional valuation of other people's emotions in the framework of two 
remaining epistemological problems associated with the awareness of other 
people's psychological states. I first show how non-classical foundationalism 
dissolves the problem of deception, a problem specific to the case of the 
perception of other minds. Second, I deal with the question of howjustification 
should be understood in the epistemological picture I am putting forward. 
Having adopted a broadly externalist strategy and, this being the case, having 
taken on board the possibility that young infants and animals are entitled to 
knowledge, I argue that the intemalist preoccupation with justification has to be 
taken into account when knowledge is attributed to human adults. This is to say 
that we would doubt that someone knows that someone else is experiencing a 
certain emotion if the putative knower were entirely incompetent with respect to 
all the possible ways in which support for such attributions can be gathered, i. e. 
incompetent with respect to emotional evaluation. For this reason, together with 
the fact that many aspects of a full-blown ascription of emotion are not resolved 
at the level of emotional valuation - in particular the question of ownership -I 
argue that the reflexive level of emotional evaluating is part of the evidence 
package - together with one's emotional valuation - that one might bring in 
support of one's final emotional evaluation that someone is currently 
experiencing a given emotion. This is to say that, when the context is such that 
the level of justification required for knowledge is very high, for example in a 
seminar on scepticism, I argue that Goldie's model of 'understanding emotions' 




CHAPTER 1: A JOU RNEY INTO PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
LAND OR THREE THEORIES OF EMPATHY 
1. Introduction 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the first section, I present Husserl's 
theory of analogical apperception; in the second, I go on to present Scheler's 
theory of the direct perception of other minds; in the third section, I outline 
Stein's theory of empathy. The two latter accounts stem, in fact, from earlier 
work by Husserl, and the whole debate takes place in a thoroughly 
phenomenological framework articulated by Husserl himself. The reason for 
2 considering the ideas of these authors, often called 'realist phenomenologists', 
is not a symptom of a phenomenologist bias on my part; rather, it happens that 
all three believed empathy to be one of the most important concerns of 
philosophy, and have thus spent a lot of energy and effort in trying to answer the 
problems it poses. In this exposition, historical perspective and accurate 
exegesis have not been my priority. Rather, I use these authors to simply 
highlight important intuitions, and then attempt to show how it is possible to 
make good these intuitions in the more homely Fregean tradition in the chapters 
that follow. 
II. Husserl's theory of analogical apperception 
Husserl's theory on the manner in which we know about other people's 
psychological states is fully embedded in his theory of sense perception. 3 I wish, 
therefore, to outline the latter. For Husserl, objects - like chairs and trees - are 
2 For the motivations underpinning this appellation, see Mulligan (200 1). 
3 Husserl's views on this topic are mainly to be found in his Meditations Cartesiennes (193 1, 
trans., 1985) and in his Die Krisis der europaisschen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale 
Phaenomenologie (1936, trans., 1970), which I quote from their English translations. It is ironic 
that Husserl's most anti-Cartesian philosophy, especially on the relation between the body and 
the mind, should be found in a book called the Cartesian Meditations. For a thorough 
examination of Husserl on the topics dealt with here, and to which I am indebted in the coming 
sections, see Bell (1990) pp. 151-215. 
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presented to the perceiving subject 'in person'. That is, the object itself is the 
direct object of the act of perceiving. Although this view constitutes a version of 
what we might want to call naive realism, Husserl's unfolding of it gets quite 
complex. He acknowledges that objects of perception are always present via 
some of their aspects or sides. A subject has a certain perspective on an object 
that allows him to be presented only with one side of the object at a time, and 
not the others, nor can he see the whole object. Nevertheless, Husserl tells us 
that the intentional object of perception is the object itself. The question thus 
becomes the following: how does something become the intentional object of an 
act of perception if no more than one of its sides is presented to the perceiving 
subject? it is important here to remember that if the object is to remain the 
intentional object of perception, then perceiving an object will not be a 
judgment or an act of inference. And Husserl is adamant that perceiving is not a 
case of judging or inferring. Unfortunately, according to Mulligan, Husserl 
never quite tells us what perceiving in his sense consists of, despite his having 
reserved a special notion supposedly covering the phenomenon: apperceptiorL4 
The aspects of the object that are not directly given in perception, as well as the 
whole object, are apperceived by the subject. Husserl rejects, at least in his 
earlier writings, the idea that apperception should be explained in terms of the 
subject having expectations or imaginings regarding the aspects or sides of the 
objects that are not directly presented to the subject. Nevertheless, it is the 
notion of apperception that Husserl uses to explain the manner in which other 
people's psychological states are presented to subjects. 
Husserl's view on the perception of psychological states is useful 
because it promises an intermediate position between the view that perception 
of these psychological states is direct, and the view that they are inferred from 
behaviour. At least, this is what we are led to believe, given the notion of 
apperception. In the first place, Husserl insists that a subject's perception of 
someone else's psychological state cannot be direct. For, he rightly notes, this 
would blur the difference between the subject's perception of his own, as 
opposed to others', psychological states: 
Cf. Mulligan (1996), pp. 193-194. 
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If what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would merely 
be a moment of my own essence and ultimately he himself and myself would be the 
same persons 
If other people's experiences were felt in a manner akin to the manner in 
which I feel my own experiences, then these experiences would be my 
experiences. Husserl's answer to that is not one of overreaction. He abstains 
from concluding that other people's psychological states are inaccessible to us, 
though he admits that they are presented via the other's body and behaviour. 
The question becomes once again, what is the relation between the perception of 
someone else's body and the perception of this same person's psychological 
state, if it is not one of inference. For Husserl insists that "we quite rightly speak 
of perceiving someone else"; "... what I actually see is not a sign and a mere 
analogue; ... on the contrary, 
it is someone else" (§55, p. 124). At this point he 
reintroduces the notion of apperception, which in this specific passage he calls 
appresentation: 
There must be a certain mediacy of Intentionality here, ... making present to 
consciousness something that is "there too", but which nevertheless is not itself there 
and can never become an "itself-there". We have here accordingly, a kind of making 
co-present, a kind of appresentation. 6 
Psychological states are apperceived, says Husserl. If we felt that the 
notion of apperception was mysterious when applied to the perception of 
middle-sized objects, it becomes even more so in the context of the perception 
of psychological states; the passage just quoted can hardly be said to be 
illuminating. For, we should keep in mind that, although the other sides of a 
middle-sized physical object are presented to the perceiving subject only 
indirectly, they can be perceived directly in principle. They are possible objects 
of direct presentation. However, there is no analogy in the case of psychological 
states of others for, as we saw, they are never presented directly. Husserl is 
aware of this problem and states that "only a precise explication of the 
Intentionality actually observable in my experience of someone else, and the 
motivations essentially implicit in that Intentionality, can resolve the enigma" 
Husserl(1931), [trans., 1985, §50, p. 119]. 
Husserl(1931), [trans., 1985, §50, p. 109]. 
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(§55, p. 121). It is in unlocking this enigma that Husserl develops his theory of 
empathy or analogical apperception, which can be summarized thus. The 
possibility of perceiving another person's body as the living body of a conscious 
being is a function of my ability to project onto or transfer an understanding that 
I originally acquire only from my own case. This is a most interesting idea, 
especially in the light of Husserl's insistence that the perception of someone else 
is "no inference from analogy", and more than that, it is "not an act of thinking 
of any sort"(§50, p. 111). It is easy to read Husserl's theory of empathy as a 
version of the familiar theory that I expounded in the introduction to this thesis. 
Namely, the view according to which getting to know that someone else is 
affected by specific states of consciousness consists of exercising an analogical 
inference from our own states of consciousness. To understand what Husserl has 
in mind, it is useful to take a look again at his theory of simple perception. I 
For Husserl, the body is an absolute 'here' in relation to which all other 
physical objects are situated 'there'. "But in virtue of my motility it is possible 
to reverse these egocentrically identified locations, making what was 'there' 
'here', and vice versa. I can change my position in such a manner that I can 
convert any 'there' into 'here"' (§53, p. 116). But more fundamentally, it seems 
that it is in the very intrinsic nature of experience that it includes implicit 
ro reference to the object of the experience, not only as it is presented to me fm 
'here', but also how it would be presented 'to me from 'there', from the rear, 
from nearer to it, and so forth. "This implies that, perceiving from there, I 
should see the same physical things, only in correspondingly different modes of 
appearances" (§53, p. 116). But this implies, as well, that implicit to all 
experiences, we will find a reference to the perceiving subject. All experiences 
are oriented, centred in a way which calls for a description in egocentric space. 
Experience thus informs me of the location and the aspects of an object as much 
as it informs me about my location and the way it looks to me from where I am. 
First, we should notice that these few remarks give the beginning of an 
explanation of what apperception consists of. The direct and actual presentation 
of an aspect of some object contains essentially other possible aspects of that 
object as presented to me were I situated differently towards it. Although we are 
still left in the dark as to how this transposition is supposed to work (is it an 
anticipation, or an act of the imagination? ), we can at least start to see how this 
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will not be an act of inference of any sort. Secondly, and undoubtedly a related 
point, we can see how sense perception in general, or what is sometimes called 
outer perception, is not and cannot be viewed as solely concerned with the 
outside world, solely concerned with the environment outside the body. All 
experiences are as much experiences of the Self - whatever it means at this 
stage - as they are experiences of the outside world. I wish to emphasize how 
these ideas are all present in Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, and even more so 
in Crisis. What Husserl calls 'kinaesthesia' is not that which allows us to sense 
internally, as opposed to those other abilities that allow us to sense the external 
world. All perceptions involve and depend upon kinaesthesia. This is how the 
following passage should be understood: 
All kinaesthesia, each being an 'I move', 'I do', are bound together in a 
comprehensive unity ... Clearly the aspect-exhibitions of whatever physical object is 
appearing in perception, and the kinaesthesia are not processes simply running 
alongside each other; rather they work together in such a way that the aspects have 
the meaning of, or the validity of, aspects of the object only through the fact that they 
are those aspects continually required by kinaesthesia. 7 
,I 
do not claim that this is very clear, certainly not at this stage. It 
emphasizes, however, the role of kinaesthesia in allowing the very possibility of 
experiencing the external world. The reference to the Self as being implicated in 
the perception of external features of the world is even clearer in the following 
passage of Crisis: 
Sensibility, the ego's active functioning of the living body or the bodily organs, 
belongs in a fundamental, essential way to all experience of objects. It proceeds in 
consciousness, not as a mere series of object-appearances, as if these in themselves, 
through themselves alone and their coalescences, were appearances of objects; rather, 
there are such in consciousness only in combination with the kinaesthetically 
functioning living body, the ego functioning here in a-peculiar sort of activity and 
habituality. 8 
The claim that the living body is essentially involved in all experiences 
ceases to be an empty slogan when its link to agency is understood. All 
experiences present the external world as a field of possible experiences and 
actions, "primarily through seeing, hearing, etc; and of course other modes of 
the ego belonging to this (for example, lifting, carrying, pushing, and the like) 
7 Husserl (193 6), [trans., 1970, §2 8, p. 106]. 
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(§28, p. 108). The world and its objects constitute a space of possible 
experiences different from my actual experiences of them, experiences that 
include those of the will. 'Liftabiltyl, 'graspabilty', 'carryability', 'pushability', 
etc., all might be features that I now apperceive. In this sense, a constitutional 
aspect of the Self is given in simple experiences, namely the potential for action 
or, in other words, the capacity of exercising my will. 9 Those cryptic remarks 
will be made clearer in the next chapter where I examine the relation between 
perception, action and the developing Self. 
Our present goal, however, is to consider the role of apperception, 
understood as consciousness of an object by a living body, applied to the case of 
the consciousness by a living body of another living body. We have considered 
already the phenomenon of the decentralisation of the egocentric space as 
intrinsically involved in experience. In other words, the fact that I can and 
generally do experience objects as they would look from locations other than 
'here'. In so doing, of course, my living body can be itself the object of this 
decentralization. My body is given to me kinaesthetically as much as it is given 
to me from the perspective I would have upon it were it situated 'there' rather 
than 'here'. Closely related to the possibility of decentralized space, we have 
what Husserl calls 'the living body's reflexive relation to itself': 
Touching kinaesthetically, I perceive with my hands, I also perceive with my eyes, 
and so forth... As perceptively active I experience (or can experience) all of nature, 
including my own living body, which is thus reflexively related to itself. That 
becomes possible because I can perceive one hand 'by means of' the other, an eye by 
means of a hand, and so forth -a procedure in which the functioning organ must 
become an object, and the object a functioning organ. 10 
To put it in rather crude terms, what we are told here is that my life, my 
feelings, my actions, etc. are presented to me, perhaps most of the time, 
simultaneously from the inside and from the outside - to use terms that we can 
see by now as being inadequate. Similarly, from a Husserlian point of view, my 
8 Husserl (1936), [trans., 1970, §28, p. 1071. 
9 For contemporary research in experimental psychology on the relation 
between the will, 
perception and action along very similar lines, see Russell 
(1996). 
10 Husserl (193 1), [trans., 1985, §44, p. 91. 
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emotions and actions are felt, as it were, both from 'here' and 'there' at any 
given time. 
The application of this idea to the perception of other living bodies' 
experiences should not be too difficult to see. Putting together the notion of a 
decentralised egocentric space and the notion of the living body's reflective 
relation to itself, we get a good grasp of Husserl's idea of analogical 
apperception. If my experiences are presented to me associated with how they 
look from 'over there', i. e. with the way they are typically expressed, then there 
is no reason why I should not be capable of using this knowledge to perceive 
other people's expressive behaviour as associated with their typical experiences. 
In effect, making use of this knowledge is not something I ever chose to do. 
Other people's behaviour is always given to me as expressive, i. e. (as being the 
expression of an inner psychological state of which I know from having 
experienced it for myself. "The natural body" says Husserl, "appresents the 
other ego by virtue of pairing association with my living body" (§55, p. 123). Or 
again " ... the assimilative apperception 
becomes possible and established, by 
which the external body over there receives analogically from mine the sense 
living body". (§54, p. 1 18). 
Let us pause for a moment. I find Husserl's theory of analogical 
apperception very appealing. The main reason for this lies in the impression that 
it gets the phenomenology of perceiving other bodies right. But whereas I can 
only applaud the strategy of attempting to find a middle way between a 
conception that conceives of our access to others as a direct affair and a 
conception that conceives of it as an inference, it seems to me that we are left 
with somewhat vague and unexplained notions like assimilation, association, or 
analogy. How do these'processes come about and how do they work? In what 
sense exactly are we sure that we are not again facing the analogical picture of 
attribution of experience simpliciter? Moreover, we are left with problems such 
as the following. We understand that Husserl conceives of the relation between 
experience and its expression as being of a very intimate kind. Notions such as 
"intrinsic" and "essential" are repeatedly used to characterise the relation in 
question, but I am still not sure of what precisely Husserl has in mind. Another 
problem is related to the fact that it does not seem right to think that experiences 
have typical expressions, or that bodily behaviour is typical of definite 
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experiences. Were we not to take a very rcartoonesque' view of the matter, we 
would realise that experiences can be and are expressed in very different ways. 
And if that is the case, then the very process of associating experiences with 
bodily behaviour becomes quite mysterious. Another question that arises, and 
which is possibly directly related to the latter point, concerns the type of 
understanding of the other that Husserl's picture presents us with. It is not clear 
to me in what sense other people's experiences are "given" to me in 
apperception. How rich an understanding does it deliver, and how are we to start 
assessing what "richness" in that context might mean? Is it not the case that, 
although analogical apperception allows for the perception of others as living 
things, it does not deliver anything strong enough to count as perception of 
other people's specific experiences? 
Despite all these questions and problems, I believe that Husserl's theory 
is on the right track. We will not answer many of these questions here, in 
particular, that concerning the "richness" of the deliveries of the perception of 
others will be postponed until the fifth chapter. What I hope to exploit in what 
follows is how careful consideration of perceptual deliveries, especially the 
distinction between presentation of an object and appresentation of it, calls for a 
revision of the distinction between internal and external perception. This 
concern is also at the core of Scheler's theory of empathy. 
M. Scheler and the direct perception of other people's experiences 
Scheler holds possibly the most radical version of the claim that the perception 
of other people's mentality in general, and mental states in particular, is a direct 
affair. II The view is as fascinating as it is confusing, and many would say that it 
is confused. The foundation of this view lies in a thorough rejection of the 
Cartesian "old notion" concerning the relation between the mind and the body 
as an "interaction between two [self-contained] substances" (p. 253). Once it is 
understood that this picture is incoherent, says Scheler, but most importantly, 
when it is understood that it gets the phenomena completely wrong, the view 
that our relation to others is totally transparent becomes the only sound avenue 
to take. The phenomena that Cartesianism gets completely wrong are chiefly to 
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be found in the distinction drawn between two (allegedly) radically different 
ways in which a living creature can be presented to one. That is, either from the 
first person perspective (internal perception), or from the third person 
perspective, (outer perception). By contrast, Scheler tells us that, "... at bottom, 
... there is no very crucial difference between self-awareness and the perception 
of other minds"(p. 251). But the claim is, in fact, much stronger than this. The 
normal case, Scheler believes, "is an immediate flow of experiences, 
undifferentiated between mine and thine, which actually contains both our own 
and others' experiences intermingled and without distinction from one another" 
(p. 246). So, it is not only the case that 11we can think the thoughts of others as 
well as our own, and can feel their feelings as we do our own! "(p. 245), or that 
"everyone can apprehend the experience of his fellow-men just as directly (or 
indirectly) as he can his own"(p. 256), but experiences in general do not present 
themselves as being the experience of a some specific subject. For it is possible 
"for the same experiences to be given both as our own and as someone else's"; 
as well as for "an experience [to be] simply given, without presenting itself 
either as our own or as another's"(p. 246). In fact, this is systematically the case 
for the child, as child-psychology shows. The child is incapable of 
differentiating between her own experience and experiences of others; and it is 
only through an effort of objectification, that the child will start to "apprehend 
[her] own self against the background of an ever-vaguer all embracing 
consciousness in which our own existence, and the experience of everyone else 
as presented, in principle, as included together" (p. 250). 12 1 have not found in 
Scheler an explanation of how this process of 'objectification' and 'detachment' 
- that should finally lead to the ability to ascribe experiences to individual 
selves - works. Leaming, we are told, "is not animation, but a continual de- 
II Scheler (1913-16), [trans., 1954, all the quotations are from the latter]. 
12 Note how Scheler's description of the child's evolving conception of Mind contrasts with 
contemporary descriptions of the same phenomenon in the so-called theory of Mind debate, e. g. 
Wellman (1990), Perrier (199 1), Russell (1996). The latter debate portrays the child's 
development as a process of leaming to understand that her own point of view on the world is 
not the only one, and that other people's point of view might differ from hers. In contrast 
Scheler seems to view the child as having to learn that all experiences are held from a specific 
point of view, for they are not, initially, given as belonging to anyone in particular. Although I 
cannot argue for this here, it seems to me that Scheler's description is not incompatible with 
current data in developmental psychology. 
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animation" (p. 239), but how de-animation occurs remains quite a mystery. 
However, we will see at the end of this section what Scheler might have had in 
mind with respect to this process of objectification. 
But by now, we should have understood that, contrary to general 
wisdom which views learning to read minds "as a subsequent addition of mental 
elements to an already-given inanimate world of material objects!, Scheler 
argues that expression is "the very first thing that man apprelicrids of what lies 
outside him, and that he only goes on to apprehend sensory appearances of any 
kind, inasmuch and insofar as they can be construed as expressions of mind" (p. 
239). 'Expression', it should be quite clear by now, is not the causal end of an 
inner process or experience that can be distinguished from this inner process or 
experience. At an ontological level, expression is the mind. Every 
'expressive unity' at this level... remains a unity belonging to the whole of the 
living organism as an individual whole" (p. 262). And this fact, of course,, 
simplifies considerably the epistemology of the perception of other minds. This 
has the immediate consequence that the "perceptions of our fellow-men do not 
relate to their bodies (unless we happen to be engaged in a medical 
examination)", but "to integral wholes" (p. 261), unitary psychophysical 
entities. "To know of the existence of an individual self, it is quite unnecessary 
to be acquainted with its body"(p. 242). 
Scheler knows that this picture is unlikely to convince his detractors, if 
only because it flies in the face of a fundamental fact, namely, that the perceived 
body of someone else can 'say' one thing, when the experiences affecting this 
very body 'says' something else; she can smile but feels sorrow. The very 
motivation for the view that the perception of emotions must be an indirect 
affair, an act that brings you from bodily behaviour to inner experience - for 
there can always be a discrepancy between the two - is something Scheler has 
to address. And, in fact, he is not afraid of doing so and believes that the 
phenomena speak for him and not for - 
his detractors. First of all, he insists that 
anybody who would deny that we are "directly acquainted with another person's 
joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame in his 
blushing" (p. 260), etc., just deludes himself or others for the sake of salvaging 
his favourite theory. More interestingly, Scheler draws our attention to the fact 
that there are numerous cases when we do operate inferences and conclusions as 
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to the mental states of others, but he argues that these cases are the exceptions 
rather than the norm. "Thus, for example, the actions of a man with whom I 
have previously spoken, and whose feelings and intentions were, as I thought, 
plain to me, may yet compel me to the conclusion that either I have 
misunderstood him and deceived myself, or else that he has been lying or 
pretending to me. Here then, I actually draw conclusions about his states of 
mind" (p. 260). He goes on to give a whole series of cases where inference, 
reasoning and analogising occurs, and makes the convincing point that in all 
these cases "the material premises for these conclusions are based upon [the] 
elementary perceptions of the person concerned", and that "they therefore pre- 
suppose these immediate perceptions" (p. 260-61). 1 suppose that the point here 
is that it is thanks to the fact that I have already made up my mind as to what 
experiences affect the other that I can start using them to make calculations and 
inferences as to the soundness of my immediate perception of these experiences. 
Responding more directly to the point made by his detractors, Scheler insists 
that other people's states of mind are, in general, completely transparent to the 
normal observer, even and especially when they lie. "I perceive that he is only 
pretending to feel what he does not feel at all, that he is severing the familiar 
bond between his experience and its natural expression, and is substituting 
another expressive movement in place of the particular phenomenon implied by 
his experience". And later, he adds that one can literally see the deception in 
someone else, "I can be directly aware of his lying itself, of the very act of 
lying, so to speak" (p. 261). Sometimes, however, Scheler's observations seem 
to have the consequence that any discrepancy between one state of mind and the 
way it is expressed is close to impossible: "[W]hen the expression of an emotion 
is violently repressed, this invariably has the tendency to repress it 
simultaneously from internal perception as well. When joy or love are inhibited 
in their expression, they do not simply remain the same from the internal point 
of view, but tend to evaporate" (p. 25 1). 
If I understand Scheler correctly, then the very act of deception, or at 
least how it is normally conceived in the Cartesian framework, is not, in fact, 
possible. Of course, we can be misled by our perceptions of other psychological 
states, we might take something for something else, but this is true about 
anything we might perceive. And this is why we find ourselves ratiocinating, 
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comparing perceptions with others, looking for discrepancies between them, and 
drawing inferences accordingly. 
One might think that Scheler's view on the perception of other minds is 
entirely founded on an aberrant, or at best mysterious, picture of the mind/body 
question, and as such cannot be given any credit. It would, therefore, be quite 
helpful if we could say some more on the grounds for his conception of the 
individual as an 'integral-whole', and what is meant by this expression. As 
hinted earlier, at the heart of this notion we find that "its intuitive content is not 
immediately resolved in terms of external or internal perception7' (p. 261). The 
mistake of the Cartesian is to privilege internal perception in a way that is not at 
all justified, and goes far beyond "an inveterate tendency to under-estimate the 
difficulty of self-knowledge, just as they over-estimate the difficulty of knowing 
other people" (p. 25 1). Here the quarrel with this conception of internal 
perception is not about incorrigibility or infallibility - which are of course 
myths - but privacy. "The concept of the mental ... characteristic of what can 
only be given in one subjective act at a time, and therefore in effect, to one 
person at a time" (p. 256), "and cannot be identified throughout a multiplicity of 
subjective acts" (p. 257). The legend fabricated by the Cartesian is that the self 
has access to properties that he is the only one capable of accessing, and this 
always through the same channel, this mysterious internal perception, in isolated 
episodes of self-perception. Thus, in this picture, we are left with a series of 
properties that, contrary to those populating the world, cannot be apprehended 
by different subjective acts of different people, nor can they be apprehended by 
the same person through a multiplicity of subjective acts from different 
modalities. And, if it is then declared that this is the means by which we 
apprehend ourselves, we are left with a picture that renders impossible the 
perception of others. For now, we have a gap between internal and external 
perception which appears to be unbridgeable. In response to that, Scheler goes 
on to claim that "every act of possible internal perception is associated with a 
similar act of possible external perception; (2) the act of external perception 
does in fact have an internal sensory basis as well" (p. 249). Scheler's point is 
that internal perception does not distinguish itself from external perception by 
having a special object - the Self - which would be the unique object of its 
operation. For, "if I touch myself with my middle finger, the double sensation 
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still consists of one and the same sensory content at the surfaces of the two 
separate parts of the body" (p. 249). What is to be understood from that, I 
believe, is that the sensation I get from rubbing my fingers is one sensation 
only. A distinction can be made between internal and external perception here, 
by focusing on one 'pole' of the sensation rather than on the other 'pole'. For 
example, I can focus on the sensation as a feel of my middle finger - internal 
sensation - while the thumb is rubbing it, but I can -also focus on this same 
sensation as a feel of my thumb - external perception. Reflecting on the case of 
touch, I agree with Scheler that the distinction, as drawn by the Cartesian, does 
not seem tenable. But how much can it be generalized to other modalities and 
other kinds of perceptions? This is what we have to investigate and, 
unfortunately, Scheler is not generous with examples. From the fact that 
perceptions are always simultaneously inwardly and outwardly directed, he 
concludes immediately that both self and others can be apprehended in the same 
fashion -a fashion that he believes to be immediate - and that the same 
properties of the self can be apprehended at different times by the self. This is 
how I think we can interpret the following (rather obscure) passage. 
Thus internal perception represents a polarity among acts, such acts being capable of 
referring both to ourselves and to others. This polarity is intrinsically capable of 
embracing the inner life of others as well as my own, just as it embraces myself and 
my own experience in general, and not merely the immediate present. 13 
Unfortunately, it does not seem to me that there is such a direct route from 
the rejection of the Cartesian distinction, and its reinterpretation, to the view that 
that self and others are presented in the same way, i. e. directly. But let us try to 
reconstruct the argument, and see where exactly the obscurities lie. Every 
philosophical question about any object starts with the object as it is presented 
to the perceiving subject; I suppose that this is phenomenology. From the 
viewpoint of phenomenology, others are presented to the subject as living 
individuals, as entities through and through psychological. This fact flies in the 
face of an alleged intuition according to which, although the subject is presented 
to himself in a psychological mode, others are like inanimate objects, presented 
to the perceiving subject in the physical mode, and need, so to speak, to be 
13 Scheler (1913-16), [trans., 1954, p. 15 1 ]. 
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affected by a process of animation before they start to be living selves 
themselves. But this distinction, as careful consideration on perception in 
general shows and as the true sense of "internal" and "external" perception 
reveals, cannot be sustained. If that were not enough, it is sufficient to look at 
the consequences of the view under attack to convince oneself that it is 
misguided - for we end up with a theory that makes it impossible for anyone to 
have access to other people's psychological states. This is so unintuitive that the 
view that generated it should be regarded as particularly suspicious. What is 
recommended instead, is to take seriously how the phenomena appear to us 
when interacting with our fellow-beings. We have no difficulty in feeling their 
feelings and thinking their thoughts, and this is how it should be, provided that 
the contents of our perception, whatever their objects are, are always the 
products of a combined and unitary effort of all our senses - senses that cannot 
be viewed as either directed inwardly or outwardly, but simultaneously in both 
'directions'. And the truth is that, when careful attention is paid to these 
synthetic perceptual products of our senses, we realise that the world is first and 
foremost the realm of expression and, only subsequently, a mechanistic world of 
bodies to whom specific experiences can be ascribed. 
I find Scheler's view on the perception of the emotions particularly 
attractive, despite its radicalism and obscurities. It raises many worries, 
however. The first, very general worry, is that it is not easy to get a firm grip on 
notions such as 'psycho-physical wholes', 'flows of consciousness', or the 
'synthetic deliveries of the senses' when so little is given to clarify these terms. 
Secondly, and more specifically, we need to know more about the idea that 
every subjective act has two poles, in the sense that it is always both inwardly 
and outwardly directed. Thirdly, if this is the case, we need to know how direct 
the route is from this point to the thesis that others are psychologically 
transparent. Fourthly, I am not as confident as Scheler seems to be, with regard 
to the specificity of the psychological states we are capable of perceiving - 
perception understood on the Schelerian model - in other people. Some of the 
nuances in affect, that he claims we see in other people, might require 
information that cannot be contained in the purely perceptual circumstances 
considered. Does he really mean that I can distinguish the red of embarrassrnent 
from the red of shame purely perceptually? Fifthly, and this is much More 
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serious, we are left completely in the dark with regard to the manner in which 
we end up ascribing experiences to specific individuals, and how this process of 
'objectification' within the general flow of consciousness is supposed to occur. 
Sixthly, a related but nevertheless distinct point concerns the manner in which 
other people's experiences are pictured to be in Scheler's scenario. I find it at 
least questionable - as a question regarding the adequate description of the 
phenomenology of the problem under discussion - that experiences of others 
should be thought of as presented to the subject without a bearer. Is the opposite 
not the case? It does not matter how much I feel for you, it does not matter how 
close I might be emotionally to you, when I sense your fear, is it not the case 
that I sense your fear as yours and not mine? How will Scheler distinguish 
between emotional contagion and emotion perception? I am particularly 
sympathetic to the idea that the perception of other people's experiences is a 
case of normal perception construed on a naYvely straightforward model. We 
have to find a way, however, to accommodate the fact that in a typical case 
there is a contrast between me experiencing my pain, and me experiencing 
yours. 
Before going any further, I wish to put forward a distinction made by 
Scheler that is directly related to the two last worries mentioned above, and that 
I intentionally left out until now, because of their obscurity. When philosophers 
from the analytic tradition think about phenomenology or the phenomenological 
character of experience, they generally have the notion of quale in mind. This is 
not what phenomenologists of Scheler's bent have in mind when they talk of 
phenomenology. Scheler draws a distinction, which he believes is of the utmost 
importance, between phenomenology and sensation and, correspondingly, 
between internal intuition and inner sense. What Scheler calls internal intuition 
is the capacity associated with the phenomenological level; what he calls inner 
sense is the capacity allowing one to feel sensations. Confusion between these 
two levels is the mistake of the Cartesian. Inner sense allows access to "bodily 
states, especially their organic sensations, and the sensory feelings attached 
thereto". These, we are suddenly told by Scheler, account for "the special 
separateness among men", because, of course, they cannot be perceived directly. 
We all have our own sensations and those are "wholly confined to the body of 
the individual concerned". Internal intuition however, apprehends, not 
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sensations, but the mental. "An identical sorrow might be keenly felt, but never 
an identical sensation of pain, for here there are always two separate sensations" 
(p. 255). 1 am not sure of what Scheler has in mind. Does he mean that 
sensations are always so particular that they never have more than one instance, 
so that presumably one could not share it by having another token of the same 
sensation type? Does he mean that because emotions like sorrow can be 
instantiated in many different ways, they can be shared in the sense of having 
two different tokens of the same emotion type? This reading, however, Will not 
do, as Scheler talks specifically about perceiving properties of the mind, not 
simply sharing qualitatively identical properties of the mind. 
Refraining from any further speculation, I would like to suggest a 
particular reading of the distinction, which I will exploit further in this thesis 
when I propose my own account of the perception of other people's 
psychological states. Scheler says that, "the body and its changes merely 
condition the appearance or aspects that our experience presents to inner sense, 
but never the experience itself'(p. 254). 1 read this as meaning that there is a 
subtle but capital distinction that can be made between the content of the 
experience, the world as the experience reveals it to be, and the experience that 
reveals this world to us. In possibly more contemporary and acceptable 
terminology, I will speak about what is salient in experience, and the vehicle of 
this experience. The latter is rarely the object of experience, rather the world is. 
According to me, and contrary to Scheler, I believe that this distinction applies 
to all experiences, including sensations like pains or tickles. Now, reflecting on 
this distinction, we have the beginning of a way in which the mysterious 'de- 
animation' or objective attribution of experience can take place. If, I decide to, 
or I am taught to, make my sensations in themselves - as opposed to what they 
reveal to me of the world - the objects of my experiences (I make them salient), 
I cannot but see that they belong to a specific body, whether mine or someone 
else's. Certain conditions have to obtain before the experience of others can be 
presented to internal intuition, conditions that "certainly include the ontological 
condition that my body should be subject to effects whose causes are located in, 
or proceed from, the other's body" (p. 249). 'Reflection' on these conditions 
allows for de-animation and objective attribution of experience. I ask the reader 
to bear with me until the end of chapter II for a full unpacking of these ideas. 
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IV. Edith Stein and the perception offoreign experiences 
Edith Stein, a student of Husserl, devoted an entire essay to the question of 
empathy. 14 The first part of this essay consists of the description of the 
phenomenon, whereby she puts forward her own account and compares it with 
others, notably with Scheler's and Husserl's; in the second part she sets out to 
trace the origin of the capacity for empathy. We will be chiefly concerned here 
with the former part of her investigation. Stein's contribution to the topic, which 
is developed in a thoroughly Husserlian framework, is undoubtedly the most 
original of those we have chosen to present. Her analysis is particularly 
sensitive to the complexity of the problem, the richness of the means by which 
we get into contact with other subjectivities, and does not dismiss any of them 
without careful consideration. I believe she is the first one to understand that 
various accounts of empathy do not necessarily compete, or if they do, it is only 
insofar as they deserve the label 'empathy' best. But this is not to say that the 
unlucky candidates in the role of empathy have no role to play in our interaction 
with others. 
"Empathy is a kind of act of perceiving" (p. 11), says Stein. Here, 
perception should be understood broadly as a mental act having an intentional 
object, encompassing such things as acts of remembering, expecting, or 
imaginings. The latter three are sui generis types of mental acts insofar as they 
have different structures, and empathy should be viewed too as a sui generis 
type of mental act. It is the act of becoming aware of a foreign experience. 
Interestingly enough, Stein uses memory and imagination as models for the 
understanding of empathy, and though distinct from them, it remains very 
difficult to understand her conception of empathy in isolation from the analogy 
with imagination or memory. Why imagination and memory? Simply, because 
what she calls 'outer perception' will not do as a model for the awareness of 
other psychological states. "The pain is not a thing and is not given to me as a 
thing, even when I am aware of it 'in' the pain countenance" (p. 6). Only the 
pain countenance is given to me outwardly as an object of outer perception. 
Outer perception presents its objects in the 'there itself right now' mode, but 
14 Stein (1917) [trans., 1989, all quotations are from the latter]. 
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empathy does not. For, and in opposition to Scheler, though the other sides of an 
object of outer perception can always be, in principle, presented to me in the 
'there itself right now' mode, pain cannot. I can consider the changing aspects 
of the pained face as much, and as long, as I want from different angles, but the 
pain cannot, in principle, be given to me in this direct mode. Yet, says Stein, in 
spite of the fact that empathy is not outer perception, it still might be endowed 
with 'primordiality'. There is no need to be scared by the term here, as it 
translates quite well into a concept more familiar in the Fregean tradition, 
namely, the concept of acquaintance. 15 At this stage, I will ask the reader to go 
along with the argument using the intuitive grasp of the notion. It is sufficient to 
say now that, for Russell, a subject could not only be acquainted with objects in 
which he might be in direct perceptual contact, but also with mathematical 
objects (axioms, numbers, sets, etc. ), or even with types of empirical properties. 
We, therefore, have a relatively clear idea of what it means for some act to have 
the character of outer perception without the character of acquaintance, or mo re 
importantly for that matter, the reverse. In the case of empathy, we are 
interested in knowing whether, despite the fact that it does not have the 
character of outer perception, it might still have the character of primordiality or 
acquaintance. Again, Stein's answer is negative. We cannot be acquainted with 
other people's experiences, and this is why the model of memory, and even 
more the model of imagination, become so attractive. For, it is essential to 
emphasise, the fact that other people's experiences are not presented 
primordially to the subject should not deter us from wanting to account for the 
immediacy and sensuousness that seem so characteristic of empathy. The model 
of perceptual memory or imagination appears to promise just that. 
Stein makes a distinction between the primordiality of the subject of the 
experience and the primordiality of the content of this experience. " This 
distinction is present in the same way in the familiar notion of acquaintance. In 
experience, I might be acquainted with myself - indeed Russell thought that 
selves are such things that we can be acquainted with - although not with the 
15 See e. g. Russell (1912). 
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content of the experience this Self has. Now, memories and imaginations 
constitute an excellent ground for illustrating this distinction. When I recall a 
past perceptual experience, the content of this experience is not primordially 
given to me; neither is the self who had the perceptual experience, but my actual 
self that is doing the remembering is given to me primordially. But in memory, 
though the content is not presented primordially, the act of remembering "points 
back to the past primordiality. This past has the character of a fon-ner now" (p. 
8). An interesting and capital point Stein makes is that the self in these kinds of 
memories can be presented to the remembering subject in two different ways. 
My self can be presented to me having the perceptual experience in the past, so 
to speak, from a detached perspective, but I can, as it were, relive the perceptual 
experience of the past and merge myself in the past self. 17 In fact, as far as 
perceptual memories are concerned, these two modes of remembering typically 
occur in sequence (and will be found in imagination and empathy as well): "The 
same act of representation in which what is remembered emerges before me as a 
whole implies certain tendencies. When these unfold, they expose 'traits' in 
their temporal course, how the whole experience was once primordially given" 
(p. 8). And it is during this 'unfolding' that merging with one's past self occurs. 
But, Stein insists that whatever kind of memory it is, "the memory always 
remains a representation with a non-primordial subject which is in contrast with 
the subject doing the remembering" (p. 9). 
All this seems to be equally true about imagination except for one 
significant feature. The self that is doing the imagining is, as in episodes of 
remembering, primordially given. The imagined self, according to Stein, can 
either be in the content of the imagining as object - as when I meet myself in 
imagination - or I can, so to speak, merge myself into the imagined self. In 
16 This distinction between the self and its properties, or more accurately the availability of this 
distinction, will play an important role further ahead in our discussion. See Chap. 2, sec. 11.3, 
and Chap 4, sec. 111.3 below. 
17 Compare with what G. Currie (1995, p. 166) calls personal and impersonal imaging: "When I 
imagine merely that such and such happens, without imagining that I see (or have other kinds of 
epistemic contact with) what happens, we have a case of impersonal imagining. When 
imagining involves the idea that I am seeing the imagined events, we have a species ofpersonal 
imagining". Is Currie's distinction akin to Stein's? Wollheim's (1984, pp. 74 ff. ) distinction 
between centrally imagining and acentrally imagining with their sub-classes might be more 
useful! As we shall see in Chapter 5 when we address simulation proper, the number of 
distinctions available is numerous. 
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neither cases though, she insists, is the self given primordially, "they do not 
coincide, though there is a consciousness of sameness", "there is no positive 
identification" (p. 8). So far, memory and imagination seem completely parallel. 
The difference between imagination and memory is that in the former the act 
does not point towards a past primordiality. "The fantasised [imagined] 
experiences are in contrast with memory because they are not given as a 
representation of actual experiences but as a non-primordial form of present 
experiences" (p. 9). Except for this marked difference, imagination is akin to 
memory in the sense that its content can arise as a whole, and its tendencies can 
be fulfilled step by step. 
What about empathy then? Ignoring for an instant the differences 
between these types of perception, we should emphasise their similarity. In all 
three cases, memory, imagination and empathy, we are faced with a perceptual 
intentional act that has the characteristic of following a typical sequencing, 
although none of the steps in the sequence need to take place. First, we have the 
emergence of the experience when its object appears as a whole. Second, we 
have the fulfilment of the tendencies of the content of this experience. And 
third, we have the comprehensive objectification of the explained experience. 18 
Can we recognise empathy in this sequencing? Here is how Stein describes it: 
This content [of the act of empathy) is an experience which, again, can be had in 
different ways such as in memory, expectation, or in fantasy. When it arises before 
me all at once, it faces me as an object (such as the sadness I "read in another's 
face"). But when I enquire into its implied tendencies (try to bring another's mood to 
clear givenness to myself), the content having pulled me into it, is no longer really an 
object. I am now no longer turned to the content, but to the object of it, I am at the 
subject of the content in the original subject's place. And only after successfully 
executed clarification, does the content again face me as an object. 19 
Typically, then, there are two fundamental stages in empathy, which are 
best understood as a gradual modification of the other's actual and primordial 
experience. Similarly, memory is a modification of a past experience whereby I 
experience primordially a content given to me non-primordially, and the same is 
true of imagination which is a modification of a putative actual experience 
IS In Chap. 5, sec. 11.3, we will have the opportunity to examine, in the context of a discussion 
of Simulation theory, what these different stages may involve. 
19 Stein (1917), [trans., 1989, P. 101. 
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whereby I experience primordially a content which is given to me non- 
primordially. In empathy, we have a modification of an experience that is not 
ours, whereby I experience primordially a content that is given to me non- 
primordially. The three cases are parallel. So what is the difference? Again, we 
are told that, in empathy as in imagination or memory, we are typically faced 
with different stages where the experience is first given as a whole and then its 
tendencies fulfilled step-by-step. Here, again, it appears to be parallel to 
memory and imagination. The difference, however, lies in the way in which the 
self that is empathised with is given to the empathiser in these different stages. 
We remember that, in memory and imagination, the self - remembered or 
imagined - is generally first apprehended as an object when the experience is 
given as a whole, and then a process of 'fusion' between the two selves - the 
imagining self with the imagined self, and the remembering self with the 
remembered self, respectively - occurs when the tendencies of the content of 
the experience is fulfilled. Again the 'fusion' with the self - imagined or 
remembered - is only partial, it is never given primordially. So, again, what is 
the difference between this and empathy? Well, according to Stein, the 
difference lies in the fact that the empathised self in empathy is not, in any 
sense, the empathising self. "And this is what is fundamentally new in contrast 
with memory, expectation, or the fantasy of our own experiences. These two 
subjects are separate and not joined together, as previously, by a consciousness 
of sameness or a continuity of experience" (p. 11). The self of the other's 
experience is given as foreign in empathy, and this is what is the gist of her 
account, and what makes it so different from Scheler's account. The difference, 
however, should not be exaggerated. For, it is obvious that the experience of 
empathising itself has a role to play, insofar as it allows me to empathise with 
you, to utter a tautology. It is through my experience, which is given to me 
primordially, whereby I experience your experience non-primordially, that I 
succeed in empathising with you. About the latter point Stein says the 
following: "If I experience a feeling as that of another, I have it given twice: 
once primordially as my own and once non-primordially in empathy as 
originally foreign. And precisely this non-primordiality of empathised 
experience causes me to reject the general term "inner intuition" [she refers here 
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to Scheler's concept] for the comprehension of our own and foreign experience" 
(p. 34). 
One can see in Stein's account the seeds of many contemporary 
discussions of the attribution of emotions as it is formulated in the framework of 
what is known as simulation theory, and the role imagination has to play in 
these theories. My own view is that simulation, though it accounts for an 
important part of how we come to understand other people's emotional lives, 
does not fit well with the first stage of Stein's three-tier account of empathy. 
While simulation seems the right picture for 'the fulfilling of the tendencies 
present in the object of the empathised experience', it is not convincing as a 
means to perceive "the other person's experience as a whole". In this respect I 
find Scheler and Husserl much more congenial, and in the second chapter I shall 
give their picture a try. I do not mean these few remarks to constitute a reason 
for discarding simulation, or any trends of it; in the fifth chapter we shall have 
the opportunity to explore the consequences of my view on the direct perception 
of emotion in the framework of simulation theory, and how Stein's account 
might fit in it. As for now, we are going to leave Stein aside, and 
I ask the 
reader to bear with me and give direct perception a chance. 
V. The issues at stake and how to resolve them 
We have presented three ways in which we could understand the perception of 
other people's psychological states as a direct affair. A 
fundamental Purpose 
behind these three conceptions was to account for the fact that it seems as if 
other people's mental states are presented to the perceiving subject 
transparently. All of them, however, propose to satisfy this basic conviction 
differently. At this point, I think four main issues have emerged. First, there is 
the idea that if the distinction between inner and outer perception - as conceived 
bythe Cartesian - can be shown to be untenable, then the door to a more direct 
picture of how we perceive other people's mental states opens up. Both Scheler 
and Husserl make this point forcefully, but rather confusingly, by articulating a 
distinction between the sensory level of experience and the phenomenological 
level of experience, or, what I will call in the remainder of this thesis, the 
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vehicle level of experience and the saliency level of experience20. This is the 
second issue. Thirdly, we have the problem that when this door opens up, there 
is a risk of losing the difference between the experience of the subject that 
empathises and the experience of the subject that is empathised with. This is the 
main problem of Scheler's account; ultimately, his account does not allow for 
the distinction, as Stein rightfully emphasises. Fourthly, there is the question of 
the richness of the deliveries of these direct perceptions. Indeed, one might 
agree that there is something like seeing an emotion in someone else's face, but 
that this cannot count as an instance of ascribing an emotion and. in this sense, 
cannot be rich enough to count as ascription at all. 
In the next chapter, I will ignore the very important fourth problem in 
order to concentrate on the first three. It is very important to keep in mind that 
this fourth problem is going to be neglected. I will speak of'experience in 
general, focusing on the experience of sensations in oneself and in others, but 
ignoring the question of the conditions that have to be met for an experience of 
a sensation to count as a genuine ascription of a sensation. This question, 
particularly as it relates to the ascription of emotion, will be the object, of the 
rest of the entire thesis. 
In the meantime, I propose to investigate further the question as to 
whether there are, indeed, grounds to revise the distinction between inner and 
outer perception in the framework of contemporary work on this issue, and to 
ask whether this revision has the consequences Scheler and Husserl believe it 
has for the problem of our access to other people's experiences. My answer to 
this question will be positive. The next step will then consist of articulating my 
own view, while trying to avoid the traps into which Scheler and Husserl seem 
to have fallen, the first by blurring completely the distinction between the 
perception of one's own experience and the perception of someone else's 
experience, and the second by retreating to a version of the inference plus 
analogy model. I set myself two tasks. The first consists of articulating the idea 
20 As we have seen, Husserl distinguishes between perception and apperception, while Scheler 
distinguishes sensory experience and internal intuition. I intend my distinction between the 
vehicle level of experience and saliency level of experience to match, at least at this stage, these 
two distinctions. In the following chapters, I shall say much more about what this distinction 
covers. 
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that there are no sharp boundaries between inner and outer perception. Thý I 
second is to explore the consequences of this claim in relation to the problem 6f 
the perception of other people's psychological states. We start with the first one. k 
CHAPTER 2: THE TR ANSPARENCY OF OTHER PEOPLE'S 
EXPERIENCES 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I shall outline my account of the structure of our awareness of 
other people's experiences, focusing for now on their pains and other 
sensations. In the third and fourth chapter, I extend and elaborate on this outline 
to give an account of our awareness of other people's emotions. The objective is 
to avoid the pitfalls into which both Husserl's and Scheler's theories fall; that is, 
I shall try to account for both the transparency intuition and the ownership 
intuition, and not merely account for one of them at the expense of the other. 
This said, I shall follow Husserl's and Scheler's strategy in their attempt 
to show that talk of the 'inner' and the 'outer', insofar as experience is 
concerned, should be viewed as referring to two different dimensions of 
attention or reflection one can pay to experience, rather than referring to two 
different epistemological routes sanctioning verdicts with entirely different 
epistemological status. I shall argue for this in three stages. First, with the help 
of Gibson's notion of ecological perception and Bermudez's elaboration on it, I 
will argue that there are good prima facie reasons to think that outer perception 
or exteroception works, as a rule, in parallel and simultaneously with inner 
perception or proprioception, and vice and versa. Therefore, perception on the 
whole provides as much information about the inner features of a perceiver as it 
does about the outer features of this perceiver's environment. In this context, 
whilst we can still talk of the 'inner' and the 'outer', these are to be conceived 
of as aspects of an experience that becomes salient to a creature when she pays 
special attention to them. In the ordinary case, however, the inner and outer 
dimensions of these experiences, together with many others, are fully integrated 
in experience; this is to say that there are no 'inner' and 'outer' types of 
experiences that are, respectively, structurally different. 
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Second, and in line with what has just been said, I will argue that there is 
no reason to think that 'inner' experience - conceived simply as a perceiver's 
awareness of some feature of her body, rather than some special type of 
experience - should not be viewed as structurally strictly parallel to 'outer' 
perception - conceived as a perceiver's awareness of features of the 
environment outside her body rather than a special type of experience. 
Third I utilise this new understanding of the inner and the outer to account 
for the transparency intuition and the ownership intuition. The thought goes like 
this. The fact that inner and outer perception are structurally the same explains 
why there is no reason to think that they constitute two epistemological routes 
sanctioning verdicts that would differ in status within the theory of knowledge. 
This is an important point, and one which I shall exploit fully in the sixth and 
last chapter of this thesis, where I shall be concerned with issues relating to our 
knowledge of other people's experiences. This issue, however, will not be the 
focus in the present chapter. Here I shall be specifically concerned with the 
psychological aspects of my question. I shall develop the idea that experience is 
integrated and, in particular, I shall exploit the fact that the inner and the outer 
aspects of it are not commonly salient to creatures as 'inner' or 'outer' before 
they pay special attention to them or make them objects of self-reflection. This 
will enable me to account for both intuitions I set out to explain. In a nutshell, 
transparency on the one hand shall be explained by means of the phenomenon 
of integration. Ordinary experience of the mental is not presented to one as 
being owned by anyone, nor is it presented in a special "inner way", nor in a 
special "outer way", as being a mental episode experienced by a particular 
creature, for example, you or me. Ownership on the other hand will be 
explained by our capacity to focus on specific aspects of how the world is 
presented to us via experiences, and how special attention or reflection paid to 
our experiences might reveal to us which creature, in particular, goes through 
which experience. 
The transparency of other people's experiences 57 
11. Perceiving in and out 
IL 1. Proprioception and Exteroception 
When we think of inner perception, two models come to mind. If I turn my 
attention to the pain in my foot and consequently judge that my foot hurts, there 
is a clear sense in which I have perceived a property of my self. This is a typical 
example of what philosophers call introspection, which is one possible way of 
thinking about what inner perception consists of. But one could argue that the 
pain I feel in my foot is, in fact, already a perception in itself. By sensing my 
pain alone, I perceive my foot hurting; judging that I have the pain is a luxury I 
can dispense with. Somatic proprioception2l is the name psychologists and 
philosophers give to this latter means of becoming aware of properties of 
oneself, and constitutes a second model of inner perception. It is what Husserl 
has in mind when he talks about kinesthesia, and perhaps also what Russell is 
thinking of when he says that one can be acquainted with oneself. 22 Reflection 
on both introspection and proprioception can lead one to suspect that the 
boundaries between inner and outer perception might be fuzzier than previously 
thought. I suspect that introspection was what Wittgenstein had in mind when 
he launched his now famous attack on the alleged privilege of the first person 
perspective. 23 The upshot of these attacks is, indeed, a revision of the alleged 
21 Proprioception is 
' 
the operation of a heterogeneous group of internal systems providing 
information about the body (purely about the body or about the body in its relation to the 
environment). These systems provide information about pressure, temperature, and friction from 
receptors on the skin and beneath its surface: information about the relation of body segments 
from receptors in the joints, some sensitive to static position, some to movement; information 
about balance and posture from the vestibular system in the inner ear and the head/trunk 
dispositional system and information from pressure on any parts of the body that might be in 
contact with a gravity-resisting surface; information about bodily disposition and volume 
obtained from skin stretch; information about nutrition and other homeostatic states from 
receptors in the internal organs; information about muscular fatigue from receptors in the 
muscles; information about general fatigue from cerebral systems sensitive to blood 
composition; information about bodily disturbances derived nociceptors. Some of these systems 
operate completely below the threshold of conscious awareness, some yield information that is 
consciously registered. Of this second kind, some operate through the medium of sensations 
(mediate proprioception), such as pain, fatigue or hunger; some are only accompanied by 
sensations (if at all) (immediate proprioception). 
22 CE Russell (1912). 
23 See Introduction, sec. II, above. 
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distinction between inner and outer perception, but one that need not concern us 
here. 24 
It is by reflecting on proprioception that I aim to establish that inner and 
outer perception cannot be viewed as distinct modes of apprehending one's 
environment. As we have seen, Husserl's contribution to this debate, though 
rarely mentioned, was prescient. Nowadays, the name associated with this idea 
is that of J. J. Gibson. A psychologist of perception (and, indeed, a perceptive 
psychologist), Gibson has done more than anybody else to reframe the question 
of inner and outer perception and to put it high on the philosophical agenda. 25 
112. Gibson's ecological perception 
Ecological psychology concerns itself with the relation between organisms and 
their environment. In Gibson's approach to ecological psychology, and to the 
psychology of perception in particular, this relation is conceived of in a way that 
he describes in the following terms: "Oneself and one's body exist along with 
the environment, they are co-perceived". 26 The rather radical idea behind this 
statement is that ordinary perceptual systems of biological organisms operate in 
a way that grant simultaneous access to both information about the environment 
and information about the perceiving self. Far from being 'windows' to the 
external world only, the senses also provide an organism with awareness of 
properties of its self. The critical point of the idea is not that organisms can 
24 As we had the opportunity to see in the introduction, there are two important, but fairly 
independent, trends in the Fregean tradition which have put into question the distinction 
between first-person and third-person epistemic access to psychological properties. Here is how 
what I say will relate to these. Both traditions, on the one hand, Wittgenstein (1953) and the 
abundant literature his work has generated, and on the other hand, Strawson (1959, p. 99 ff), 
Evans (1982, pp. 103 ff), and the literature their work has generated, have on the basis of 
semantic considerations consistently attacked the distinction between first-person and third 
person access as conceived by the Cartesian. At the core of their argument - which rests 
crucially on an epistemic conception of meaning - we find that, because we have to insure that 
the meaning of psychological predicates is the same when applied to oneself as when applied to 
others, epistemic access to oneself and to others cannot possibly be conceived of on the 
Cartesian model, which conceives of them as radically different. As the reader will have realised 
by now, I believe that perception is a pre-verbal affair, and consequently that arguments starting 
with semantic considerations, be it 'word-use' or 'concept application', are a poor starting point for me. I will therefore be concerned with this family of arguments only tangentially when 
emphasising with Evans the minimal requirements for content. See Introduction, sec. 11, for 
more details, and Chap. 3, sec. 111, for more on minimal content. 
25 Gibson (e. g. 1966,1979 [1987]). 
26 Gibson (1979 [1987]). 
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choose, as it were, where to direct the attention of their senses - either inwardly 
or outwardly - but that the very act of sensing the outer world is also an act of 
sensing the inner world. The fundamental contribution of Gibson's theory of 
perception to our long-standing conception of how organisms are supposed to 
access features of both the world and of themselves via their senses can be put 
in the following way. We have to stop thinking of the world as being accessed 
via the five senses. We also have to stop thinking of the inner physical and 
psychological self as being accessed via some special inner sense called 
proprioception. Instead, we should think of proprioception as underscoring all 
exteroceptive perception such that the latter could not operate without the 
former. That proprioception informs organisms about states of themselves is 
now a well documented and a well accepted idea, which is not to say that 
proprioception cannot be distinguished from other modalities. All perception, of 
oneself or of one's environment, involves a mixture of proprioception and some 
other modality or modalities - or so, with the help of Gibson, I shall argue. 
How does proprioceptive perception provide information about the self? 
The variety of information about ourselves that we gain is totally dependent 
upon the way in which we gain information about the external world, the 
location of the objects in it and their movement. The perception of invariants, 
the fundamental perceptual capacity to which Gibson draws our attention, is 
possible only via a perceptual system that is capable of simultaneously gaining 
information about properties of the body and properties of the environment. 
(1) The most basic way in which exteroceptive perception provides 
information about the self is linked to the very shape of the perceiver. Every 
animal has a field of view which is bounded by its body, and the particular way 
in which this animal's body blocks out aspects of the environment is unique to 
that species of animal. According to Gibson, what hides the surrounding 
environment when you look upon the world is not emptiness but the self. 
(2) More fundamental to the matter is the way in which the systematic 
flow in the visual field, in virtue of its systematicity, specifies invariants about 
the self's posture and movement. Here is how Eilan summarises the point: 
[ ... ] when the perceiver moves, this is invariably accompanied by flow ill the optic 
array. Gibson's idea is that by and large, the world being as it is, there is a correlation 
between particular patterns of flow and particular properties of the perceiver's 
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movement, so the flow pattern, can sufficiently specify for the perceiver both that she 
is moving and various properties of her movement: its direction, speed and so forth. 27 
It is thanks to this mechanism that I do not have the impression that any given 
object moves when I turn my head or comes to me when I step forward in its 
direction. Simply by looking at the world, I am constantly informed about very 
important properties of my body, and this is undoubtedly information about 
myself. Related to invariance are the constancy phenomena on which Gibson 
also insists, and which are relevant for us because they give a clear sense of the 
distinction between what we have called the sensory level and the 
phenomenological level of experience, or in my phrases, between the vehicle 
level and the saliency level of experience. It not only our perception of size, but 
also our perceptions of shape, colour and form that remain constant, despite 
widespread variation at the vehicle level of experience. 
(3) But even more important for our purposes, as we shall see in the fourth 
chapter, is Gibson's notion of affordance. According to Gibson, normal 
perception of the environment provides a third kind of self-specifying 
information. This information relates to the self in the sense that features of the 
environment present themselves to the perceiving subject directly as 
possibilities of action and reaction. 28 4ffordances are properties of the 
environment that are relative to the particular observer. Objects, says Gibson, 
are represented to the particular perceiver as liftable, places as within reach or to 
the left, shapes as graspable, ditches as leapable and so 
forth. These self- 
specifying properties are, according to Gibson, given in the very structure of the 
given animal's perceptual system; they are not learned, nor 
inferred, nor 
projected, but directly perceived as higher-order invariants. 
In this picture, 
ordinary human perception is never neutral, but always charged with meanings 
or values at the most fundamental level. But, again, note that these are not 
associated or glued onto value-free perceptions. Gibson thinks that affordances 
are features of the environment. 
Since Gibson's first articulation of the notion of affordance, many 
experiments have been conducted for the purpose of illustrating the 
27 Eilan (1996, p. 346). 
29 Note the similarities with Husserl on the same issue, d Chap. 1, sec. II above. 
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phenomenon. 29 Though it is, of course, extremely difficult to exclude alternative 
explanations in terms of learning, inference or associations, rather than in terms 
of affordances, these experiments, because they were conducted on very young 
infants, appear to show that we are, indeed, equipped with innate mechanisms 
for directly perceiving features of the environment as immediately relevant for 
the young perceiver's action. As far as we are concerned, what is important at 
this stage of the argument is the idea that, at a very primitive level, ordinary 
perception provides information as much about the external world as it does 
about the perceiver himself. 
It is important, however, not to exaggerate the import of Gibson's 
contribution to my problem. The lessons from Gibson for my concerns are, I 
believe, the following. The salient in the sensory field of a perceiver is highly 
integrated in at least the three following senses. First, what is salient in the 
perceiver's sensory field is in sharp contrast with what would be salient were 
the perceiver focused on the vehicle of his experience. The wall looks uniformly 
white to her, is salient to her as white, although, were she to focus on the 
experience that reveals the wall to her as white, she would see nuances and 
shades of colours which were not at all salient to her in the first place. This 
contrast is not only true of colour perception, but also true of size perception, of 
shape perception, of movement perception, etc., as well. Second, what is salient 
in the perceiver's sensory field is integrated in the sense that a particular 
perception essentially contains possible perceptions involving different sensory 
modalities from the ones actually implicated in the given perception. The idea 
of affordance presupposes that I relate to the features of my sensory field as 
relevant to other possible ways in which I might sensorily be in contact with 
those features, by touching them, tasting them, etc, in order to act upon them. 
Third, what is salient in the perceiver's sensory field is integrated in the sense 
that sensory perception informs me about features of the world outside myself in 
relation to aspects of it that are relevant to the possible impact I can have on it. 
In this sense, it delivers information about my environment as well as about 
myself in this environment. 
29 Particularly convincing is the visual-cliff experiment conducted by E. Gibson & al (1969). 
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Now, the question is whether the idea that the verdicts of perception are 
integrated in this way can be used to unravel the more specific traditional 
philosophical problems associated with the perception of other people's 
psychological properties, in particular, sensations and emotions. Can it be that 
other people's experiences function a bit like affordances, in the sense that they 
present themselves to perceivers as features of the environment upon which they 
might act? And were this to be a real option, can it be that perceptions of other 
people's experiences as affordances constitute genuine cases of perceptions, 
such that they would satisfy both the transparency and the ownership intuition? I 
propose, in what follows, to push as far as possible this line of thought, although 
I will refrain from using the term 'affordance' outside its Gibsonian context. 
IIJ Is proprioception perception? Shoemaker vs. Bermýdez 
If Gibson's contribution to our question provides a good starting point for the 
articulation of the interaction between inner and outer perception, it hardly 
addresses, and certainly cannot resolve, the philosophical problems associated 
with this interaction. In particular, some have claimed that proprioception is not 
a form of perception at all. Shoemaker has put forward a very well developed 
argument to this effeCt, 30 an argument that might be thought to reinforce the 
Cartesian picture. It might be taken to reinforce the Cartesian picture because it 
trades on the claim that we have seen rejected so forcefully by Scheler, 
according to which the self in inner perception is 'given to only one person at a 
time', and that this is what makes it so peculiar. Ultimately, of course, it cannot 
be used to reinforce the broader Cartesian picture, for if inner sense is not at all 
a form of perception, then it cannot be put to the use a Cartesian would like it to 
be put to. Nevertheless, it fosters the idea that inner sense allows an access to 
oneself that cannot be had in any other way. If correct, Shoemaker's argument 
will cut short Scheler's and Husserl's projects, for it is based on the assumption 
that it is possible to make sense of inner sense as a form of perception which is 
30 Shoemaker (1994, Essay III). 
I ýMmmý 
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dependent and depends upon outer sense. Bermfidez has convincingly shown, 
however, that Shoemaker's argument does not succeed. 31 
What does Shoemaker's attack on inner sense consist of? The core of the 
objection is the complaint that self-awareness and, explicitly, proprioception, 
because it has only one object - the body - is not a form of perception at all. If it 
is the case, says Shoemaker, "that perception involves "object-awareness" and 
that object-awareness of a thing involves having to it a kind of relation such that 
[ ... ) it is possible for one to have this relation to any of a range of different 
objects, [ ... ] then it is clear that introspective awareness of the Self does not 
satisfy if ". 32 Does proprioception have a unique possible object of perception? 
And why, if that were the case, should proprioception be disqualified from 
being a case of perception? These questions have to be answered first, and, if 
answered negatively, we shall be in a position to assess whether Scheler and 
Husserl are warranted in utilising the phenomenon of proprioception to 
elucidate the perception of other people's experiences. 
An issue that has been blurred so far is the structure that a thought about 
oneself or about someone else has to have. We spoke about sensing one's own 
experiences or sensing others' experiences and a question this raises is whether 
or not there are thereby two things that we have to perceive: someone and a 
property of that someone. This seems very plausible, and in fact many have 
argued for this dual capacity as a minimal requirement not only for thoughts 
about other people's psychological properties, but for thought in general: 
We thus see the thought that a is F lying at the intersection of two series of thoughts: 
on the one hand, the series of thoughts that a is F, that b is F, that c is F, and, on 
the other hand, the series of thought that a is F, that a is G, that a is H. 33 
Here is not the place to discuss the import of this idea in general. 34 If the content 
of an attribution of an experience to someone has typically the form: OtherlSelf 
is in inner circumstances e, then two distinctive capacities will have to be 
31 Bennfidez (1998, Chap. 6). 
32 Shoemaker (1994, p. 210). 
33 Evans (1982, p. 104). 
34 Evans' Generality Constraint will be at the centre of considerations about content that I will 
develop in Chap. 3, sec. 111.2 below. 
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exercised, one associated with the reference-identification component of the 
attribution and the second associated with the property-identification component 
of the attribution. The latter capacity consists of recognising that some 
psychological property is instantiated in some object, whilst the former capacity 
consists of identifying a certain object to which some psychological property is 
going to be ascribed. The reference-identification capacity component, and the 
property-identification capacity component together allow for basic thinking. As 
we shall shortly see, this much is, in fact, not needed for thought in general, but 
one might think it compelling in the case of attributions of psychological 
properties to people. If I am to recognise that some object is going through 
changes over time, I must be capable of identifying that object independently of 
these changes. My capacity to track a flying bird, for example, depends on my 
capacity to identify the bird from one appearance to the next, independently of 
my recognition of it as instantiating the flying property. This is why ordinary 
perception allows for two basic types of mistakes. I can be right about the fact 
that something is flying, but wrong about the fact that it is a bird. Alternatively, 
I can be right about the fact that there is a particular bird in the sky, but wrong 
about the fact that it is flying. It might be a bird attached to a wire, or I might be 
flying and think (wrongly) of a stationary bird that it is flying. 
Now, it is not clear at all that anything of that kind 
happens in 
proprioception, or so it is in Shoemaker's case. At first blush, no such dual 
capacity seems to be at work in proprioception. The pain in my 
foot and the fact 
that it is my pain are not identifled separately. They come in a package, as it 
were. It is not the case that I first identify the object of the pain, namely myself, 
and then ascribe to it the property of hurting. For that very reason, it is not 
possible for me to misidentify the pain in my foot as the pain in someone else's 
foot. In philosopher's jargon, proprioception is immune to error through 
misidentification35 of the object to which a certain property is ascribed and, for 
that reason, Shoemaker continues, proprioception is not a form of perception at 
all. In contrast with intentional perception, in proprioception "the reality known 
35 The phrase is Shoemaker's; cf. his (1994) and Evans (19 82). 
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and the faculty of knowing it are, as it were, made for each other - neither could 
be what it is without the other". 36 
For genuine intentional perception to take place at all, the properties that 
are detected through it must, in principle, be ascribable to objects other than 
oneself This much is clear from Evans's passage quoted above. But in 
proprioception there is a unique object of attribution of properties. 
Proprioception thus violates the principle according to which perception should 
potentially have a multiplicity of intentional objects. This is enough to discount 
proprioception as a genuine form of perception. Is this attack justified? 
Bermfidez believes that the problem with this objection is that it 
represents falsely basic facts about perception. 37 It is doubtful that there is 
something like an inner sense working in isolation from the rest of the senses 
and of which the only object would be the body, as our earlier discussion of 
Gibson's conception of perception has clearly indicated. Recall, for example, 
Scheler's discussion of the operation of the sense of touch. 38 The touching of a 
physical object provides both exteroceptive and proprioceptive kinds of 
information, and the thought that only exteroceptive touch satisfies the 
multiplicity of objects principle just mentioned is simply false. If I am in the 
dark exploring a cube by means of touch, I perceive its cubic nature by focusing 
my attention on proprioceptive information. 39 The question, of course, is 
whether this argument can be extended to all modalities. Can't I feel a 'pure' 
pain for example? The answer, I believe, should be negative. Pains are felt in 
certain locations of the body, and the way they feel contrasts with the way the 
rest of the body feels. Speaking metaphorically, one can say that pains are 
salient in the foreground, with the rest of the somatic field functioning as the 
background. I could, for example, feel two pains of identical quality in each of 
my arms against the background of an otherwise undisturbed felt body. If this is 
correct, then proprioception does clearly satisfy the multiplicity of objects 
principle, and the objection fails. In the pain case, for example, there are various 
36 Shoemaker (1994, p. 245). 
37 BermAdez (1998, p-136-145). 
38 See Chap. 1, p. 42 above. 
39 For more on cross-modal perception, see e. g. Martin (1995). 
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locations in the body that I identify as hurting. 40 We have an identification 
component and a predicative component. And as we will see, I might be 
mistaken on both accounts. 
At this juncture, we have two important results. First, none of our 
perceptual systems work in isolation. The verdict of perception is always the 
integration of the outputs of all or most modalities, including proprioception. 
Again, this does not mean that we cannot distinguish between inner and outer 
perception. But the distinction is understood now as concerning the location of 
the property identified, outside or inside the body, not as two different epistemic 
routes providing different types of awareness of features of the world. Second, 
Evans' requirement, according to which all perception consists of at least the 
joint exercise of two capacities that can be applied to potentially a multiplicity 
of objects, is satisfied only when it is understood that the body does not have to 
be seen as one unique object, but a complex one in which different sensations 
can be felt at various locations. 
When this is understood, we appear to have at least the beginning of a 
clarification of what our phenomenolo gists might have meant by apperception 
and internal intuition, respectively, and what I called the integrative character 
of experience. That integration does in fact obtain is shown by numerous well- 
accepted experiments, clearly establishing that perception is almost always 
cross-modal, i. e. that it requires the contribution of a combination of modalities 
of which proprioception is an essential component. 41 
That proprioception is immune to error through misidentification, as 
opposed to ordinary perception, is also doubtful. The fact is that 
being subject to 
error through misidentification cannot be a fundamental 
feature of 
proprioception, as demonstrative-perceptual thought is clearly a 
form of 
perception and is also immune to this kind of error. I cannot be wrong about the 
referent of the 'that' in my perception 'That is blue' (though obviously it can 
fail to refer, which is a different matter). 
40 For a fascinating discussion of these issues, see Dokic (2000). 
41 See Appendix I for an illustration of a complex case of cross-modal perception in the 
phenomenon of young infants' imitative behaviour. 
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-I think enough has been said at this stage in favour of the idea that inner 
sense can be viewed as a genuine form of self-perception, given that 
proprioception does, in fact, always work in parallel with exteroceptive 
perception. Inner sense and outer sense always depend on each other; and 
Husserl and Scheler are to that extent vindicated. Of course, this fact once again 
tells us nothing about the question of whether these primitive forms of 
perception can support something 'rich' enough such that it would support the 
idea that they are genuinely perceptive of the self and its psychological 
properties. After all, we spoke here merely of bodily properties. This will be 
discussed in the fifth chapter, the entirety of which is devoted to a response to 
this worry. 
But one worry that can be dispelled right away is the following: one could 
argue that in proprioception, as opposed to genuine self-consciousness, the 
perception of the bodily propertiesjust happens to be about the self, whereas 
these bodily properties of the self, if we were facing a genuine case of 
perception, should be perceived as properties of one's body. This is a weird 
complaint, however, since it could be raised just as well with respect to 
introspection. Neither introspection, nor proprioception can support a sharp 
distinction between mere self-reference and genuine self-consciousness. This is 
obvious when one considers a real case of accidental self-perception. An 
example would be if one saw oneself in a mirror and failed to see that it was 
oneself. Of course, this cannot happen in proprioception, but nor can it happen 
in introspection. The perception in these two cases cannot be accidental. But no 
one would suggest that introspection is not a form of self-consciousness on this 
basis. 
What we have achieved so far, with the help of Bermfidez, is twofold. 
First, that proprioception is a forrn of perception. This is a question that did not 
really preoccupy our phenomenolo gists but seemed a possible objection to their 
line of argumentation. Second, that proprioception and exteroception cannot be 
viewed in isolation, as two different perceptual capacities, by contrast with what 
the Cartesian would want us to believe. Any perception is the delivery of the 
integration of all the senses working together. If this is correct, we have 
achieved our first task, viz. to have effectively shown that it is not the case that 
there are two different epistemic routes, first vs. third person, to features of the 
68 Chapter 2 
world. Let us now move on to engage in our second task, which is to explore the 
consequences of this outcome for our understanding of the perception of other 
people's experiences. 
III. Perceiving other people's experiences 
1111. Back to Scheler and Husserl 
Why would anyone think that the possibility of direct perception of other 
people's psychological states is opened up by the fact that perception is 
integrative in the various senses just mentioned? Why should the fact that there 
is no sharp distinction in experience between being presented to oneself and 
being presented to the world encourage the thought that perceiving 
psychological properties of oneself and psychological properties of others are on 
the same footing? Here are Scheler's thoughts on this issue. For him, the idea 
that the psychological is of a different nature to the physical arises logically 
from conceiving of epistemic access to oneself and epistemic access to the 
world as radically different. When this prior conception is shown to be 
untenable - as I hope it has been shown - then we no longer feel compelled to 
endorse a picture of the mind that involves two layers, one of which, the 
psychological, is hiding behind the other, the physical. Once it is understood 
that inner and outer sense are just different dimensions of the same process, then 
everything starts to militate in favour of the view that mind and body constitute 
a whole, of which, again different dimensions can be emphasised. Hence the 
claim that I can see your psychological states in the same way that I can see 
mine, 'directly' or 'indirectly', depending upon how we construe perception in 
the first place. 42 And, according to Scheler, the phenomenology of the 
perception of other people's experiences militates strongly in favour of the 
former, in the sense that there are generally no obstacles whatsoever to my 
being able to see your sadness or pain. 
42 Of course, strictly speaking, even if there were two epistemic routes to the self, that wouldn't 
show that mind and body are fundamentally different. We can get newspaper and television 
coverage of the same events. That is to say that there is no inconsistency in being both a 
materialist and an epistemic dualist. 
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Although I find all this very compelling, some do not, and not without 
reason. When you are sad and I am happy, and I happen to see your sadness, I 
do not need to be sad to experience your sadness. Experiencing your sadness is 
not, in general - although it can be -a case of experiencing sadness myself As 
both Husserl and Stein emphasise, direct perception of other people's 
experiences is the wrong model, for the result would be that one would find 
oneself no longer in a position to distinguish between the sadness of the other 
and the sadness of oneself. I have already explained why this result seems, 
according to them, a reductio of Scheler's view. 
I am not so sure that they are right to be confident about this, and as we 
have seen, Scheler is happy to bite the bullet. He believes that experiences do 
not present themselves as belonging, in principle, to anyone in particular. If this 
is the case, then doubt or wondering as to who is sad and who perceives the 
sadness is perhaps very natural. If you do find this suspicious, think of the 
following example. You go to visit a friend in hospital who is dying from 
cancer. You sit at her bed, and the atmosphere is very heavy. Who is sad and 
who feels pity? Who or what is going to determine thiS? 43 My opinion on the 
matter is that Scheler's picture is right on target if we consider such examples. 
Nonetheless, it is our duty to give Husserl's theory a chance. For him, 
experiences have bearers, or as I will say, they have owners, and are presented 
to the perceiving subject as such. The consequence is that other people's 
experiences, regardless of how close I can feel with them and for them, remain 
their experiences. To say much more than this about Husserl's theory is 
speculation, but in the next section we shall see that there are at least two ways 
to interpret him. 
I shall try now to articulate Husserl's and Scheler's theories more 
precisely. To recall the nature of the problem in somewhat crude terms, we are 
looking to articulate the idea that, in my perception of your experience, my 
experience of your experience is very much like your experience - the 
transparency intuition - except that it is my experience that I experience not 
yours - the ownership intuition. This is, somewhat inelegantly, our problem! 
43 1 owe this example to Morton (forthcoming, Exploration 11). 
70 Chapter 2 
111.2. The structure of Scheler's and Husserl's proposals 
One way of continuing to take seriously Scheler's idea - according to which 
there are no such things as radically separate, inward and outward respectively, 
epistemic routes to worldly items - is by showing that sensation and perception 
are structurally the same. This might be a way of explaining why there is no 
more difficulty in feeling one's own experiences than there is in feeling 
experiences of others, i. e. a way of explaining the transparency intuition. That 
this is at least a viable option, I hope, has been shown by our answer to 
Shoemaker's objection. On the current proposal, becoming aware of emotions, 
sensations, moods, etc., through one's body, say, is as much a case of 
intentional perception as becoming aware of objects, processes, events, etc., in 
the external world, because they all exhibit the same fundamental structure. 44 
In articulating more precisely Scheler's and Husserl's proposals, I shall 
focus on one type of experience: sensation; and attempt to show how we can 
reconcile the transparency intuition, together with the ownership intuition, with 
respect to sensation. Sensation is a good candidate for our analysis, for it is 
generally thought to be the kind of thing that is most difficult to see directly in 
others. In other respects, however, it is a bad candidate, for it seems that higher 
level cognitive states, such as emotion - which we might also want to believe 
can be perceived directly - involve much more than sensations. 
I suggest we put 
this worry aside for now. I will offer my conception of the transparency claim 
with respect to emotion, as well as a consideration of how the emotional case 
compares with that of sensations, in the next two chapters. 
To say that becoming aware of a sensation is structurally equivalent to 
becoming aware of an object in the external world, so that we have to think of 
sensation on the model of perception, is to say that awareness of sensation meets 
the conditions most central to perception. First, all perceptions are about 
something. Second, in all perceptions, attention allows focusing and assessment 
of specific aspects of that which is the intentional objects of them. Third, all 
perceptions are prone to (sometimes) misrepresenting their intentional objects; 
the content of the experience might either be a hallucination or an illusion. 
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These three conditions are generally thought to be central features of intentional 
perception of objects visually presented to subjects, and of course, the question 
is whether awareness of sensation really does have these features. 
There are good prima facie reasons for thinking that these conditions are 
met in the sensation case too. First, the intentionality condition appears to be 
met because, as we have seen, sensations are localised. Pains, itches or tickles 
are felt in particular regions of the felt body, and one can be said to perceive 
these regions as painful, itching or tickling. Second, the particular regions 
affected by this or that sensation can be focused upon and as it were 'scanned' 
for the purpose of evaluation, just as objects or scenes lying in the visual field 
can be 'scanned'. Third I can sometimes be mistaken about my sensations, 
confusing a feeling of pain in my leg for a feeling of pressure on it (illusion), or 
even feel a pain in my leg although this leg has been amputated (hallucination). 
The fundamental structure just uncovered focuses on sense experience as 
a means by which information about the world is gathered, how it works and 
how it can go wrong. The qualitative aspects of the sensation, in the exposition 
just offered, seems to have been left out, as an ingredient that does not belong to 
the fundamental structure of these mental episodes. Viewed from this 
perspective, it makes it a particularly anti-Cartesian conception of sensation. 
How this is going to help us reconcile our two intuitions is not 
straightforward. First, if my perception of my injury and my perception of yours 
exhibit the same structure in the sense outlined above, then perhaps we start to 
have an idea'as to why transparency is a feature of both my perception of my 
injury and my perception of your injury. For nothing in the latter case exhibits 
obstacles to be overcome which do not have to be overcome in the former: both 
are as direct or indirect, depending on what interpretation we want to give to the 
structure. Both allow for the gathering of information about a located injury in 
the same way, and both allow for the same'kind of mistakes. But notice that, 
unfortunately, this will not be enough to account for the transparency intuition. 
Not only do we want it to be the case that both acts are equally reliable (or 
unreliable) as a means of gathering information, but we also want it to be the 
44 For one possible articulation of the view that sensations have Intentionality, see Anscombe 
(1963). For a more recent version of the same thesis, see Tye (1995). 
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case that your injury is transparent to me in the sense that it is also given to me 
from your perspective, your special angle on it. And nothing in the story told so 
far promises to account for that! 
Second, if sensation and visual perception of an injury have the same 
fundamental structure, then how does one become aware that one is 
experiencing one's own injury rather than the injury of someone else? Nothing 
in the account so far makes room for the fact that identifying injuries in oneself 
and identifying injuries in others are quite different things - this is the problem 
of ownership, and the second intuition that we have to account for, in a way that 
is compatible with a plausible account of transparency. 
How then can we complement the story told so far so as to really account 
for transparency, whilst taking into account the intuition that experiencing one's 
own sensation is not the same as experiencing the sensation of someone else? 
Let us have a look at Scheler's and Husserl's unsatisfactory proposals again. 
Here is how Scheler, I suggest, would describe first-person experience in 
the context of the claim that sensation is structurally equivalent to perception. 
(1) Experience (a particular body part is F) 
This describes a particular experience enjoyed by a particular subject. 
In 
brackets, we have the content of what she experiences. This is possibly the most 
simple and naYve way to describe the experience of a sensation 
in oneself. 
Although reporting that one has butterflies in one's stomach or pain 
in one's 
shoulder will most probably take the form 'I have 
butterflies in my belly', or 'I 
have pain in my shoulder' the proposed description neglects the presence Of the 
first-person. As argued earlier, the thought has to be structured. I experience 
something being F; and the analysis 
insures that via the presence of the body 
part in the description. Now, as Hume 
is well known for having emphasised, it 
is not clear at all that the referent of 'my, in the report of this experience is 
presented to the subject in any clear-cut way. A more faithful description of the 
experience omits the reference to the first-person pronoun and uses an indexical 
instead. When I experience pain in my shoulder, from the inside, it is like 'that 
shoulder hurts', and not 'My shoulder hurts'. As far as this point of the proposal 
is concerned, it seems sound. 
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The problem with it, though, is that we may want to use the proposal 
exactly as it is, as a description of an experience, not of my own sensation in my 
shoulder, but of anything else in the world - or for that matter, your sensation in 
your shoulder. If transparency is the case, then on this indexical. proposal, 
experience might be the exact description of how it is to experience sensations 
in others. I imagine this is exactly what Scheler has in mind; or at any rate, this 
analysis would fit nicely into his own account. For us, however, it will not do, 
as we disagreed with him that, in the normal case, there is no difference between 
my experiences of my own sensations and experiences of other people's 
sensations. Description (1) therefore does not capture the difference between the 
first-person and the third-person. 
Scheler's account places the difference between first-person and third- 
person perspective purely at the level of reference. What makes your experience 
your experience is ultimately to be traced back to the fact that the pain is in your 
shoulder, not to whether someone in particular is aware of it. But, as we have 
just seen, there seems to be more to this that we need to account for. Perhaps an 
analysis in terms of sense would be more adequate. Here is an attempt to cash 
out the difference in terms of modes ofpresentation: 
(2) Experience (a particular body part is F [where F is presented under the 
mode M]) 
Here M is a mode of presentation of a property F. The idea is that the 
nervousness in my body is presented to me in a certain way, one that differs 
significantly from the mode of presentation M* under which your nervousness 
is presented to me. However we might want to develop this idea and 
characterise further the way in which two tokens of the same type F are 
presented to me under different modes of presentation, it is not clear that we did 
not just revert to the Cartesian picture. For, as is well known, one might not 
immediately recognise that one faces the tokens of the same type F under two 
different modes of presentation, unless it is also the case that one makes a 
judgement as to the identity between the two F's. In the case we are interested 
in, there is no possible discovery as to me being in the same state as YOU, as we 
have discovered, that Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus. For, by hypothesis, 
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it is transparent to me that you have the same experience as me, or the same 
experience that I had. 
Although difficult to ascertain, the suggestion under discussion might very 
well be what Husserl had in mind. Different modes of presentation are like 
different sides of the same object. 45 When the object is apperceived, then all the 
sides are implicitly present in my perception, although I am presented only with 
one of the sides. But Husserl felt that there was a link missing in his account of 
the perception of other people's experiences, and this is why he re-introduced 
terms like 'association' and 'analogy'. The subject has to know that different 
sides of the same object, i. e. different modes of presentation of a psychological 
property are, in fact, about this same property. A story has to be given as to how 
the subject 'associates' these different modes of presentation together. And this 
is exactly what Husserl does. He produces a story - the world is presented to the 
subject in a unified perceptual field - that downplays, or perhaps precludes, the 
possibility of a discovery that two si des presented to a subject are two sides of 
the same thing. The whole question is, how convincing is this story? 
The reason we might think that this attempt to explain the puzzle in terms 
of sense amounts to reverting to the Cartesian model is that it construes inner 
and outer modes of accessing one's experiences in two radically different ways, 
which is perhaps what Husserl ultimately did. Now, the pres . 
ent objection is 
valid against any proposal that makes* inner sense and outer sense altogether 
radically different, which is the traditional objection raised against the 
inference+analogy model. I do not think, however, that 
Husserl's situation is so 
critical, as his account might well be interpreted somewhat 
differently. Perhaps 
we should really think of inner perception simply as a variety of outer 
perception, as Scheler clearly does, and as Husserl might be thought to be doing, 
whilst trying to account for the difference between the two kinds of access, 
without recourse to maintaining that there is a difference at the level of 
reference or at the level of sense. 46 Let us explore this option. 
45 See Chap. 1, sec. II above. 
46 Mike Martin (1995) has made a proposal along just these lines. What we need to account for, 
according to him, is the special sense of ownership characteristic of the first-person, and absent in the third-person. His original contribution is to put down the difference between the two as a difference concerning the spatial structure of bodily experience as opposed to experience of 
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Iff. 3. Transparency and Ownership 
The way out of our dilemma, I believe, should proceed via the denial that 
ownership is explicitly represented to the perceiver at the saliency level, but that 
it is represented implicitly at the vehicle level. This is a strategy pursued slightly 
differently by Searle47 in his analysis of the causal aspects of perceptual acts, in 
still different terms by Woodruff-Smith48 in his discussion of acquaintance, and 
more directly on the topic that concerns us by DokiC. 49 Without referring any 
further to the way these authors develop the strategy, I wish to present the way I 
understand and intend to use it. In the presentation that follows I freely use the 
distinction between the implicit and the explicit, and only later expand on how I 
understand it. I first illustrate the strategy in an ordinary case of the perception 
of a distal object, and then show how we can exploit it for the perception of 
other people's experiences. 
Imagine an individual being aware of a car in front of her. That this car is 
the cause of this person's current perception of a car is part of the conditions of 
satisfaction of her perception, but that this is the case is not explicitly 
represented by her. She does not see the car as the cause of her perception. Note 
items outside one's body, and not at all as a difference in the property F which is perceived. The 
idea is that in bodily experiences the boundaries of the perceived object (the body) are co- 
extensive with the somato-sensory field. There are no bodily experiences to be felt outside the 
boundaries of the felt body, in contrast with visual perception. The boundaries of a seen object 
always fall within the limits of the visual field. There are always points to be seen outside the 
boundaries of the object. 
At least two worries come to mind. First, it is rare to have experiences of our body in which our 
entire somato-sensory field is filled. Quite the contrary, most sensations present themselves as 
salient against a background of undifferentiated sensations. In that respect, it seems to me that 
the contrast with visual perception is not quite so significant. But a more important worry is 
Martin's lack of concern for the idea that the subject's environment is presented to him as 
integrated in the senses I alluded to, i. e. one of which is the idea laboured in this chapter 
according to which objects and their location are presented to the subject in a way that depends 
on the operations of different modalities, including proprioception. When this point is made, the 
relevant contrast between co-extensivity of felt body and somato-sensory field in the one hand 
and inclusivity of felt object within the perceptual field in the other cease to exist. And it could 
be argued that in cases where the entirety of my somato-sensory field is involved in my 
experiencing my body, that I do experience it against the background of my entire perceptual 
field. If this is so, perhaps we do have the relevant contrast in visual perception as well. After 
all, I cannot see objects that are behind my head (though I might hear them), in the same way 
that I cannot feel my body outside it. 
47 Searle (1983, esp. Chap. 2). 
48 Woodruff-Smith (1989, esp. the last chapter, and its footnote 18). 
49 Dokic (forthcoming). 
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two interesting consequences of the claim. First, the perceiver can be said to 
perceive the car only if it is, in fact, the car that she sees that causes her 
perception. Second, although the latter fact is not explicitly presented to her, she 
can reflect on it, and come to know that the specific experience she has is an 
experience of that car only if the car is present where she sees it, and caused her 
experience. The second and related aspect concerns the dependence of the 
changes in the scene experienced and the changes in the experience that reveals 
these changes. We have here a counterfactual dependence between the two 
members of the perceptual relation. Were it not the case that these changes are 
taking place out there, it would not be the case that the experience that reveals 
these changes to the perceiver changes the way it does. Experience thus tracks5O 
changes in the environment, and does it more or less well. Abnormal conditions, 
posture and positioning of the perceiver, the condition of the perceiver's 
perceptual system, and its current state poses limits on how accurate this 
tracking might be. That experience tracks, so to speak, changes in the 
environment is also a condition of satisfaction of someone's perception, 
although, of course, the fact in question is not explicitly represented by the 
perceiver. But again, it could be made explicit by her, were she (for purposes of 
judgement, assessment, comparison, etc. ) to focus on the co-variation of her 
experience of the scene perceived and the world as the experience reveals the 
scene to be. In the next section, I will suggest that this experience to which I 
sometimes pay special attention is the level of vehicle whereas what 
it reveals of 
the world is the saliency level. 
But for now, how would this strategy help to explain ownership of 
experience? Let us swap the car for a pain. First, someone experiences pain if 
and only if there is a pain to cause the experience that reveals it to the perceiver. 
What the perceiver sees is a localised pain, and she does not represent to herself 
the fact that she is perceiving that pain unless it is it that causes her experience. 
Second, the experience that reveals this pain to the perceiver tracks the changes 
in it, its intensity, perhaps its movements along her arm, etc. And again, she 
does not perceive this tracking relation as a tracking relation. However, if she 
50 On the matter of 'tracking', see Evans (1982, esp. p. 146, pp. 174-75, and pp. 192-96). Evans 
speaks of informational states with content, rather than experiences, tracking changes in the 
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were asked to do so, by a doctor for example, then she could put it to the front 
of her mind, as it were, and engage in the difficult task of thinking and talking 
about it. 
Up to this stage in the exposition, the case is strictly parallel to that of the 
perception of the car; we have to explain now how ownership enters into the 
picture. 
First, note a very peculiar aspect about pains felt in one's own body. Their 
instantiation is essentially dependent on the experience that reveals them; one 
cannot have a pain in one's own body without an experience to reveal it. 51 This 
contrasts of course with pains perceived in other people's bodies whose 
instantiations do not depend on the experiences that reveal them. Hopefully, if I 
close my eyes and run away, I do not see your pain anymore, despite the fact 
that if you genuinely had one then it should still be there. This, I-contend, is a 
very important element of ownership. Although I do not explicitly see the 
essential dependence between my pain and the experience that reveals it, and 
although I do not see explicitly the contingence of my experience of your pain 
and its instantiation, I can pause, reflect on it and come to appreciate who the 
owner of the pain is. 
Second, if it is true that experiences of pains track changes in the pain, 
then special attention to this tracking relation might also bring to light whose 
pain the pain I experience is. At least two dimensions of what the 'special 
attention paid to the tracking relation' consists of are worth mentioning. The 
first concerns the tracking of the location of the sensation. A finger pain or a 
tooth pain is presumably located in a finger or in a tooth, but which finger it is 
or which tooth it is, is not always obvious. Until careful attention is given to the 
question, it is often impossible to answer, and even then I might not be able to 
tell. But I would go even further and say - and probably Scheler would follow 
me on this point - that I might not be aware of whose finger or whose tooth the 
pain is located in until I reflect upon it. But once it is clear to me that the pain is 
environment. 
I This is, according to Dokic (forthcoming) the special 'Ontological fact' about bodily 
experience -a fact that is only implicitly represented by the subject - which single-handedly 
explains ownership. I have no fundamental objection to the idea, but I believe he has to say 
much more about the manner in which the implicit fundamental ontological fact interacts with, 
without determining, the phenomenological level. 
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located in your finger, I can certainly use this to decide questions of ownership, 
perhaps in combination with knowledge I have of the importance of the body in 
questions of ownership. The second dimension concerns the tracking of the 
intensity of the pain or even, perhaps, its qualitative aspect. It is no secret that 
experiences of pains located in one's own body usually have an intensity, and 
also perhaps a quality, which differs from those experienced in other bodies. 
Those aspects can also be used to decide questions of ownership, although it 
takes training, attention to one's sensations, and sometimes reflection, to 
become competent in determining the right verdict. 
The proposal is thus the following. To experience a sensation is to 
perceive a property F. At the explicit level, this is (most oo what there is to the 
perception of a sensation, and this satisfies partly the transparency condition. 
Special attention placed upon the experience that reveals this F to me brings to 
the fore elements which were implicit in my perception, such as its localisation, 
its intensity and special quality, and the contingency or non-contingency of its 
instantiation in a specific case. Focusing on these different dimensions of my 
perception will help me decide questions of ownership. 
Iff. 4. Vehicle vs. saliency 
Exploitation of the distinction between the implicit and the explicit is vacuous 
until explained. The question is how talk of 'special attention on the explicit 
experience that reveals the implicit dimensions of the perception' should be 
understood. This schema, as it is, seems too rigid to account for the 
'smoothness' of how, in practice, perception works. Appealing to Scheler's and 
Husserl's distinction between the sensory level of experience and the 
phenomenological level of experience, as I have started to do, is a first step in 
the right direction as far as understanding how the 'smoothness' in question 
should be conceived. Understanding their distinction is also a step towards a 
more charitable interpretation of their respective accounts in the light of our 
present discussion. According to Scheler, confusion between these two levels is 
the mistake of the Cartesian. Sensory experience allows access to "bodily states, 
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especially their organic sensations, and the sensory feelings attached theretoll. 52 
These, we are told, account for "the special separateness among men", because, 
of course, they cannot be perceived directly in others. We all have our own 
sensations and those are "wholly confined to the body of the individual 
concerned". Internal intuition, however, apprehends not sensations but the 
mental. "An identical sorrow might be keenly felt, but never an identical 
sensation of pain, for here there are always two separate sensations" (P. 255). 
Certain conditions have to obtain before the experience of others can be 
presented to internal intuition, conditions that "certainly include the ontological 
condition that my body should be subject to effects whose causes are located in, 
or proceed from, the other's body" (p. 249). 'Special attention' paid to these 
conditions allows for the previously mysterious way in which de-animation and 
objective attribution of experience works. Although somewhat confusing, these 
few remarks by Scheler might be interpreted in the light of the proposal made in 
this chapter. This is equally true of Husserl's insistence that the world is 
ordinarily apperceived, i. e. the objects of our experience, although apprehended 
only from one side at a time at the sensory level, are given as wholes at the 
phenomenological level. In my terminology, this is to say that in ordinary cases 
of perception of other people's experiences, the fact that this experience belongs 
to someone else is not salient, unless or until special attention to the vehicle of 
my perception reveals it to me. 
How precisely the interaction between these two levels works is a 
complicated question that is essentially empirical. However, it is certainly 
possible to make a few general remarks. Experience in general, we said, tracks 
what and where changes occur in the environment. Most of this information is 
not provided by focusing on the sensations our body goes through - the vehicle 
of the experience - but just by being aware of how the world is presented to us 
via sensations, the saliency level of experience. Sometimes, however, because 
information we are gathering in this way clashes with what we already know, or 
because we are interested in some aspect or other of the way our perceptual 
systems tracks changes in the world, we focus on the experiences that reveal 
these changes to us. What is important to understand, however, is that this 
52 Scheler (1913-16 [trans., 1954, p. 255]). 
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interest or care in our tracking devices is not an unhealthy philosopher's 
preoccupation with epistemological questions, but an integral part of a child's 
growing up and learning about how and when her perceptual systems are 
reliable information gatherers. The idea here is that the very fact that we keep an 
eye on the ways the sensory vehicles track and are trained to read into specific 
aspects of this tracking is likely to alter what will become salient for us in the 
environment. The infant used to see the ball vanishing when it disappeared 
behind the wall, whereas now the ball appears to her as being behind the wall. 
The infant used to feel experiences without owners, now those experiences 
appear to her as belonging to people. Having said that, it should be made clear 
first, that what training can achieve insofar as our perceptual systems are 
concerned is very little, or, in other words, severely constrained by what those 
perceptual systems are and how they work. Most changes during the child's 
development of the phenomenological level of experience will be explained by 
normal maturation of the brain, rather than training. But the upshot is, 
nevertheless, one in which some discriminatory capacities - being sensitive to 
many different shades of whiteness of the snow, for example - can become 
second nature by training. When the training is 'over' and the discriminatory 
capacities are in place, the need for concentrating on the vehicle rather than 
what it makes salient will, in part, disappear. Second, it has to be emphasised 
that learning to make efficient use of our perceptual system is not a case of 
adjusting or correcting what the focus on our sensory vehicles would tell us of 
the world. For example, no attention paid to my sensations will tell me when my 
head, as opposed to a car, moves when a car is going from right to left in my 
visual field. 
I do not. claim that these scattered comments provide more than the 
beginning of an explanation of the nature of the interaction between experience 
(vehicle) and the way experience reveals the world as being (the salient). What 
it does, however, is indicate a route for understanding what is meant by the 
distinction between the implicit and the explicit in perception, as well as 
showing that any explanation of the interaction in question will be rather 
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complex, involving quite a bit of empirical testing, some of which, of course, 
has already been done. 53 
IV. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have suggested a way of understanding creatures' perception of 
other creature's experiences, like pains, which satisfy, I claim, two intuitions 
that we have about such perceptions in the ordinary case. First, that they are 
transparent in the sense that it is not more difficult to be aware of them in others 
than it is to be aware of them in oneself, and second, that they must be perceived 
as owned by someone other than oneself if such perceptions are to count as 
perceptions. In the previous chapter, we considered two proposals, one by 
Scheler and one by Husserl, both of which failed to satisfy both intuitions at the 
same time. In the present chapter, we have seen that both proposals seem to 
satisfy one intuition at the expense of the other. We have also seen however, 
that this reading of both proposals was forced on us only if we did not take into 
account the significant distinction that they both make between what I called the 
vehicle level of experience and what is salient in experience. At the latter level, 
I have argued, with the help of Gibson and BermMez, that perception is fully 
integrated, one aspect of integration being, as far as the perception of other 
people's experiences is concerned, that experiences do not present themselves to 
creatures going through them as being more first personal than third personal. 
What is salient when one has pain is simply located pain, not my located pain, 
not your located pain, and not her located pain, etc. This is why we have 
53 It is difficult not to interpret the following piece of recent empirical research - also mentioned by Dokic (forthcoming) and Hutto (forthcoming, 2001) - as having no bearing on, or even as 
providing evidence for, the view on the transparency advocated for here. Hutchison et al. (1999) 
have recently discovered cortical neurons that respond to painful stimuli in humans. One of 
these neurons is activated by pinpricks applied to the subject's hand, and also responds to 
pinpricks being applied to someone else's hand. These neurons can be compared to the so-called 
6mirror neurons' for action discovered by Rizzolatti at al. (1996) in macaque monkeys. The 
latter has provided evidence that observing someone else's action and performing the same 
action are underpinned by the same sub-personal mechanisms. These neurons, which are 
situated in the pre-motor cortex of the monkey, fire equally when the monkey actually performs 
an action, as when he merely watches another monkey performing the same action. Similar 
neurons are also thought to exist in human beings. It is, of course, a delicate question whether 
and in what ways these mechanisms ground the transparency of bodily experience at the 
phenomenological level, but it is impossible not to see a parallel between these findings and the 
view that a subject's perception of other people's experiences is integrative in the sense 
advocated here. 
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transparency, i. e. this is why there is no more difficulty involved in being aware 
of one's own pain than there is in being aware of someone else's pain. This 
same perception of pain, however, might -and more often than not will - reveal 
the owner of the pain when focusing, paying special attention to, or reflecting 
on what reveals the pain, the vehicle of the experience. Paying attention to or 
reflecting on its localisation, its intensity and special quality, and the 
contingency or non-contingency of its instantiation in a specific case will reveal 
who owns it. It is thus at the vehicle level that the ownership intuition is met. 
In the next two chapters, I explore the possibility of extending this line of 
thought concerning pains, as I pursued it in the present chapter, to the case of 
emotions. Might other people's emotions, as in the case of pains, be 
transparent? The application of the argument pursued in the present chapter is 
far from straightforward, given that emotions, as opposed to sensations, have 
objects that go far beyond bodily properties. 
CHAPTER 3: EMOT ION AND CONTENT 
1. Introduction 
It is now widely acknowledged that emotions have contents. I argue that t is is 
only true given a correct understanding of the notion of content. This chapter 
has, thus, a negative and a positive part. First, I attempt to show that the kind of 
content philosophers generally believe emotions have is ill suited to account for 
the nature of our basic emotions. Second, I develop a notion of content which I 
believe accords with our basic emotions. 54 
In more detail, here is how it should go. First, I shall argue that since any 
theory of the emotions has to account for the fact that animals and young infants 
experience emotions, a sound account of them should not construe emotions as 
requiring cognitive capacities, i. e. types of contents that the latter creatures are 
not likely to be able to acquire or manifest. In particular, I argue that most 
contemporary cognitive theories of the emotions fail because the kind of content 
they believe emotions to have, is too sophisticated for animals and infants to 
have. Rather than wholly discarding these cognitive theories of the emotions, 
however, I argue that their relevance and application concerns only one part of 
that which we think of as belonging to the emotions. This part, I believe, is that 
aspect of emotional life that is exclusively human. Those exclusively human 
54 There are interesting inventories in the biological literature on emotions of the basic or 
primitive ones. For example, Maclean, (1975), has isolated six fundamental emotions, "desire", 
"anger", "fear", "sorrow", "joy" and "affection7, which are, according to him, related to six 
fundamental behavioural activities: searching, aggression, protection, dejection, gratulant, and 
caressive (p. 13). Panskeep's (1982), four criteria (p. 411) for emotions generate only four basic 
ones: "expectancy", "rage", "fear" and "panic"(p. 414). Although often illuminating, the number 
of different lists of our primitive emotions suggest that they are more revealing of the aspects of 
the emotions the author is interested when selecting his criteria, than of any natural kinds of 
emotions that the scientist is supposed to discover. I use the term basic emotion as an intuitive 
umbrella term for all those emotional phenomena that I will cash out later in this chapter under 
the label emotional valuation. Which emotions fall under this category is very much dependent 
on how specific emotions are conceived. My own opinion is that conceptual analysis of the 
emotions generally reveals that they do not form unified types, and decisions as to whether an 
emotion is basic or not will always have to be decided in context. 
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emotions, I contrast with basic emotions, which are such that human adults as 
well as human infants and animals are capable of having. In a second stage, I 
argue that this dichotomy is encouraged by considering the phenomenon of 
irrational emotions. In a third stage, I give my own cognitive account of those 
basic emotions that are not covered by classical cognitive accounts of them. 
This chapter is first and foremost concerned with the notion of content, and only 
secondly concerned with the emotions, the nature of which I explore more fully 
in the next chapter. 
II. Layers of content: basic emotion as perception 
Let us say that (1) animals and young children have emotions. Let us say too 
that (2) to have emotions, a creature has to have at least some beliefs. Now, if 
we add that (3) to have a belief a creature needs to master the concept of truth, 
then we face a problem. For, if, as is likely, (4) animals and young children do 
not master the concept of truth, then one of these claims has to go. 
Most of us would wish to resist the third claim, or so the literature 
suggests. I shall not. I proceed in the following way. First, I expose the rationale 
for each of these four claims, I assess their plausibility, and then discuss the 
issue as to which of them should be given up, if any. Rather than rejecting (3), 
which is what most philosophers do, I argue that they may all be correct, 
including (3), but that (3) depends on an interpretation of (2) which is not 
compulsory. That is, I will defend the idea that there are at least two concepts of 
beliefs, one of which does not entail the mastery of the concept of truth. The 
latter concept of belief is fit to figure in an account of our basic emotions, or so I 
shall argue. 
1. Angry animals and happy children: assessing claim (1) 
It is difficult to defend the idea that animals and young children have 
emotions, 55 for it is far from clear that the concept of emotion is not, in fact, a 
theoretical term such that the alleged claim we set ourselves to defend is, in fact, 
derivative from our preferred theory of the emotions. This worry is misplaced, 
55 Unless otherwise stated, I use the term 'emotion' to mean 'occurrent emotion'. 
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however. Whatever our preferred theory of the emotion is, everyone has to 
accept that, central to the idea of a creature having emotions as well as pivotal in 
our practice of ascribing them, we find the following two elements: first, it feels 
a certain way to experience an emotion, and second, emotions are, in general, 
about something, i. e. they are intentional states. 56 English syntax exhibits this 
latter feature in attribution of emotions by means of the following devices. The 
verb that denotes the emotion is either followed by the relative pronoun "that" 
in turn followed by an embedded proposition, or the verb is simply followed by 
an "of', "towards", "about", etc., in turn followed by a noun phrase. Thus, Ali is 
afraid that the dog will bite her, or Ali is afraid of the dog. In both cases, Ali's 
fear is about something. 57 Now, whereas it is not clear that we want to report 
emotions of animals and young infants by means of ascriptions of propositional 
attitudes, especially when the embedded proposition presupposes a complex 
conceptual repertoire - we might hesitate to say, for example, that the dog is 
afraid that its master will not come until next week - we definitely want to 
report their emotions by means of emotional verbs followed by a preposition 
and noun phrase. Dogs can be afraid of the thunder, aggressive towards a 
stranger, excited about their food, etc. 58 
As far as I can see, there are only two reasons we might bring forward to 
deny the fact that animals and young infants have emotions. First, we might 
56 Of course, neither of these two conditions is either necessary or sufficient for emotion, 
whether taken in isolation or taken together. This does not bother me as I have no intention of 
offering any such characterisation, and I do not believe this to be possible. The argument to 
follow is, thus, clearly non-deductive. To say that it consists of an 'inference to the best 
explanation' is perhaps the best way to characterise it. 
57 Cf. e. g. Gordon (1974), on the topic of the 'aboutness' of the emotions. 
58 Searle (1983, Chap. 2) and others once believed they had an argument in favour of the claim 
that animals are not endowed with intentional contentfal states just because these latter types of 
reports, as opposed to reports followed by an embedded proposition, form extensional contexts. 
The idea was that, (1) given that the mark of Intentionality is intensionality, (2) given that we 
are disinclined to report animal mental activities using sentences with embedded propositions, 
then animals could not be credited with mental states having Intentionality. The problem with 
this argument is twofold. First, though we are disinclined to report animal mental states using 
'that-clauses" for complex propositions, we might wish to do so with simple ones - "the dog believes that there is a mouse in the cupboard". Secondly, intensionality might not be the only 
mark of Intentionality. Do we really want to deny that the dog's fear is about something that he 
apprehends in a certain way, or under a certain mode of presentation, perceptual perhaps? The 
fact that the way in which we report his fear allow for substitution might only reflect something 
about our linguistic practice, not something about the Intentional character of the mental state 
ascribed. More on this in section III of the present chapter. 
86 Chapter 3 
define emotions in a way such that logically the creatures in question Will not be 
capable of having them. If, for example, it is believed, for whatever reason, that 
only a creature capable of introspection or self-reflexivity is dignified enough to 
have emotions, then, of course, animals and young infants will not have them. 
This is always a possible worry someone might have about my claim, and I 
suppose the worry in question can only be assessed against the merits of the 
account of the emotions that prompted it in the first place. The objector might 
have a lot to lose by giving up his favourite account of the emotions which 
excludes some creatures from having them, but I will ask him to follow me, to 
assess the merits of my account, and to become fully acquainted with it before 
he makes his choice. More seriously, one might object that if a stimulus- 
response model of animal or young infant emotional responses is available, then 
there is absolutely no reason why we should view their emotions as being 
'about' anything. The complaint here is that if the emotional behaviour of the 
creatures in question can be explained in non-intentional terms, then a simple 
principle of theoretical economy should prompt us to refrain from positing 
entities, i. e. contents, which are notoriously difficult to handle. This, I believe, is 
a legitimate worry. The main premise, however, is false, and the behaviour of 
animals and infants, as ordinary usage does suggest, cannot forgo explanations 
in intentional terms. As will be argued more fully below, the emotional 
responses of the creatures in question cannot - no more than it can with human 
adults - be plotted in a law-like manner, and thus a stimulus response model for 
their behaviour is forever unavailable. 
Now, for one who believes that ordinary usage of emotional terms has 
some bearing on the discussion - and I will argue that it has - then whatever 
way we want to theorise about the emotions, we are at this stage encouraged in 
thinking that animals and young children have them. 
ILZ Do I need to master the concept of truth to have beliefs? Assessing 
claim (3) 
To understand our third claim, it is useful to understand where it comes from. 
Interpretationism is a philosophical tradition, rather then a specific claim, of 
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which Davidson and Dennett are the leading proponents. 59 As I will use the 
term, Interpretationism designates, first of all, a method about the way in which 
mental phenomena at large should be approached. Its main recommendation is 
that anyone who is interested in understanding the mental should explore the 
very ordinary ways in which we ascribe psychological properties in the process 
of making sense of others and ourselves. The method urges that we should ask 
ourselves what we mean and what conditions obtain when we attribute mental 
predicates to explain and foresee the behaviour of various creatures around US. 60 
The specific argument I am going to discuss, loosely based on an argument by 
Davidson, 61 is only one tiny element in the enormous literature that the 
interpretationist tradition has produced. Davidson's specific argument has been 
extensively discussed in the literature, and the general consensus is that it has 
been discarded for good, although weaker versions are still very much held to be 
sound. 62 As will become apparent, I disagree with Davidson's general picture of 
the mind - i. e. that cognition should be understood in the framework of a belief- 
desire psychology - although I will defend his characterisation of the 
propositional attitudes. 
The argument, to the effect that a creature that does not possess the 
concept of truth would not have beliefs at all, is quite simple. Before preknting 
it, we should be cautious of the following point. Beliefs have at least two 
components: the attitude of believing something and the propositional content 
which is believed. A consequence of this distinction is that if the argument is 
successful, it will not follow that creatures without the concept of belief, de 
facto, will not have cognitive states with propositional structure. Unless it can 
be shown that only beliefs and similar attitudes have propositional structure - 
which is unlikely - then the argument concerns only the attitudinal element of 
59 Davidson and Dennett, although not its only representatives, are certainly the main reference 
points in the literature about the Interpretationist approach to the mental. See, in particular, 
Davidson (1974a, 1974c, 1975) and Dennett (1987). For a thorough examination of the 
Interpretationist tradition, see the excellent Child (1994, esp. Chap 1). 
60 Davidson (1975, p. 15 8). 
61 See in particular Davidson (1975, p. 170; 1982, p. 480). 
62 See Child (1994) for an exhaustive review of possible criticism against Davidson's 
Interpretationism, and how weaker versions can nevertheless be sustained. 
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the concept of belief. Appeal to this distinction will be made later against the 
Davidsonian approach. 
The argument's structure is the following. To have beliefs one must have 
the concept of objective truth; young infants and animals do not have the 
concept of objective truth, therefore, they do not have beliefs. The premise, 
which should be of concern to us, is the idea that to have a belief one has to 
have the concept of objective truth. According to an appealing and widespread 
understanding of what it is to believe something, we have the idea that it 
amounts to holding a proposition true. If I believe that African stamps are nicer 
then Asian ones, then I hold the proposition that African stamps are nicer then 
Asian ones true. Now, it is tempting to say that it does not make sense to ascribe 
this belief to someone who would not understand what it would take for the 
belief to be false. More accurately, what beliefs have in addition to mere 
representations is that the features that the representation represents the world as 
having are believed by the one who possesses the representation that they 
represent the world correctly, and that they might represent it incorrectly. 
Basically, this requires that the representing creature understands the difference 
between how the world is represented to him by its representation and how the 
world really is, or in simpler words, the creature has to understand the 
difference between appearance and reality. 63 If this is the case, then this is too 
much to ask from non-human animals and young children, and we should 
conclude that they do not have beliefs. 
The argument seems to me to be perfectly valid if it is, indeed, the case 
that believing p is a case of holding p true. One problem, however, is that it is 
not at all obvious that this is the only way, or even the natural way, of thinking 
about beliefs. To put it in a way that highlights the problematic nature of the 
claim: Is it true that to believe something is to believe that a particular 
representation of ours represents the world (in) the way the world really is? 
Here is a possible objection to this line of thought. After all, when, for example, 
63 A more cautious way of putting the point is by insisting that what a believer has to understand 
is what we can call, after Luntley (198 8, Chap. 1), The Principle ofIndependence constitutive of 
the concept of truth. To understand that a proposition is true/false, or that a representation is 
correct/incorrect, requires at least the understanding that what makes it true/false or 
correct/incorrect must be independent from the proposition or the representation it makes 
true/false or correct/incorrect. 
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Ali says of her dog that it believes that there is a mouse in the cupboard, it is not 
clear that she means that the dog believes its representation to represent 
correctly this state of affairs. What this means is that one might accept the 
suggested analysis according to which one cannot 'hold a proposition true' 
without mastering the concept of truth, but reject the analysis according to 
which 'believing' is a case of 'holding a proposition true'. 
This is possibly all the more problematic for a Davidsonian as she 
explicitly attempts to capture our everyday concept of belief, not some by- 
product of some neural phenomenon described by some neurologist or 
cognitivist. The Davidsonian is interested in beliefs as we ascribe them to 
creatures around us using everyday folk-psychology - the gist of 
Interpretationism. A Davidsoman approach to the mental is clearly not directed 
at the sub-personal level of mental activity, which can and is often conceived of 
on the analogy of beliefs. Now, if it turns out that we have to discount some of 
our everyday belief attributions, for example those, we use to explain the 
whereabouts of our pets, it is the Davidsonian's task to tell us why this is the 
case. 
The following line of response is open to the Davidsonian, however. It is 
common enough that we use the same words to express somewhat slightly 
different ideas. Even if we are inclined to ascribe beliefs to non-human animals 
and young infants, we might be perfectly ready on reflection to concede that 
there is a fundamental distinction between the way competent adults believe 
things and the way non-human animals and young infants 'believe'. The 
Davidsonian might argue that most people would be ready to admit that 
ascribing beliefs to animals and young infants is improper or metaphorical. 64 
My opinion on this move is that, ultimately, the debate between the 
Davidsonian and his opponent will continue to depend on intuitions about the 
concept of belief, and no resolution is likely to carry much conviction. And 
64If our interpretation of Davidson is correct, then we can see that there is a significant 
difference between him and philosophers like Ryle (1949) and especially Dennett (1981,1987). 
While the three of them insist on the primacy of the third person point of view for the 
understanding of the propositional attitudes, Dennett's "intentional stance" is much more liberal 
than anything Davidson proposes. As long as attribution of propositional attitudes help us to 
make sense of the behaviour of systems around us - for example attributing to one's toaster that it wants to bother us - Dennett appears to believe that it is fine (e. g. Dennett, 198 1, p. 67). For a Davidsonian, however, these are only ways of talking. 
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there is a good reason for this: both the Davidsonian and her detractor capture 
intuitions about our everyday use of the concept of belief, but because this use is 
very loose and embraces different phenomena, they end up with incompatible 
accounts of beliefs. I will argue later in this chapter that there are at least two 
concepts of beliefs, one of which is captured by the Davidsonian analysis of it. 
In the meantime, I propose to keep the Davidsonian characterisation of belief as 
he construes it, while emphasising that it does not commit me to the much 
stronger Davidsonian claim according to which cognition starts with belief so 
understood. 
Continuing the dialectics of this chapter, we must now present and assess 
the claim of the cognitivist about emotions, according to whom having emotions 
necessarily requires having beliefs. It is already clear, however, that if the 
cognitivist accepts the Davidsonian line on belief, she will have to deny that 
children and animals have emotions. Alternatively, she can reject the 
Davidsonian line on belief, and propose a deflated account of them such that 
animals and young infants can have them. Another possibility consists of 
accepting the Davidsonian line on belief, but deny that it is all that there is to 
say about it. This would consist in exploiting the idea that ordinary ascription of 
beliefs is ambiguous between at least two conceptions of belief. It is the latter 
option which, orthogonal to the debate between the Davidsonian and his 
detractor, is the one I will pursue in the second half of the chapter. 
IIJ The Cognitive view of the emotions: the indispensability of beliefs: 
assessing claim (2) 
First, we should clarify what we mean by a cognitivist view of the emotions. By 
doing this, we will also introduce terminology and distinctions that will prove 
useful further along in our discussion. The cognitive conception of emotions can 
be viewed as an answer to the worries expressed against the phenomenalist 
conception of emotions. The exposition that follows is intended ultimately as a 
presentation of the cognitive view of the emotions and not as a rebuttal of the 
phenomenal view, as the conception of our basic emotions which I shall defend 
in the next chapter shares much with it. I do not, therefore, consider all the 
replies that the phenomenalist might want to give to his cognitivist detractor, 
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although the reader will easily figure out possible lines of responses in the light 
of the conception of sensations advanced in the first, and especially the second 
chapter. 65 
The friend of a phenomenalist conception of emotions will typically hold 
the following familiar views: what is distinctive about emotions is that they 
have a special feel, and what distinguishes different emotions is that they feel 
different. 66 More specifically, we firstly have a metaphysical claim: different 
emotions are different qualitative experiences or different groups of sensations; 
secondly, we have a semantic claim: the meaning of emotion terms is given by 
these qualitative experiences or collection of sensations; and finally, we have an 
epistemic claim: emotions are accessed via these experiences. 
Objections to the phenomenalist conception are familiar as well. It is 
important, though, to keep in mind what follows, for in producing objections to 
the phenomenalist conception, we shall specify at the same time important 
constraints to which any theory of the emotions shall have to conform. 
(1) A theory of the emotions should, in principle, be capable of providing, 
if not a principle of individuation, at least reasons for distinguishing as we do 
among the different emotions. The phenomenalist suggests that the particular 
phenomenology of the particular emotions can do just that. But can it really? 
Can joy, contentment and happiness really be distinguished on the basis of how 
they feel? Can terror and horror be distinguished on the basis of how they feel? 
In the latter case, I am tempted to say that terror feels "stronger" than horror. 
But is this satisfactory? The intuition lies, rather, in the thought that what 
distinguishes them does not lie in the way they feel. Similarly, couldn't we think 
of emotions without any particular feel? And what is the phenomenology of 
65 The exposition that follows has greatly benefited from Tappolet's (2000, Chap. 5) 
illuminating taxonomy of the main options in the theory of the emotions. 
66 It is possible, in fact, to distinguish between two different versions of the phenomenalist 
conception: the 'psychic' conception and the 'bodily' conception. An extreme version of the 
first conception would endorse the idea that a pure soul could have emotions; it thus stresses the 
psychic or phenomenological aspect of the experience of the emotion; cf. Leighton (1984) for a 
contemporary version of this view. An extreme version of the second conception would insist 
that emotions are, in fact, nothing but the bodily changes felt whilst experiencing the emotions; 
cf. James 1890, p. 499-50. More recently, Tye (1995) argues that differences in the felt quality of 
an emotion arise because of differences in the bodily states that are sensorily represented. This 
could be viewed as an intermediary view between Leighton and James if it were not for the fact 
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regret? (2) Emotions can be said to be appropriate or inappropriate. It is 
perhaps appropriate to feel adoration in the presence of Socrates, but it is 
inappropriate to feel lust in front of my old goat. It is appropriate to feel 
repulsed at a cutting-up-babies party, but it is inappropriate to feel happy at the 
same occasion. Evaluating emotions in terms of their appropriateness is 
something we do, and therefore something the theory has to incorporate. 67 
Unfortunately, it might be argued that the phenomenalist conception will not be 
able to satisfy this constraint. It is not immediately clear what it means for a 
given qualitative experience to be (in)appropriate. We do not say about a 
physical pain that it is or is not appropriate, and if we say so, we either mean 
that the person does not really have a physical pain, or that he has a very weak 
resistance to physical pain. But this would be a metaphorical use of the word 
cappropriate', certainly nothing similar to what we mean when we say that a 
case of fear is inappropriate. (3) Emotions are intentional states. If I am furious 
at Ali, my fury is directed towards Ali; if I am worried that Ali has been 
disloyal to me, my worry is about the fact that she might have been disloyal to 
me. Emotions have objects, are directed toward objects. Can we say the same 
about the phenomenalist's emotions? Does it make sense to say that a 
qualitative feel, a sensation, has an object? The answer seems to be negative. 
Shivers and tickles do not seem primafacie to be directed towards anything. (4) 
We often have emotions about emotions. I can be afraid of my own fear, be 
amused by it, or ashamed of it. We are, it seems, capable of second-order 
emotions. But are we capable of second order sensations? Can a tickle, a 
physical pain, a shiver be about a tickle, a physical pain, or a shiver? 68 (5) 
Qualitative experiences are notoriously things that are difficult to talk about in a 
philosophically sound manner. The literature recommending definitive 
abandonment of qualitative experience (qualia) talk is fantastically abundant. 69 
Defending phenomenalism about emotions would require showing that this 
recommendation is misplaced. 
that sensations are, according to Tye, and indeed according to the view defended in this thesis, 
representational states (See Chap 2, sec. 111.1 above). 
67 See e. g. Bedford (1957) and Pitcher (1965) for early formulations of this requirement. 
68 See e. g. Kenny (1963,1989, esp. Chap. 4). 
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The view that emotions should be conceived solely in terms of distinctive 
sensations has been seen, in the light of these various objections, as discarded 
for good. 70 This is true, however, only if the phenomenalist insists on construing 
sensations as non-intentional states. As argued and illustrated in the first 
chapter, there are good reasons to believe that sensations are intentional states. 
If that is so, then many features of emotions - as conceived of by the 
phenomenalist - might be retained without falling prey to the objections just 
exposed. This latter move I intend to make in the second part of this chapter. 
But, before we do that, we should introduce the family of positions 
about the emotions that I have called the cognitive view of emotions. 
Psychologists and philosophers have both emphasised the fact that we do not 
have emotions in a void. To use a neutral term, we can say that emotions have 
bases. I presently fear Ali on the basis of my perception of her and on the basis 
of my belief that she is going to hit me. Bases come in many formats: beliefs, 
desires, memories, perceptions, imaginings, etc. Now the question is the 
following: in what sense are these base-states involved in the emotions? 
The gist of the cognitive view on emotions is very simple. It says that the 
cognitive bases involved in an emotion belong to that emotion in an essential 
way, whether or not they are also causally responsible for the occurrence of the 
emotion. The cognitive bases of the emotions are, thus, necessary ingredients of 
them. This is the main claim of the cognitive view, but it is also the only one 
upon which all its advocates agree. It would be a tedious, and most probably 
fruitless, task to try and produce a taxonomy of these different positions, but it 
is interesting to list the fundamental distinctions upon which different 
theoretical alternatives can be constructed. The different trends of the cognitive 
view can be devised in two big families corresponding to the importance given 
to the role of conative states (desires, wants, etc. ) in the emotions, from a lot of 
importance to no importance at all. Another division concerns the importance 
given to phenomenology as an extra element to the cognitive ingredient. Yet 
another line of demarcation: some claim that emotions necessarily involve states 
containing evaluative concepts, others deny it. A further distinction, which will 
69See e. g. Dennett (1988,1991). 
70 But see footnote 66 above. 
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be of direct interest to us shortly with regard to the Davidsonian line of 
argument presented above, concerns the way one should conceive of the 
attitudes that build up a cognitive state. One might claim that the attitudinal 
states involved in emotions are committing their holders to the truth of the 
propositions towards which they have these attitudes, as beliefs do according to 
Davidson. But others might deny that, and claim that having an emotion simply 
involves representation(s) which is (are) (in)correct about their (its) subject 
matter. 
These few distinctions alone generate quite a lot of different positions 
and more relevant distinctions could be added. Most of these distinctions are, 
nevertheless, not pertinent to the present discussion. I will therefore speak of the 
cognitive view in general, mentioning here and there particular trends, 
relegating attribution of authorship to footnotes. 
As mentioned earlier, the cognitive view has two big trends. On the one 
hand, what we could call, after Tappolet, 71 the conative view of the emotions, 
has it that emotions are nothing but sets of beliefs and desires. On the other 
hand, what we could call the standard view has it that having a particular 
emotion involves having a cognitive state containing propositions made up by at 
least one evaluative concept. According to the standard view, the motivational 
aspect of the emotion is exhausted by the presence in the emotion of an 
evaluation. There is no need, therefore, to posit any extra desire to explain the 
motivational force of the emotion by contrast with what the conative view 
recommends. 
According to the conative view, to say that Ali fears the dog, for example, 
is to say that she believes that the dog is going to bite her, together with the 
desire that the dog will not bite her. It is, indeed, striking that most emotions can 
be analysed just in terms of beliefs and desires. 72 If I fear Ali on a particular 
occasion, it might be because I believe she is going to humiliate me, and I desire 
not to be humiliated. If regret that I have not met Ali, it is because I believe I 
have not seen her, and I wish I had seen her. Some emotions might be less 
straightforwardly analysable in terms of beliefs and desires, but could be 
71 Tappolet (2000, p. 139). 
72See e. g. Marks (1982, p. 227). 
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managed nevertheless. If I hate Ali, it can be because I believe that she wronged 
me in some way, together with a desire to be treated with respect. Examples can 
be multiplied. 73 
According to the standard view, fearing Ali on a particular occasion 
involves, for example, believing or judging that she is a dangerous. Being proud 
of my drawing involves some judgement or belief as to the aesthetic properties 
of my work. As can be expected, proponents of the standard view disagree on 
how exactly the relation between the evaluative belief or judgement on the one 
hand, and the emotion on the other hand, should be understood; they also 
disagree on whether and how more ingredients should be added to the basic 
account. One possibility is that the fear of Ali is just the judgement about the 
dangerousness of AH74; another possibility is that it is this judgement, but one 
that has a special feel to it. 75 Another possibility would be that the judgement is 
just an ingredient of the emotion, and that most of the time, it will be 
accompanied by something else: bodily changes. 76 Someone else might argue 
that the judgement is both a cause and a necessary condition for the emotion to 
be had. 77 
We should first notice that both these trends of the cognitive view of the 
emotions satisfy the constraints formulated earlier, when I discussed the 
73 The main problem with this view, though, is the existence of too many counter-examples. 
Many emotions do not seem to require any desires. Classic instances of this kind are amusement 
and surprise. It is bluntly wrong to analyse my surprise to see you in town in terms of my belief 
that you were away, and the desire that you would have stayed away. The same considerations 
apply to amusement. The only serious move open to the friend of the conative view is to deny 
that amusement and surprise are emotions. But this is crude. Any account of the emotions had 
better accommodate our intuitions about what clearly belongs to the emotions, rather than force 
the intuitions to accommodate the account. Examples of emotions that do not seem to involve 
desires can be multiplied. What are the desires supposed to accompany pride or shame? Finally, 
it is not clear how happy we should be about the fact that considerations about phenomenology 
or feelings have been put out of the way. It is, after all, one of our stronger intuitions about the 
emotions that they feel a certain way, and perhaps difficulty in analysing feelings is not a good 
enough reason for ignoring them. For a philosopher who has developed a quite sophisticated 
version of this view of the emotions and takes into account this last point, see Green (1992, p. 
87). 
74 Both Solomon (1976, pp. 185-87) and Nussbaum (1994) believe that emotions are simply 
evaluative judgements; Thalbcrg, (1977, p. 34) claims that the evaluative belief is the cause of 
the emotion. 
75 Cf. Greenspan (1989, p. 4). 
76 Cf. Lyons (1980, p. 207). 
77 Cf. Davidson (1976, p. 288-89). 
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objections to the phenomenalist conception of the emotions. Especially those 
concerning, respectively, the necessity of accounting for the possibility of 
assessing the emotions in terms of (in)appropriateness, and the necessity of 
accounting for the fact that emotions have intentional objects. If the putative 
beliefs and desires sets or the evaluative judgement are the emotions, then we 
have no problem in accounting for the fact that they have satisfaction 
conditions, as well as the fact that they are intentional states. Indeed, these two 
features are generally thought to be among the defining features of the 
propositional attitudes. It is in its capacity to meet these latter constraints that 
the attractiveness of the view resides. 
In this and more especially in the next chapter, I develop my own standard 
view which is at least adequate to explain our basic emotions. That is a view 
that takes evaluative properties as figuring centrally in the content of the 
emotions, and by this same token, accounts for their motivational force. It is a 
view, too, that accords with the basic intuitions of the phenomenalist and her 
emphasis on the importance of the way emotions feel. 78 Before I expound this 
view, however, let me pause and look at where we are in the argument. If the 
cognitive view of the emotion is correct, whether in its standard form or its 
conative one, then emotions require propositional attitudes. Now, if having 
beliefs is as demanding as the Davidsonian suggests, then we have to conclude 
that young children and animals not only lack beliefs, but lack emotions as well. 
The options are as they were earlier. The cognitivist can reject the Davidsonian 
analysis of belief and propose something weaker instead, which would 
accommodate animals and young children having emotions and beliefs. A 
second option would consist simply of biting the bullet and denying that 
animals and young children have emotions, and attempting to characterise their 
affective responses differently. I have already explained why I believe this route 
to be misguided. A third option, which is the one I will pursue, is to accept the 
Davidsonian characterisation of belief, but argue that ordinary ascriptions of 
78 My view of the emotions, I suppose, approximate this of Roberts (1988,1996) who conceives 
of emotion in terms of concern based construal and possibly this of Greenspan (1988) who 
conceives of them as "comfort of discomfort directed towards evaluative propositions" (p. 14). 1 
feel in tune with their concern to explain animal emotion, as well as the non-intellectualist 
manner in which they account for our sensitivity to the evaluative. 
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them are not limited to that concept as characterised by the Davidsonian. This 
consists of devising a cognitive account such that it remains distinctively 
cognitive, but one that does not require competences that animals and young 
infants are not likely to have. 
Although the argument so far does not force us into the option just 
taken, I will now give another motivation for adopting it, linked to the existence 
of irrational emotions. 79 The phenomenon of irrational emotions strongly 
encourages the thought that emotions conceived of on the model of the 
propositional attitudes are only part of the story that can be told on the emotions 
- one that should stay away from the demands of the Davidsonian 
line on belief, 
while remaining distinctively cognitive. 
11.4. Irrational emotions 
Montaigne tells the story of a philosopher who has a nasty adventure. 80 Put 
inside a cage and hung from a large and secure steel chain at the summit of a 
cathedral, the unfortunate thinker was left to meditate for a few days about his 
destiny. When brought down and asked if he was afraid, the story continues, the 
philosopher said that he was terrified all along. When asked if he thought he 
was in any danger, he answered that he believed he was not, but that he found 
no comfort in this thought. 
There is no need to be suspended at the top of a cathedral to be familiar 
with the kind of ambivalent states which this philosopher went through. We can 
call this kind of state an irrational emotion, given that the rational assessment 
involved in the context of the emotion seems to fit very badly with the emotion. 
Why would I be afraid if I do not believe that I am in danger, that I am not 
going to be humiliated, that I am not going to fail my exam, that she is going to 
love me whatever happens, and whatever else. Apart for a few exceptional 
(boring? ) people, experience of gaps between rational assessment of a situation 
and the emotions we have is the common lot. It is, I presume, the kind of 
79 It is Hursthouse (1991) who has made popular in the philosophical literature on the emotions 
the topic of irrational emotions and the problems it raises for cognitive accounts of them. She 
speaks of arational emotions rather than irrational ones, but this distinction will not concern me 
here. 
80 Montaigne (1588), Livre II, Chap. 12. 
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phenomenon that has been used for the long-standing and very popular 
conception of the existence of a gap between reason and passion; the kind of 
phenomenon that psychoanalysis has been based upon, and that any theory of 
the emotions has to explain. Whereas the theories inspired by the two latter 
views are not very popular anymore, the modem cognitive conception of the 
emotions that we have presented might be thought to be in an even worse 
position. At first blush, it would be incongruous to suggest that the beliefs of 
our hero philosopher are either the cause or an essential part, or both of these, Of 
his fear. On the contrary, it seems as though his beliefs are notably not part of 
his emotion. And it is important to emphasise that what I called irrational 
emotion, as well as phobic emotions, are not strange or extreme cases. Disgust, 
love, hate, rage, jealousy or shame often take place despite us having no beliefs 
or making no judgements as to, respectively, the disgusting, loveable, hateable, 
enraging, enviable, or shameful character of what appear to bring about these 
emotions. I would go further and say that we very often believe that these 
properties are not instantiated at all. It is therefore essential that the theory will 
accommodate this important phenomenon. 
I see at least three options for the cognitivist. Firstly, he could try to argue 
that the fear our philosopher experiences is not really fear, but only some bunch 
of sensations or perhaps some physiological change occurring in him as the 
result of a purely causal process, due perhaps to the positioning of his body in 
being removed from the ground. But it is difficult to see the rationale for this 
claim, apart from the fact that it fits the cognitivist's theory better. On this 
picture, the cognitivist will have to postulate this ad hoc clause to his theory for 
the sole purpose of accommodating irrational emotions, and this seems to me 
not promising as a way of distinguishing what is an emotion from what is not. 
Indeed, why on earth should we deny that the hero philosopher has an emotion 
if he agrees and we agree to say that he is frightened? The second option is more 
promising. It consists of saying that our hero philosopher has two contradicting 
beliefs with respect to the danger of the situation in which he finds himself, 
which explains why he is in fear. Perhaps the best way to construct this 
hypothesis is to view the mind as a compartmentalised entity with not much 
communication between the compartments, and the inhabitants of these separate 
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compartments bearing differently on the emotional life of the subject, depending 
perhaps on how hidden or how deep the compartment is in the subject mind. 
The latter proposal is not so much incoherent as very speculative, 
metaphorical and vague. But it leads us to a third option, which is the one I 
promise to examine. This to say that, instead of talking of contradictory beliefs 
entertained at the same time in irrational emotions, we might speak of two 
different types of beliefs - which ordinary ascription of beliefs fail (not at all 
unhealthily) to distinguish - that are pulling in different directions. Before we 
investigate the nature of this second type of beliefs, it is judicious to look at a 
parallel phenomenon of that of irrational emotion occurring in perception. 
The case of irrational emotion has, indeed, interesting parallels in 
perception. Some conscious sensory perceptions present us with impossible 
objects: for example, the sensory perceptions we have in front of some Esher 
figures. Although we know these objects to be impossible, we are not in a 
position to revise these sensory perceptions in the light of whatever belief in a 
principle of rationality that commands us not to consciously hold true two 
contradictory propositions. A more familiar example: despite the fact that I 
believe the lines of a Mueller-Lyer figure to be of equal lengths, I still 
experience them, and continue to experience them, as being of different lengths. 
These kind of sensory perceptions do not seem to be revisable on the basis of 
stronger evidence - coming either from beliefs or other sensory perceptions. To 
recast the point in an appealing Fodorian formulation, sensory perception seems 
to be informationally encapsulated. 81 As we shall see, the encapsulation should 
not be taken too literally. This being said, there is a strong case for thinking that 
beliefs, those resulting in us reflecting about the world, do not seem to affect the 
processing of the inputs stimulating our visual systems. In a word, there are 
strong indications that the sphere of perception might be, in many ways, 
autonomous from the sphere of beliefs; the whole question being, of course, in 
what respect they are and in what respect the are not. Before we turn to that 
question, we should note that something similar could be said of the case of our 
unfortunate philosopher who is afraid despite his best judgement as to the 
absence of danger in the circumstances in which he finds himself. The question 
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is, therefore, the following: can we pursue the analogy with perception a bit 
further, and possibly learn something about the content of emotions? I think we 
can. 
There is a familiar tradition, perhaps best represented nowadays by 
Peacocke, Crane and Bermfidez, who have encouraged the thought that 
perception cannot be construed on the model of the propositional attitudes. 
Their key idea is that the notion of a mental state with content is not tied with 
that of propositional content, with all the ordinary implications that being a 
system with such contents bring with it. A representational system, they 
suggest, might be capable of entertaining content defined minimally, and 
ordinary episodes of perception satisfy contentfulness so minimally defined. In 
other words, none (or most) of the competences required for being endowed 
with propositional attitudes would be needed for being a perceiving creature. 
The upshot is that we should distinguish between perceptions on the one hand 
and beliefs or judgements that perception brings about on the other hand. 
Although ordinary ascription of perceptual belief does not clearly reflect this 
difference, philosophical theory might. The objective in the remainder of this 
chapter is to assess the possibility of exploiting the idea of minimal content in 
its application to emotions. 
In what follows, I shall, therefore, expose in some detail an account of 
the emotions along the lines suggested by the authors for perception. Drawing 
on a common distinction in the literature between perceptual representation 
(perceptual judgement) and perceptual presentation (perception), 82 I will speak 
of emotional evaluation and emotional valuation. As a first approximation of 
what I have in mind, one should view the latter as emotion proper, while the 
former is a judgement by a creature as to what emotion it has. The main idea of 
the account is to say that belief desire psychology, when it tries to reduce 
emotions to beliefs and desires, refers only to emotional evaluation, not 
emotional valuation. In the rest of this chapter, I will begin to characterise the 
nature of emotional valuation, focusing solely on the kind of content that it 
involves. In the next chapter, I give a full characterisation of it; in the fifth 
81 Cf. Fodor (1983). 
82 See e. g. crane (1992, Introduction). 
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chapter I will discuss the ways in which emotional valuation and emotional 
evaluation 'cooperate' in the various ways in which we engage in understanding 
others as emotional creatures; and in the sixth and last chapter I shall examine 
how they might interact to produce knowledge of the emotions, if any. 
Let us recap the argument so far. We have presented reasons (and 
accepted them) to the effect that emotions are cognitive states with content. 
Emotions must be, among other things, openings to a certain kind of 
information in the subject's environment. We have seen that the traditional way 
of conceiving of content, i. e. on the model of the propositional attitudes, will not 
do in this case. Although, I argued, the model of the propositional attitudes 
does, indeed, capture an essential aspect of our dealing with the world and 
others, emotions cannot be just a mixture of beliefs and desires, for at least the 
following reasons. First, animal and young infants have emotions, but do not 
have propositional attitudes. Second, we are capable of irrational emotions, a 
phenomenon which does not seem to fit well in a purely belief desire model of 
the emotions. What irrational emotions suggest is that there are different levels 
in our emotional dealings with the world. Montaigne's philosopher seemed to 
be in a position of saying, without contradicting himself- "I am not afraid of 
dying, but I am afraid of dying". In the light of these considerations I suggested 
that there might be a route out of this dilemma. If we can find a coherent notion 
of content that does not require for having it competences that animals and 
young infants are incapable of having, but is still powerful enough to figure in 
an account of their emotional capacities, then we do have a possible model of 
the emotions, or at least a possible model of some basic form of emotional 
capacities. And more importantly, we shall have all the ingredients for 
understanding how this more basic form of emotional capacities might, in 
creatures capable of having full blooded propositional attitudes, be changed, 
influenced, redirected, so as to produce confused philosophers of the kind 
Montaigne speaks about. 
It is now time to outline the general framework in which I will develop 
my account of the emotions in the next chapter. That is, I present in broad 
outline the structure of the content of our basic emotions given the necessary 
conditions they have to meet for satisfying a genuine cognitive account of them. 
I have examined the Davidsonian understanding of belief, and suggested that 
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ordinary ascription of them conflates belief so conceived and belief conceived 
in another way. It is thus my task to unravel the latter concept. 
111. A revised cognitive account of the emotions 
111.1. Introduction 
As a manner of pursuing the option opened by the parallel made with 
perception, the cognitivist might simply say that he is not interested in belief per 
se, but in the fact that emotions present worldly state of affairs. What he needs, 
therefore, is something like the notion of representation or perhaps awareness 
of something or other, not the notion of belief that something is thus, or at least 
not the notion of belief as understood by the Davidsonian. The idea would be to 
construe the content of the emotions, not as something a subject has to hold 
true, but as something in relation to which the question of truth and falsity does 
not arise for the subject. It would be a sort of direct opening towards the world. 
Although, I think this move is ultimately correct, it is, unfortunately, not so 
straightforward. For, the very reasons for which the Davidsonian regards belief 
in the way he does might simply resurface at the level of representation. So, ' at 
least, Peacocke has argued: 
The representational content (of an experience] is the way the experience presents the 
world as being, and it can hardly present the world as being that way if the subject is 
incapable of appreciating what that way is. 83 
In this early book, Peacocke - who, as we will see, later changed his mind - 
insisted that a subject has to be capable of appreciating the way his 
representation represents the world as being. He takes this to mean that the 
subject should be capable of realising what it would take for this representation 
to end up not doing so correctly. Well, this is tantamount to the Davidsonian, S 
requirement that a subject can have a belief only if he has the concept of truth. 
This means that the cognitivist has to do more than simply substitute the 
notion of representation for that of belief He has to provide a Characterisation of 
representation which conforms to some basic conditions for being a state with 
83 Peacocke (1983, p. 7). 
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intentional content, but which is not as demanding as the Davidson-Peacocke 
characterisation of it. 
The best strategy for the cognitivist at this point is to unfold, as much as 
he can, the conditions for having propositional attitudes, and demonstrate that a 
creature not meeting these conditions could still be credited with intentional 
states with content. This is the strategy Crane has pursued84; he suggests that a 
creature capable of having propositional attitudes needs to manifest three kinds 
of capabilities linked to the constituents making up a proposition towards which 
this creature has an attitude. In line with the tradition, he calls these constituents 
concepts. To be credited with the mastery of a specific concept, a creature has to 
master at least the three following types of relational properties that, in fact, 
constitute the concept in question: epistemic, logical and semantic relational 
properties. I master a concept A if and only if (1) 1 am capable of recognising 
the circumstances in which concept A is applicable (epistemic relationS)85; (2) 1 
am capable of appreciating how two propositions in which concept A figures 
might combine to produce a third proposition in which A figures (logical 
relations), 86 (3) 1 am capable of appreciating that if A is instantiated then a 
whole bunch of other concepts will also be instantiated (semantic relations). Let 
me illustrate these three kinds of abilities linked with the mastery of a concept. I 
master the concept of apple, for example, if and only if (1) 1 am capable of 
, recognising the perceptual circumstances that allow me to apply the concept of 
apple; (2) if I am capable of inferring from the fact that there is a blue apple on 
the table, that there is an apple which is blue and on the table; or from the fact 
that I recognise that A is apple, B is apple, and A is not identical with B, I am 
capable of inferring that there are at least two things that are apples; (3) if I am 
capable of appreciating that there is an apple on the table, I should be capable of 
84 Crane's (1992) aim in his paper is to examine the idea that some mental states have non- 
conceptual content. Although I am sympathetic to this program, most of the points that he 
makes (as well as those I make, for that matter) can be brought into the discussion without 
entering the sensitive and thorny issue of non-conceptual content. 
85 Cf. Crane (1992) "A thinker's beliefs about the world are [ ... ] sensitive to perceptual 
evidence, and their contents are partly defined by the perceptual evidence that a thinker would 
take as counting in their favour" (p. 146). 
86 Cf. Crane (1992) "To possess a concept is to be in intentional states whose inferential 
relations are an appropriate function of their contents. The elements in a thinker's network of 
intentional states are essentially inferentially related to one another" (p. 147). 
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appreciating the fact that there is food in front of me or that something is in 
front of me, etc. Of a system capable of performing these three types ý of 
inference I say, after BermAdez, that it is capable of "global recombinability". 87 
We will see very soon what this entails. 
Although all three kinds of capacity are extensively discussed in the 
literature on the propositional attitudes, it is not clear to me that attribution of 
propositional attitudes to subjects or even to other sorts of creatures always 
presupposes global recombinability. As much, I believe, has been shown in the 
discussion of Davidson on belief, but at this stage it is beside the point. The 
question that is relevant here is whether it is possible to construe a notion of 
content that would not require that creatures having them master all of these 
capacities. if it can be shown that none of them is needed for a creature to be 
presented with something being thus and so, but that this creature could 
nevertheless be endowed with intentional states with content recognisable as 
such, then a path opens up for a theory of perception, as well as a cognitive 
theory of the emotions which will not depend on the capacity for having 
propositional attitudes as characterised here. 
111.2. The content of basic emotions 
In this thesis, I argue that basic emotions are intentional states understood as 
directly motivating bodily responses to features of the environment that the 
creature values either positively or negatively. This characterisation of basic 
emotions, which, as we have seen, I call emotional valuations, will be fully 
cashed out only in the next chapter. Here, I wish to deal solely with the main 
issue that has occupied us up to now, that is, issues related to the structure of the 
content of the emotions so conceived. In the light of what has been said so far, 
what I need is a model of content which is not as demanding as the one required 
by the propositional attitudes model which could not possibly be ascribed to 
animals and young infants, but powerful enough to explain their basic emotional 
capacities. 1, thus, present in broad outline the structure of the emotions, given 
the necessary conditions they have to meet for satisfying a genuine cognitive 
87 CE Berm6dez (1998, P. 92). 
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account of them. These minimal conditions are the following. Emotions must be 
structured, must have conditions of satisfaction, a stimulus-response model of 
them should not be available and, finally, they should integrate with higher- 
order mental states. 88 
111.3. Content: lawlessness 
Appeal to content is needed in the absence of the possibility of explaining the 
behaviour of a creature by means of a stimulus-response model. Characteristic 
of a creature satisfying a stimulus-response model we find that its behaviour can 
be plotted in a law-like fashion. If token stimulus of type a causes response 
token of type b, then token stimulus of type a will always cause token responses 
of type b. In such a case, there is no need to appeal to the notion of content, for 
it would do no job at all. It is always open to one to explain the behaviour of 
stimulus-response system by positing that the system represents the stimulus 
and reacts to it, in virtue of representing it in this specific way. But this move 
does nothing more than enriching the ontology of the theory with another entity 
that has, in fact, no explanatory power. Reflexes, for instance, are such that it is 
not necessary to postulate content to explain them. The behaviour of an 
intentional system, however, cannot be plotted in a law-like fashion, and this is 
when the notion of content becomes handy. As we have seen, both the 
behaviour of human adults, animals and young infants cannot be plotted in a 
law-like fashion, and thus appeal to content is required. We want to say that it is 
in virtue of the various contents of the system, those stored in memory, those 
that presently affect the system, together with those that the system wants to be 
realised, that bring about the behaviour of the system. Systems whose behaviour 
do not espouse the stimulus-response model force explanations that exploit the 
internal states of these systems which, in virtue of the way these states interact 
with one another, bring about the behaviour they do. The question becomes 
88 These are the basic conditions for content, according to Berm6dez (1995b), conditions 
satisfied by non-conceptual mental states. I have argued elsewhere that the label of 'non- 
conceptual content' applied to this type of content does nothing but distract one from what 
should be the main concern, i. e. the difference between content as understood by the 
propositional attitude model, and the minimal notion of content examined here. Cf. Deonna 
(2000, unpublished). 
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then, the following: what kind of features does content have to have in order for 
this interaction to take place? 
IIIA Content: structure 
Central to the notion of content is the idea of structure. We think that contents 
are made of constituents that together form a specific content. It is difficult to 
imagine how a thought of the form 'a is F could refer to a and say about it that 
it is F without it being the case that the thought, one way or another, includes 
the two parts 'a' and 'F'. Although we can decide that from now on we will 
express the thought 'a if F' by the one part expression V, it is doubtful whether 
one could ever understand the expression without separating it into the different 
constituents from which it was construed in the first place. Here is how Evans 
puts it: 
It seems to me that there must be a sense in which thoughts are structured. 
'The 
thought that John is happy has something in common with the thought that Harry is 
happy, and the thought that John is happy has something in common with the thought 
that John is sad. [ ... )I should prefer to explain the sense 
in which thoughts are 
structured [ ... ] in terms of their 
being a complex of the exercise of several distinct 
[ ... ] abilities. 
Thus, someone who thinks that John is happy and that Harry is happy 
exercises on the two occasions [one] conceptual ability [--. 1. And similarly someone 
who thinks that John is happy and that John is sad exercises on two occasions a single 
ability, the ability to think of, or think about, John. 89 .I 
I 
Whether we think of constituents of thought as involving the exercise of 
abilities or not, we want it to be the case that whatever cognitive achievement is 
involved in having a state with a certain content will be equivalent to the 
cognitive achievement involved in having another content which we expres's 
linguistically by using the same expression. Part of the cognitive achievement 
realised in thinking "John is happy" should be the same as the cognit 
I ive 
achievement realised in "John is sad" 
for the simple reason that no cognit ive 
mechanism could support the amount of thoughts they appear to be able to think 
if each of them required new and separate achievements. 
89 Evans (1982, pp. 100-100- 
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111.5. Content: integration 
Contents, thus, have to be structured so as to allow interaction between them in 
the way just mentioned. After Bermýidez, 90 I called 'global recombinabilityl the 
full package of inferential relations that such a compositional system of thought 
built out of recurring constituents would be capable of sustaining, and the three 
types of which we have had the opportunity to appreciate above. Now, as 
Bermiidez has pointed out, although global recombinability entails structure or 
compositionality, compositionality does not entail global recombinability; far 
from it. What is needed to explain the behaviour, emotional or otherwise, of 
animals and infants is the capacity to re-identify features of the environment 
when encountered in subsequent experiences. Re-identification entails the 
realisation that a recurs in 4a is F and 'a is G', and in this very sense their 
thoughts have to be structured in the sense explained. Similarly, we want it to be 
the case that the content of a creature's desires will be such that it can integrate 
with the contents of the creature's commitments as to how the world is, and this 
too requires that the system be capable of detecting in its environment features 
that figure as constituents in the content of its desires. None of this, however, 
requires ascribing to them the full range of inferential capacities isolated earlier. 
In Bermudez's phrase, "compositional structure can exist in the absence of 
global recombinability" (p. 93). 
111.6 Content: correctness conditions 
A third fundamental feature of the notion of content is that of correctness, about 
the conditions of which we have already said a lot. Here is how Peacocke, 
having changed his mind for the better, characterises a 'minimalist' way of 
putting the point: 
A state [with content] presents the world as being a certain way only if there is a 
condition or set of conditions under which it does so correctly. 91 
90Berm6dez (1998, p. 92). 
91 Peacocke (1992a, Chap. 1) 
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Although very intuitive, the interpretation of this requirement is far from 
straightforward. It looks very similar to early Peacocke's condition 
_for 
representation, and might be thought to be very similar to the first condition 
(epistemic relation) for concept possession (Crane), and - to go even further 
back - to the Davidsonian analysis of belief. Notice, however, that it is much 
weaker: it does not mention an agent who should be capable of appreciating the 
fact that it might or might not be correct. 
It is now my duty to unfold, even succinctly, the idea that such a 
minimalist conception of correctness condition might be applicable to the 
phenomenon of emotional valuation, even in the absence (for now) of a full 
elaboration of what the notion covers. As briefly indicated, and as will become 
fully apparent in the next chapter, I have tied up emotional valuations to bodily 
responses, and made the object of those responses largely dependent on the 
current interests of the creature having them. It might be thought, therefore, that 
the notion of correctness conditions in this instance makes no sense at all. What 
will, in this scenario, it might be asked, provide the necessary independent 
elements to make the content of the evaluation correct or incorrect? 
Let me, thus, schematically indicate what I have in mind. We are 
familiar from the literature with two fundamentally different ways of thinking 
about correctness conditions. The traditional way of individuating them focuses 
on the relation between thought and world. 92 The content of a belief is 
individuated via the circumstances that would make this content correct. And it 
is correct in relation to its subject matter if and only if the subject matter is as 
the content of the belief represents it be. A more recent way of thinking about 
correctness conditions, in particular in approaches attempting to naturalise the 
mind, has it that the content of a mental state should be individuated in terms of 
the normal consequences for thought and action that this content has. 93 Such 
content is satisfied if and only if the thoughts and/or actions it triggers satisfies 
92 The most representative proponent of this approach is Davidson (e. g. 1973b, 1974b, 1975). 
93 In fact this view reaches as far back as the pragmatism of James (1911) and Pierce (1878). In 
contemporary naturalist philosophy of Mind, 
Millikan (1984,1993), Papineau (1984,1993) and 
Whyte (1990,199 1) are certainly the authors who have developed this approach the most 
thoroughly. 
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the desires of the subject having the content. 94 These radically different 
approaches to thinking of the ways in which we individuate content are always 
presented as competing accounts of truth. The former roots truth in a vertical 
relation between content and the world, the latter roots it in a horizontal relation 
between the desires and actions of a subject. A proponent of the former accuses 
the latter of having a circular account of truth whilst priding himself that he can 
explain action by appealing to beliefs that are independent of the action. A 
proponent of the latter accuses the former of not having a real account of the 
alleged vertical truth-relation anyway, and even if it had an account, it would 
still need action to individuate belief. 
Butterfill has recently suggested that, rather than viewing these two 
conceptions of content as two competing accounts of truth, they might be 
viewed as two ways in which we think of belief, two ways in which we might 
become aware of them. 95 He calls the first kind intellectualist, and the second 
pragmatist. His view is that, when attempting to understand other people's 
actions, we might adopt one or the other strategy. In fact, he argues that we are 
first and foremost pragmatists in the following two senses. First, as young 
children we are only pragmatists, and little by little we learn to be 
intellectualists. Second, when we reach adulthood, we continue to be first and 
foremost pragmatists, and become intellectualists only when the pragmatist 
explanation fails. It is only when the action does not look like a direct 
satisfaction of a readily available desire that one then needs to be acquainted 
with the facts that the subject we are trying to understand knows or does not 
know. 
Butterfill thinks that these two ways of thinking of correctness 
conditions promotes the view that there are two conceptions of beliefs at work 
here - rather in the same way that I suggested in this chapter - and suggests that 
perhaps we had better view it simply as two types of contents, one which would 
be the content of attitudes conceived on the Davidsonian model, the other 
conceived on the model of minimal content developed here. This being said, I 
94 This formulation is close to Papineau's conception of content (e. g. 1993, §3.6, claim '(C)'. 
Millikan speaks of intentions being satisfied in accordance with a Normal explanation, where 
the notion of 'normal' is rooted in the theory of evolution. 
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see no urgency in resolving this terminological debate here. Applied to the 
present characterisation of basic emotions, i. e. of emotional valuations, I suggest 
that we should think of them as the pragmatist would, while more complex' 
ones, i. e. emotional evaluations should be conceived as the intellectualist would. 
With regard to the former, this would be to say that emotional valuations are 
directly individuated via their normal bodily responses, where normal means 
bodily responses that affect what a subject values, in ways favourable to the 
subject from his perspective. The content of an emotional valuation is satisfied 
when the bodily response that it brings about affects what the creature values, in 
ways favourable to the creature from his own perspective, and is not satisfied 
when it is not the case. The content of an emotional valuation that the lion is 
dangerous is satisfied if and only if running away will satisfy the need to avoid 
injury, and is not if running away does not satisfy the need toavoid injury. 
Traditional objections to the pragmatist here won't bite in the present 
account, for Pragmatism is not here presented as an account of truth, but as an 
interpretative strategy; and second, because I am not claiming that the 
pragmatist strategy by itself is enough for all interpretative projects. Indeed, I 
suggest, that the way emotional valuations are individuated contrasts with the 
way emotional evaluations are individuated. Attributions of emotional 
evaluations always involve, from the point of view of the interpreter, knowing 
the facts and knowing whether or not the person to be interpreted knows them. 
An emotional evaluation is based on beliefs and desires which have to be 
represented by the interpreter for the actions of the interpretee to make sense. 
This is the intellectualist strategy, which always consists of asking oneself how 
the world is represented by the person we are attempting to understand, and how 
those representations might clash with ours - or with the world for that matter. 
By contrast, ascribing an emotion on the pragmatist mode is simply to see an 
action as the normal consequence of what is needed or desired in the 
circumstances, as opposed to what one particular creature needs or desire in the 
particular circumstances. 
95 Butterfill (forthcoming, Chap. 2). 
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These contrastive attitudes, pragmatist and intellectualist respectively, 
will become clearer as my distinction between emotional valuation and 
emotional evaluation unfolds, the task I now engage in. 
111.7. Content: assessing basic emotions 
This being said, I need to explain how emotional valuations are going to be 
assessed in the light of the way I just characterised their correctness conditions. 
One of the virtues of any cognitive account of the emotions, it has been argued, 
is that they can be assessed in terms of their appropriateness or 
inappropriateness in the circumstances in which they occur. Naw, I said that the 
content of an emotional valuation is satisfied when the bodily response it 
triggers affects favourably the creature from its own perspective. The questions 
are the same as they were a moment ago. First, in what sense can an emotion be 
assessed in terms of appropriateness if its satisfactions conditions are essentially 
linked with the desires and needs of the creatures having the emotion? And 
second, in what sense does my characterisation of correctness conditions of 
emotional valuations fail to amount to correctness conditions understood in the 
early Peacocke way, where the creature has to 'appreciate' for herself the way 
her representation represents the world as being? 
Those two questions, it seems to me, can be answered together. One way 
of unfolding what I have in mind goes like this. Representing agents do not have 
claims as to how the world is represented in their representations, or claims as to 
how they want the world to be in their represented desires. One way to put it 
would be to say that the world has, so to speak, claims on agents as to how the 
world is for them or claims as to how the world is desired to be for them. This 
way of formulating the point is more than a rhetorical trick when we think of the 
kind of error a creature with such content would be prone to. For here, we are 
tempted to say that he does not make mistakes, but has mistaken representations. 
Correcting the latter kind of mistakes would consist of checking whether the 
viewing conditions are good, whether the perceptual systems of the creature are 
in good order, etc. When you 'take the world as being in a certain way' 
however, it means that you have reasons for that, and therefore to be thinking 
wrongly that such and such reasons are supporting such and such 
112 Chapter3 
representations. This way of formulating the issue will have crucial significance 
in the sixth chapter when I will deal with the epistemological questions 
concerning the possibility of knowing other people's emotions. 
I said that the world makes claims on creatures inhabiting it, and that 
emotional valuation was one such claim. The idea here is to subvert the 
traditional idea according to which any contentful state in which a creature 
represents the world as being in a certain way is always such that there can be 
another creature also present to think of it as being in another way. 'I claim this, 
you claim that! " When this happens, one can always imagine that one of the 
creatures is going to be convinced by the other - to change his mind, as it were. 
This happens in cases when the contents involved dividelclassify the world in 
ways that go over and beyond the verdicts of the affective and perceptual 
systems interacting causally with the environment of the creatures involved. If 
you and I disagree as to whether there is a barn in front of us, it can be for one 
of at least two major reasons. Either the perceptual conditions are not good, 
perhaps because it dark, or we have taken drugs, or I am half blind, etc., or we 
disagree as to what deserves to be called a bam. The latter kind of disagreement 
is indeed generally resolved, if it all, when one of us changes our mind, or when 
we agree that the way I use the word, or the way you use the word is preferable. 
To exaggerate somewhat, we can say that some epistemic virtue has been 
violated, and it is only after a conference between the protagonists in the dispute 
that the sin committed (if any) to good epistemic conduct can be redeemed. In 
the former case, however, nobody is asked to change his mind, no sin is 
committed. We change the lighting, we wait until the effect of the drug recedes, 
etc., until agreement comes. When it does come, one of us is likely to say: "Oh' 
I see now! " I do not change my mind in this case, because it is my mind or the 
environment in which it is that changes. It is in this sense that the world makes 
claims on us, rather than we who make claims about the world. 
Now, I suggest that emotional valuations are precisely like that: they are 
claimed on us by the world, given our biology, the environment in which we 
are, and the acculturation to which we have been subjected. I cannot help but 
emotionally value the lion as I do, given the animal I am, and the dispositions 
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that my history has induced in me. 96 Now, if the considerations we just made are 
true, they should be reflected in the way we assess emotional valuations, for we 
recall that one of the main reasons why we felt the need for a cognitive account 
of the emotions was linked to the fact that we assess them in normative terms. 
We think that certain objects are not fitted to the emotional responses they 
trigger. And here, as with perception, there are two main types of reasons we 
might give for thinking that there is something wrong with regard to some 
creature's emotional response. Either there is something wrong with the world 
(i. e. the creature having the emotion is tired, ill, under drugs, visibility is bad, 
etc. ), or we think it is wrong because one should not respond emotionally in that 
way, given the circumstances. In this case, it is some moral virtue that has been 
tampered with. We feel it is wrong, for example, to rejoice at someone else's 
predicament because we find that some vice is at work. Now, I have said that 
emotional valuations allow only for the first type of error, and the question now 
is whether the way I construed content for emotional valuation is compatible 
with what has just been said. An emotional valuation, I suggested, is not 
satisfied when the bodily response does not affect favourably the creature 
having the emotion from his own perspective. And the consequence of this is 
precisely what we want. For, if content is individuated from the subject's 
perspective, than there is no room for criticism from the point of view of what 
one should value, rather than what one does value in particular circumstances. 
At the level of emotional valuation, therefore, emotions are appropriate or 
inappropriate in a very trivial non-normative sense. It is purely a question of 
normal or proper functioning of the system in its environment. 
111.8. Emotional valuation and emotional evaluation 
I wish now to convey in very intuitive terms what lies behind the contrast 
between emotional valuation and emotional evaluation, which I will develop 
further in the next chapter. In very crude terms, the former is an opening to 
96 This means, among other things, that, pace Geach (1965), emotional valuations cannot be put 
in the antecedent of a conditional, because emotional valuations cannot be supposed. It means 
also, pace Sartre (193 9), that we are not free to choose our emotions. Having said that, the 
account here defended leaves room for both Geach and Sartre's point. Emotional evaluations 
can figure in the antecedent of conditionals, and there is some freedom to choose to have them. 
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information that is significant for the creature affected by it in the world for the 
conduct of its life. Having a basic emotion is to see some aspect of the world as 
directly requiring some form of action that will improve the position of the 
creature having it. What is special about emotional valuation is the fact that the 
feelings and bodily changes that accompany the emotion are not at all salient as 
phenomena affecting the body, but as aspects of the environment which are 
significant for the creature in terms of action. By contrast, emotional evaluation 
is the perspective we have when we focus our attention on the experience that 
reveals the world to us in emotional valuation. When I emotionally evaluate, and 
I am successful in the enterprise, both the feelings and bodily changes on the 
one hand, and what they are directed to on the other hand, become Salient to me. 
To have a firmer grasp on the distinction, You can think about the parallel 
contrast in perception. Seeing is just a case of experiencing features of one'IS 
environment, but by contrast, making a perceptual judgement is being sensitive 
to how the experience in question reveals the features of the environment as 
being. Although we are very familiar with this distinction in the case of 
perception, we are much less so in the case of emotions. By this, I do not mean 
to say that it is an original thought that emotions are often directed at aspects of 
the world, but the thought that they are fundamentally and primarily so,, is. 
When we start to learn about emotions and theorise about them, it is only then 
that we become capable of thinking of them independently of their objects, in' 
terms of how they feel, and the bodily changes that accompany them. That is, it 
is only when we start to emotionally evaluate, as opposed to emotionally value, 
that we become capable of learning to make full-blown judgements about what 
emotions we are experiencing, or to make full blown ascriptions Of emotions to 
others. These are the thoughts that I pursue in the next chapter. 
IV. Closing the argument 
We began this chapter by advancing four claims which, although all plausibleý 
could not all be true together. If emotions require having beliefs, I argued, and 
having belief requires mastering the concept of truth, then animals end up not 
having emotions for, presumably, they do not master the concept Of truth. This 
conclusion, I claimed is not acceptable. After exploring the options to get out of 
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this predicament, I suggested that the best strategy was not to deny that 
emotions do not have content, or that beliefs did not require the concepts of 
truth, but to examine the possibility that creatures might have contentful 
emotions that did not require having beliefs of the kind that requires the mastery 
of the concept of truth. I then motivated this strategy - the upshot of which is a 
picture of the mind that does not welcome a unified account of belief - by 
examining the case of irrational emotions, which suggests that we are capable of 
simultaneously entertaining emotional attitudes towards contents that pull in 
different directions. In order to articulate this thought, I borrowed from the 
literature on non-conceptual content, and I showed that there is a logical space 
for a notion of content that does not require, in order to entertain them, the full 
baggage of competences associated with the capacity for belief traditionally 
conceived. This logical space, it has been argued, is the natural home of 
perception. In this chapter, I have shown that, likewise, basic emotion - what I 
called emotional valuation - was a potential candidate for occupying this logical 
space, as it satisfied - in a manner akin to perception - the conditions for 
minimal content. If this is correct, we now understand how animals and young 
infants can have emotions conceived on a cognitive model without having 
beliefs on the model of the propositional attitudes. 

CHAPTER 4: FROM HAVING EMOTIONS TO BECOMING 
AWARE OF THEM IN OTHERS 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I formulate and defend the claim that the emotions of others are 
sometimes transparent to us. Intuitively, this is to say that if someone is 
experiencing fear just in front of me, if this person's face and body is fully "in 
view", if the lighting is good and I am attentive to what is happening in front of 
me, then becoming aware of this person's fear is not more difficult, not more 
complicated, not less obvious, not less immediate, not less direct, etc., than 
becoming aware of this person's skin colour, texture of hair, etc. That this 
person is frightened is as obvious to me 'as the fact that this person is, say, 
tanned. This is what I mean intuitively by the proposition that the emotions of 
others are often transparent to us. Moving away from intuitions a little, I take 
the transparency thesis, if it is going to be an interesting thesis, to imply at least 
the two following claims. First, if your fear is transparent to me, then there must 
be a sense in which what you feel now is something that I can feel myself. 
Second, if your fear is transparent to me, then there is a minimal sense in which 
I am aware of, or I am sensitive to, or I recognise, or understand, that you are 
experiencing or feeling fear. With regard to the first claim: that there should be 
a sense in which I feel your emotion, is meant to capture the idea that if the 
emotion of someone else is transparent to me than the apprehension of the other 
person's emotion is not mediated by something else, especially not something 
fundamentally different in nature to an emotion. With regard to the second 
claim: that there must be some kind of understanding on my part that the other 
person is undergoing a certain emotion, captures the idea that there must be a 
form of registering on my part that this is the case. The emotion of the other 
person must figure in some way in the content of the psychological episode I am 
going through. In this sense, the emotion is transparent to me, not because I can 
see through it, but because there is no obstacle in the way to my seeing it. 
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Why should one bother to defend the transparency thesis? A first 
obvious reason is simply to try and clarify and to possibly explain an intuition 
that we all have. Most of us agree with the fact that the boredom, sadness, 
annoyance, joys, excitement, fear, etc. of others often strikes us as obvious, even 
though, of course, it does not always make sense to us, and even though we 
often feel that the way we feel about others should be altered in the light of 
other evidence. In this sense, transparency does not entail infallibility or 
incorrigibility. Secondly and more importantly, if the emotions of others are 
transparent in the sense just outlined, then learning to apply emotions to one's 
self and others ceases to be a mystery. The mystery in question is, of course, 
entirely philosophical, for common sense uncorrupted by philosophy has never 
been particularly aware of a mystery. It just happens that the way most accounts 
of the mental in philosophy make use of a distinction between the 'inner' and 
the 'outer, for example, between feeling a certain way and the expression of 
this feeling, or, say, between a belief and its manifestation, etc., makes the 
learning of mental concepts, and in particular those concepts that refer to states 
having a qualitative aspect to them like the emotions, quite unintelligible. 97 
When the transparency thesis is articulated, however, the distinction between 
the inner and the outer ceases to be a threat to the possibility of learning the 
concepts of the emotions, as well as hopefully explaining our day to day 
emotional interaction with others. 
The reader will have, I hope, taken the right turn in the dialectics of this 
dissertation. Let me, however, make the way as clear as possible. I have argued 
in the first and second chapters that two intuitions concerning the perception of 
other people's experiences, respectively, the transparency and the ownership 
intuition, needed reconciliation if they were to live happily together. I have 
shown what strategy I believe could achieve this reconciliation, in particular 
how the idea of integrated perception and the distinction between vehicle and 
saliency were key elements in the pursuit of this strategy, with respect to its 
application to the case of sensation. In this chapter, I shall attempt to apply the 
same strategy to the case of emotions, for which some important preparatory 
97 Of course, the interpretationist tradition about which we already had the opportunity to talk 
(Chap. 3, sec. 11.2 above) is not prey to such a complaint, although its way out of the problem is, 
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work has been accomplished in the preceding chapter. I wish, however, to draw 
your attention to the following. In the second chapter, whilst examining 
Shoemaker's and Bernifidez's debate with respect to the necessary capabilities 
implicated in perception, recall that recognitional capacities in general involved 
at least a reference identification component and a property identification 
component. 98 And in the case of the perception of other people's emotions, it is 
tempting to assimilate the property identified with the emotion perceived and 
the reference identified with the creature experiencing the emotion. This, in 
turn, raises the question as to which of these two components I have in mind 
when claiming that transparenc implies recognition. Is it the case that both the Y 
reference identification component condition and the property identification 
component condition have to be met for recognition to take place? And if the 
reference identification component condition has to be satisfied, does it have to 
be satisfied in such way that it satisfies the ownership intuition as well? My 
answer to this will be the following: both conditions have to be met - to that 
much I am of course committed, as I have admitted that it is necessary for 
perception - although I shall claim that the satisfaction of the reference 
identification component condition is not such that that the ownership intuition 
will be fulfilled. 
L. I. The possibility of learning to recognise emotions in oneseýf and 
others 
As we have seen in the introduction of this thesis, the old 'reflection+analogy' 
theory on the one hand, and the Wittgenteinian attack and suggested alternative 
on the other hand, which can both be seen as constituting rival accounts of 
emotion recognition, fail because the former makes learning logically 
impossible - this is generally known as the conceptual problem of other minds - 
and the latter portrays learning in a way which is psychologically implausible. " 
I argued, at the expense of giving any role to the 'inner' in their account of the mental. 
98 See Chap 2, sec. 11.3 above. 
99 See introduction, sec. 11 above. 
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Brewer has recently proposed a solution to what he calls "another 
minds' problem" which should be of special interest to us-100 Brewer's focus is 
the conditions of possibility of one's capacity to apply emotional concepts to 
one's self and others in the light of the traditional conceptual problem of other 
minds. Although he does not place his account in this framework, this amounts 
to providing a story about how we learn emotional concepts which does not 
terminate either in the logical cul-de-sac of the 'reflection plus analogy' theory, 
or in the psychologically implausible picture of leaming offered by the theory- 
theorist. This project is of particular interest to me as it is precisely this middle 
route that I am pursuing, although, it should be emphasised, the picture I am 
about to put forward as to how we perceive emotions in others does not, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, require the mastery of any concepts 
whatsoever. In the story I am going to tell, applying emotional concepts to 
oneself and others is an achievement that comes much later and requires 
capacities far greater than those needed for the capacity to perceive emotions in 
oneself and others. This being said, the structure of Brewer's solution does not 
rest on these premises. His main idea is to exploit the model of "A's having a, 
specific emotion" to understand "A's understanding that B has a specific 
emotion". More specifically, the idea is that when I learn, for example, to feel 
frightened of some frightening item in the world, by the same token I learn to 
recognise fear in others. The claim I want to defend rests precisely on this 
strategy, and we shall now see how Brewer proposes to pursue it. 
It is only if access to emotions is radically different in one's own case 
than it is in the case of others that learning to apply emotional concepts is 
forever impossible. If I know what being angry means from how it feels to be 
angry in my own case, and if I can never feel that you are angry, than how could 
I possibly ever know that you are angry. Conversely, if I know that You are 
angry on the basis of what you look like when I am watching You, then how can 
I know that I am angry in the absence of the possibility of watching myself? 
Brewer's strategy is, therefore, to show how those things that are SuPposedly. ý 
accessible only on the first person mode (feelings) are such that they are or get, 
in fact, glued with those things that are supposedly accessible only in the third 
100 Brewer (forthcoming, 2001). 
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person mode (expressions of these feelings) in such a way that the above 
dilemma does not bite. The question "How can I ascribe an emotion to someone 
else on the sole basis of how this emotion feels to meT will not carry through in 
an account that glues experience and its expression in the right way. What 
Brewer is looking for is the glue between feeling a certain way and the 
expressive behaviour attached to this feeling. What is it, he asks, that unifies all 
experiences of fear into this con unction of feeling and expressive behaviour? 
Like Wittgenstein before him, and perhaps the contemporary theory- 
theorists, Brewer's answer is that the unifying factor, the "glue provider", 
should be something public, accessible to everybody, or as Brewer would put it 
"some mind-independent item". But, rather than pointing to the behaviour itself 
as the main candidate for constituting the gluing factor,, as Wittgenstein possibly 
did, and certainly the theory-theorist does, Brewer points, towards what elicits 
the behaviour. In the case of fear, for example, it would be the frightening. But 
let us elucidate this idea in more detail. 
Rather than starting right away with emotions, Brewer wonders what it 
is that makes the experience of a certain colour an experience of that type of 
colour. He begins by asking what it is that unifies all experiences of red - both 
yours and mine. What is it about a token experience of red that it is a token of 
just the type red? The difficulty here is to provide an account that is non- 
circular, an account that would not presuppose a prior understanding of the 
concept of red. Saying, for example, that experiences of red are just those 
experiences that are caused by red things is a non-starter, for it is not something 
we could learn to identify without prior grasp of what it is to have red 
experiences. Drawing on what Brewer calls the Strawson-Evans strategy to 
resolve this puzzle, he claims that it is by means of indexical reference to a 
mind-independent worldly item that red experiences can be something that we 
can learn to individuate from other types of experiences. And in the case of red, 
the worldly mind-independent item is the colour that presents the world as being 
like that (pointing at red patch). The indexical provides the necessary 
independent item for getting outside the circle that would make learning the 
concept of red impossible. 
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Now, it is the same strategy that Brewer tries to pursue with emotional 
experiences. He begins by pointing out that James's account of the emotions in 
terms of collections of sensations is tantamount to the account of experiences of 
red, in terms of that which causes red-experiences. It would make the learning 
of emotional concepts impossible. Although he reckons that James was 
absolutely right to think that feelings are an essential component of the 
emotions, he believes James has failed to appreciate the fact that emotions 
present mind-independent worldly states of affairs. 101 If James had taken that 
into consideration, only then would he have had a complete account of the 
emotions, one that would make acquisition of emotional concepts possible. The 
move is apparently quite straightforward. If red experiences are those 
experiences that present the world as that colour (pointing at red), says Brewer, 
then experiences of fear are those experiences that present the world as thus 
(pointing at the frightening). The strategy employed for observational concepts 
applies to emotional concepts, as fruitfully, or at least so it seems, until some 
marked difference emerges. And as we will see, it is precisely this marked 
difference that will ultimately provide the necessary glue between feeling and 
expressive behaviour. Whereas we might think that red items in the world cause 
red experiences, because red items all have in Common some essential physical 
properties, 102 it is clearly not the case with what is frightening. Nobody believes 
that the frightening is a physical property shared by all frightening things, a fact 
clearly brought home by noting that I might be afraid of something whereas you 
might not, and that this cannot always be explained away by the fact that you 
are blind to frightening things. This is why the indexical involved in emotional 
experiences is of a more complex nature than the kind of indexical involved in 
colour experiences. The frightening, says Brewer, is that which elicits a 
characteristic kind of behavioural response while genuinely being afraid of 
some worldly item. The indexical is, thus, ultimately a demonstrative directed at 
characteristic behaviour whilst experiencing the frightening. The original 
101 See Chap 3, sec. 11.3 above for the expression of similar worries concerning James' type 
accounts of the emotions. 
102 Brewer is certainly too optimistic here as to the possibility of reducing colours to physical 
properties. See Hutto (200 1) for a defence of the idea there might be much less difference 
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puzzle, which was to provide an account which would make it possible for a 
child to learn emotional concepts, is here resolved, as in the colour case, by 
appeal to a mind-independent indexical, but by contrast with the colour case, 
one that would be ultimately referring to expressive behaviour: 
[ ... ] the child learns simultaneously to categorize 
behaviour of just this type, thought 
whilst performing some appropriate exemplar, and to recognize various items as 
eliciting behaviour of that type in him. Thus, as his response develops into one of 
genuinely feeling afraid of the relevant worldly phenomena, say, he also acquires a 
detenninate identification of his, now expressive, behaviour in terms of which the 
feeling is itself to be individuated. 103 
Again, what this line of thought achieves is a middle route between two 
pitfalls: the old 'reflection+analogy' thesis on the one hand and one common 
application of Wittgenstein's 'private language argument' to the case of 
attribution of emotions on the other hand. The progress, we are led to suppose, 
is, first, that we are not faced anymore, as in the former account, with a picture 
in which the child learns about the relation between feelings and their 
expressions all by herself, and secondly, we are not faced either, as in the latter 
account, with a picture of the emotions in which feelings, either construed 
phenomenologically or as physiological bodily changes, play no role 
whatsoever. Reference to mind-independent items which are available to both 
child and caregivers and which ultimately refer to genuine expressive behaviour 
of feelings, allows Brewer to avoid falling into either of the two pitfalls, the 
mentalist one, or the behaviourist one. 
The problem, however, is that, unless we are told more about the relation 
between the feeling and its expression, the account might still be read on either 
of these two interpretations. That is to say, nothing at this stage prevents us, as 
Hutto rightly notes, from formulating the conceptual problem of other minds 
anew. 
For the fact is that in the example provided [the example is that of Brewer just 
quoted] the experience and expression of fear both belong to a single subject. Given 
this, we can ask how can 'that type' of genuinely expressive behaviour also apply to 
others? If the behavioural demonstratives in question are of an essentially self- 
referential kind our conception of experience would remain unacceptably first 
between colour perception and emotion perception than Brewer seems to believe (cf I lardin 
(1990, pp. 560-2, pp. 564-6), Dretske (1995, p. 89). 
103 Brewer (forthcoming, 2001). 
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personal, despite making essential reference to our own expressive behaviour. On the 
other hand, if the referent is the behaviour of others how can it apply to us? Starting 
from this position, we cannot help ourselves to the idea that the behaviour of others is 
genuinely expressive, unless we have somehow already solved the conceptual 
problem of other minds. 104 
It is not so much that the account is wrong-headed, Hutto continues, it is that it 
does not go far enough. The first worry is the following. Although we are told 
that there is some essential relation between feeling a certain way towards some 
worldly item and having a certain expressive behaviour on that occasion, we are 
not told from the perspective of the experience of the child how these essential 
components are for her glued together. The second worry is that, even if we 
were told that, we would still need a story that would tell us how this could be 
of any use for the ascription of emotions to others. Brewer is right to insist on 
cases of triangulation between child, caregiver and worldly items; however, it is 
significant that in his example the caregiver's sole function is to point to the 
adequate worldly items of the emotions, whilst the caregiver's own emotions 
seem to play no role at all in this learning process. The outcome, I believe, is 
that we need to supplement Brewer's account on two fronts. 
First, we have to explain how it is that from the child's perspective her 
feelings and their expression get glued together, and second, why this should be 
of use to explain the perception of emotions in others. My answer to the first 
question, which is surely compatible with Brewer's, is that emotionally 
experiencing some worldly item as so and so is neither particularly first personal 
nor particularly third personal. This idea might be contained in Brewer2s 
solution, but certainly not in an explicit way. To make the idea explicit it is 
necessary to go into the nature of emotions, which is something that Brewer 
does not do. My answer to the second question, as should become apparent, 
derives directly from the proper understanding of how the first person vs. third 
person distinction is articulated in my first answer. When those answers are 
provided, we shall understand how other people's emotions are transparent at a 
basic level, and how this, in turn, allows for the learning of emotional concepts 
and their application to particular individuals, others or oneself. It is crucial to 
have an appreciation of why it is important to get a grip on the kind of relation 
104 Hutto (forthcoming, 2001). 
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that holds between feeling something and the outward manifestation of this 
feeling. Let us first look, in attempting to answer our question - What does it 
mean for someone to experience the expressive behaviour of his or her own 
feelings? - at the kind of considerations Brewer could have brought in to clarify 
the nature of this intimate relation, and second, let us see why he owes us such a 
clarification. 
The sort of considerations I have in mind emanate first from results in 
developmental psychology and second from reflection on the phenomenology of 
the perception of other people's emotions. Research in developmental 
psychology - although Brewer does not touch on this in his article - suggests 
strongly that learning emotional concepts does not involve looking at one's 
behaviour in mirrors or such like devices when experiencing some particular 
feelings. Meltzoff et al have convincingly established through experimental 
work on imitation in infancy that this is not the case. 105 If the phenomenon of 
early imitation shows anything, it shows at least that there is no need for 
children to have any outer awareness of their bodily movements - in the sense 
of purely exteroceptive awareness - in order to have knowledge of the relation 
between bodily feelings and those bodily movements. 106 Of course - and this 
leads us to the phenomenological considerations - we did not need to be shown 
this by developmental psychology in order to believe it. We think we know that 
bodily experience is both experience of what we feel and of what we dol 
Although it is true that neither experimental data, nor phenomenological facts 
are commonly thought to be considerations of any strong weight in philosophy, 
nor are transcendental arguments of the kind Brewer relies on to make his point 
particularly in favour. 
But an explanation of how feelings and their expressions are connected 
in such an intimate manner from the point of view of the subject is needed, and 
this is so because of the same old powerful reasons. First, the need for 
explanation arises from reflection on examples in which we seem to have the 
feelings without the corresponding expression, a fact comparable to examples in 
105 E. g. Meltzoff (1993) Meltzoff & Moore (1977,1995); Meltzoff & Gopnik (1993). 
106 See Appendix I for a discussion of the significance of early imitation to the present 
discussion. See also Campbell (1995). 
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the domain action, in which we have the desires without the corresponding 
actions. But, second, and more importantly, not only do we think that those 
entities are separable, but also that the feelings explain the expression, the desire 
explains the action, etc., and if these explanations are to be non-circular, then 
the explanans and the explanandum had better be two separate entities. 
What we need, therefore, is a means (1) to reconcile a phenomenological 
fact backed by developmental psychology, i. e. that we experience, as it were, 
always from the inside and the outside at the same time, with a seemingly 
incompatible logical claim according to which (2) we can have the experience 
without its outward manifestations, the desire without the action, etc. But if it 
can be shown that the entities referred to in these two claims are, in fact, 
different entities despite bearing the same names, then we will at least have 
shown that there is no incompatibility between the two claims. 
The apparent incompatibility, I believe, arises from confusing the 
relation between feelings and the expression of the feelings on the one hand, 
with the relation between bodily response and its manifestation on the other 
hand, and similarly, confusing the relation between desire and action on the one 
hand, with the relation between motive and bodily activity on the other hand., 
What the worries show is that we do not, indeed, experience directly our 
feelings as coupled with their expressions and we do not experience directly our 
desires as tied to our actions. The reason for this is that any one feeling is 
compatible with any number of different expressions, and any one desire is 
compatible with any number of different actions. That is to say that there is 
always scope for interpretation when the time comes to make sense of an 
emotion or an action from the perspective of our everyday concepts as they exist 
in natural languages. Deciding what emotion I have, or deciding what action I 
perform requires a reflective or introspective attitude of classifying what I feel 
or what I do, and this activity of classification involves adopting what I have 
called the intellectualist strategy towards our emotions. It involves inference 
and cannot, thus, be just experienced. This is why one can be at pains to explain 
what one feels, why one is doing something, or what one is doing. This requires 
making sense of what one feels and what one does in the broader context of 
functional folk-psychological explanations. Now although this is true when 
adopting the intellectualist attitude, there is no reason to deny that there is a 
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sense in which we do experience the 'outer' manifestation of what goes on 
'inside' when experiencing an emotion. I will claim that experiencing a bodily 
response towards something 'from the inside', as it were, is also experiencing 
the manifestation of this bodily response 'from the outside'. 
These few remarks are, at this stage, only gestures at the solution I am 
aiming at. They are only gestures because it is only by going into some details 
into the nature of emotions, which Brewer does not do, that the metaphor 
between the inner and the outer will be understood. The program should be clear 
enough, however. If I am right, and if developmental psychology is right, then 
we start to understand why emotionally experiencing some worldly item might 
not be more first personal than third personal. 
Il. Basic emotions 
Let us now step back a bit, and recap the argument as we left it at the end of the 
last chapter. We have presented reasons (and accepted them) to the effect that 
emotions are cognitive states with content. Emotions must be, among other 
things, openings to a certain kind of information in the subject's environment. 
We have seen that the traditional way of conceiving of content, i. e. on the model 
of the propositional attitudes, is only part of the story that can be told about the 
emotions. Although, I argued, the model of the propositional attitudes does, 
indeed, capture an essential aspect of our dealing with the world and others, 
emotions cannot be just a mixture of beliefs and desires, for at least the 
following reasons. First, animal and young infants have emotions, but do not 
have propositional attitudes. Second, we are capable of irrational emotions, a 
phenomenon which does not seem to fit well in a purely belief/desire model of 
the emotions. What irrational emotions suggest is that there are different levels 
in our emotional dealings with the world. In the light of these considerations, I 
suggested that there might be a route out of this dilemma. If we can find a 
coherent notion of content that does not require for having it competences that 
animals and young infants are incapable of having, but is still powerful enough 
to figure in an account of their emotional capacities, then we do have a possible 
model of the emotions, or at least a possible model of some basic form of 
emotional capacities. It is, thus, high time to fulfil my promises, and elaborate 
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on the contrast I made between emotional valuations - and cognate notions such 
as v-values and v-contexts - on the one hand, and emotional evaluations - and 
cognate notions such as e-values and e-contexts on the other hand. To recall, on 
a first approximation the latter should be conceived on the model of 
belief/desire psychology and require the capacity to adopt the intellectualist 
attitude, whereas the fonner should not be so conceived. In this section, I 
explain what emotional valuations are, and in the next I suggest why these are 
such that access to them in other people is what I call transparent, and why this 
very fact makes learning emotional concepts possible. 
Basic emotions, I will argue, constitute sui-generis types of cognitive 
episodes of direct motivating bodily responses to something [a creature 
presently values in her environment, (either because she has always valued it or 
because she values it in the specific current circumstances)] that affects 
favourably or adversely the creature ftom her own perspective. This is the gist 
of the type of standard view I wish to defend. It is an account of what I called 
the standard type because the content of the emotion involves essentially 
values. 107 
In somewhat more detail: Emotional valuations are intentional contentful 
states. This incorporates the idea that they are cognitive states. These states 
present something that the subject cares about (the object of her emotion, as 
opposed to its target). The content of an emotional valuation is satisfied if the 
bodily response specifying this content affects what the creature cares about 
favourably from her own perspective. The content is not satisfied if the bodily 
response affects what the creature cares about adversely from her own 
perspective. 
My task now is to unpack this general characterisation. Among the key 
points of this characterisation that this account of our basic emotions should 
contain, we find the following key elements: (1) the notion of a motivating 
bodily response to what a creature values, (2) the notion of what a creature 
values, (3) the distinction between the target and the object of her emotion, (4) 
the idea that the bodily response is direct (5) the question of how the content of 
these states should be individuated, (6) the notion that these responses are 
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claims that the world makes on the creature, (7) the question of the 
circumstances (or context) in which those emotional episodes take place, (8) the 
question as to how thedifferent elements of this context interact to produce the 
emotional episode in question, (9) the question of how these emotional states 
will integrate with higher order thoughts, notably emotional evaluation, a 
creature with propositional attitudes has. 
In the previous chapter, we had the opportunity to expand partly on points 
(5), (6), (8) and (9). In what follows, I shall focus mainly on the other points and 
how what I am going to say bears on those we have already had the opportunity 
to look at. This I shall do, of course, in the perspective of the establishment of 
the transparency claim with respect to basic emotions in others and how this 
allows for the learning of emotional concepts. 
H. 1. Motivating bodily responses 
The notion of a motivating bodily response is not very happy, although it is one 
that I have carefully chosen. Emotion has been alternatively thought of as a 
special type of desire, a special type of perception, a special type of action, or 
some combination of these. Emotions might be thought to form desires of a 
kind because they are enough to motivate one to do something. Her anger seems 
enough to explain why she threw her coffee at him. Although we sometimes 
want to say that, not only was she angry at him, but also that she wanted to 
show him that it was the case, we often do not think that we need to appeal to 
any ffirther desire of that kind to explain why she acts the way she does. On 
reflection, however, one might think that the action itself is part of the emotion, 
or even the emotion itself. When we say that "she threw her coffee at him in 
anger", we might be thinking that what we do is precisely report her anger in 
this specific case. And that might prompt us to think of emotions as actions. But 
anger, one might object, is more a re-action, than an action. Getting angry is a 
case of registering, in a specific 'feely' mode, that something we care about has 
been tampered with in ways that displease one, and this is why we might be 
107 See Chap. 3, sec. 11.3 above. 
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prompted to think of emotions as perceptions, as cases of registering that 
something is going or not going in the way one wants it to go. 
None of these particular identifications, however, will do, at least for 
two reasons. First, because it seems totally arbitrary to identify emotions with 
either one of these three ways of thinking of emotions, and second, and more 
importantly, because although we think of desires, perceptions, and actions as 
being ingredients implicated in the emotions, it is very easy to find examples 
where we want to distinguish between any of these three ways for one to be 
engaged with the world, and the emotions that one might have in these 
occasions. 108 There is always a possible gap between getting informed of 
something, desiring something, acting upon this desire on the basis of this 
information on the one hand, and the emotion that one might have in the 
circumstances on the other hand. This is the reason why, in the previous chapter, 
we concluded that emotions couldn't just be a combination of propositional 
attitudes, and this is the reason why I concluded that Brewer owed us an 
explanation of how the different ingredients of the emotions got glued together 
in the ever-present possibility of gaps existing between them. 
Despite all that, however, I want to argue that emotional valuations can 
only be understood as a mixture of all these ingredients. Although an emotional 
valuation constitutes a sui-generis cognitive ability that is fundamentally a 
capacity to care about what happens to one, it can only be conceived of as 
involving these three ingredients. The fact that, in numerous cases of attempting 
to understand someone else, we are likely to find gaps between motivation,, 
perceptual input and behavioural output, should not deter us from thinking of 
emotional valuations as being fundamentally a case to be identified with all 
these ingredients. The gaps, I will argue, are in general to be explained by 
further beliefs, desires, or emotional evaluations, of which the interpreter might 
not be privy; and when this is the case, we are not facing emotional valuation 
108 Although my fear of failing in the water might be thought of as a strong desire not to be 
eaten by the crocodiles, we can always think of the fear separately from the desire. I might have 
the desire in question without the fear. She might be angry at him, but not throw the coffee at his 
face. Here it is the action that we can think of independently of the anger. And the same goes 
with perception. We want to say that I can perceive the danger, the aggression, the admirable 
qualities of someone, without respectively, being in fear, getting alert, or admiring the admirable 
person. Those considerations are, of course, of the kind that is always brought up against 
hardcore cognitive theories of the emotions. 
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only, but emotional evaluation as well. When motivation, perception and action 
come apart, we are forced into what I called the intellectualist strategy for 
understanding others (more on that soon), and this is precisely what animal and 
young infants are incapable of. 
The notion of a motivating bodily response to what one values is 
supposed to capture precisely this idea of a conjunction at the level of basic 
emotion of motivation, action and perception. It is a registering of how the 
environment is (with respect to what we want to do with it); bodily responding 
is also acting on this environment in ways profitable to one; and it is also a case 
of being motivated that some aspect (what one values) of this environment 
should be different in ways suitable to one, and in this sense, constitute a 
motivational state too. It is because these three aspects go essentially together at 
this level, as we will see, that being informed of one of these is being informed 
about the two others. 109 
Now, as shall become clear, I am not bluntly contradicting myself. That 
is, I am not saying that emotions cannot be a mixture of beliefs, desires, and 
actions, but nevertheless insisting that they are. There is no contradiction, for 
the ingredients I-am claiming are found together in basic emotions are primitive 
forms of desire, perception and action. What we do not find in basic emotions is 
the propositional attitudes corresponding to each of these. We should, thus 
distinguish between being motivated to do something and desiring that 
something be so and so, between perception and perceptualjudgement, between 
bodily activity and action. The first member of each of these distinctions is the 
name of a type of natural and personal response a creature might have vis-a-vis 
her envirom-nent, which contrasts with, first, the corresponding propositional 
attitude she might have which always involves classification and choice, and 
second, which contrasts with the corresponding 'mere' behaviour, i. e. the 
109 There are two interrelated worries here that are, as a matter of course, brought in any 
discussion of the emotions when those are broadly understood on a cognitive model. What about 
emotions without definite objects? What about emotions not linked with any particular action? 
These worries are related, since it is precisely those emotions that do not seem to present the 
specific items as tampering with one in specific ways (e. g. varieties of anxiety, joy, restlessness, 
excitement, etc. might have this feature of absence of focus) that are only weakly linked to 
action. I do not think I have to answer these worries here, given that my aim is to defend the 
transparency claim, which has limited scope, and not a full-blown and totally immune cognitive 
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behaviour looked at from a neutral scientific viewpoint, the non-personal point 
of view, which is always a possible way of looking at the creature's response to 
her enviromnent. 
H. 2. What we v-value and context 
Anything whatsoever, in a suitably complex context, could be something that a 
creatures values, and therefore might be the object of a creature's emotion. 
What a creature emotionally values in my sense (or v-values for short), i. e. the 
possible object of an emotional valuation is more definite, however, and this is 
central, as we shall see, if I want to keep my triad of primitive forms of action, 
perception and motivation together. Before I expand on what it is to v-value 
something or other, let me say a few words about the general picture I have in 
mind. 
It is familiar enough, if only because of the emotivist tradition, to think 
of the emotions as being connected with values in a very intimate way. That 
admiration is intimately connected with the admirable, or that irritation is 
intimately connected with the irritable is hardly controversial. The harsh 
disputes have always been about the way in which this connection should be 
understood. One of them revolves around the question as to whether the 
emotions in question, which seem to be directed towards values, should be 
viewed at all as cognitive states assessable in normative terms (true or false, 
correct or incorrect, fitting or unfitting, appropriate or inappropriate, etc), or 
whether these emotional states are just expressions (exclamations, screams, etc. ) 
of internal feelings and, thus, not at all assessable in normative terms. A second, 
and related, dispute revolves around the question as to whether those values are 
in some way projected onto the world by their corresponding emotions, or 
whether they rather serve as detecting mechanisms of their corresponding 
values. 110 A third, and related, dispute concerns the question as to whether 
theory of the emotions. For a discussion of possible answers to these kinds of worries, see e. g. 
deSouza(1987, pp. 134-139). 
110 The emotivist tradition represents the epitome of the projectivist view (Ayer 1976), whereas 
Tappolet's Experientialism constitutes the epitome of the realist view (Tappolet 2000). Most 
contemporary accounts, however, try to construe the connection between emotions and values 
dispositionally, on the model of the secondary qualities, and constitute, thus, a middle-ground 
position between these two extremes. McDowell (1985a), Wiggins (1987), Smith (1989), 
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emotions so conceived are sufficient in themselves for motivating the subject to 
act in ways corresponding to the way the subject appears to value some aspect 
of his environment, or whether we have to appeal to an extra desire to explain 
why the subj ect starts moving. III As to the first dispute, I have already insisted 
on the necessity of a cognitive account. Concerning the second dispute, we have 
already seen when unfolding the notion of a bodily response, that I take it that at 
the level of emotional valuation, motivation and action are fundamentally 
connected. The third dispute belongs to a greater debate about the metaphysics 
of values. Although a resolution of this debate would figure nicely in this thesis, 
I believe the bulk of what I wish to say about the emotions can be done without 
presuming anything about the reality of values. The reason I believe I can 
bypass the metaphysical debate at this stage resides in the fact that the object of 
an emotional valuation - what I will call a v-value to distinguish it from what 
philosophers might or might not mean by 'value' in general - is wholly 
dependent on the creature experiencing it. The content of emotional valuations, 
as I argued in the previous chapter, is wholly individuated via the interests, 
needs, wants of the creature having the bodily response in the specific 
circumstances. We will see now what this means, but it is clear that the account 
does not presuppose either a realist or a projectivist account of values. 112 In 
what follows, I will use realist formulations of the kind 'emotions present 
values' or 'emotions detect v-values', etc. By this, I claim only to describe the 
phenomenology of these episodes, not to offer an accurate account of what 
happens from the third person perspective. 
Now the core of the thesis. A property of an object, a state of affairs, a 
process, an event etc. is a v-value if it brings about directly a certain bodily 
response in the creature detecting it in the particular circumstances in which she 
Johnston (1989), Lewis (1989), Mulligan (1998), have all explored different ways of construing 
dispositionalism about values. 
III This debate rages in ethics under the general question 'should we be intemalist or extemalist 
in ethics? ' See e. g. Smith (1994, Chap. 3). The internalist believes that valuing something 
positively is also a case of being motivated to act positively toward it; the externalist (or 
Humean) believes that valuing something positively is one thing, and wanting to act positively 
with regard to it is another. This debate I believe is not irresolvable if we do distinguish between 
different levels of emotions. The distinction I operate between emotional valuation and 
emotional evaluation I hope dissolves the dispute. 
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is. By direct, here, I mean that the bodily response is not mediated by any 
further occurrent beliefs or further occurrent desires that the detector might 
have, or at least no beliefs or desires as conceived on the model of the 
propositional attitudes, as it has been understood in the third chapter. This does 
not mean, however, that the bodily response is entirely non-mediated, for this 
would be a non-starter. Emotional valuations, like all our cognitive states, take 
place in contexts. They take place in contexts that include many different 
components. Among them, we find such things as the long standing character 
traits (fearful, excitable, irritable, callous, impulsive, perverse, etc. ) of the 
subject, his long-standing interests (particular fancies, tastes, dislikes etc. ), his 
present interests (finding shelter, protecting his progeny, etc. ), his present mood 
(excited, nervous, restless, contented, etc. ), the state of his body (hot, cold., 
hungry, tired, ill, etc. ), and of course, his present perceptual awareness of his 
environment, etc. All these constitute states of the creature which are going to 
be causally significant in whether or not some emotional valuation is going to 
take place. Those states will interact causally to bring about a particular 
motivating bodily response. A state with content 'grass is edible, is sufficient 
for being ari emotional valuation, and thus anepisode of a detection of a v-value 
if, given the context in which it occurs, it triggers a definite motivating bodily 
response. But note that none of the states basing the emotional valuation are 
propositional attitudes. A context that does not include propositional attitudes, I 
call a v-context, a context that brings about emotional valuations. A context that 
involves propositional attitudes, I call an e-context, a context that brings about 
emotional evaluations. 
Consider the following example. If I am told to jump each time I see a 
patch of yellow, this bodily response is mediated by the belief that I am 
supposed to jump each time I see a patch of yellow, and the desire to follow the 
instruction. Yellow in this context is, therefore, not a v-value, and seeing yellow 
is therefore not an emotional valuation. This is not to say that in some other 
context this could not be the case. A childhood trauma linked to yellow might 
prompt me to run away each time I face a patch of yellow. In this case, I 
experience an emotional valuation and yellow is a v-value. Compare with this 
more complex example. Imagine I emotionally value a lion as dangerous. This 
state, together with the other states in which I am, motivate MY running away, 
From having emotions... 135 
together perhaps with the judgement that the lion is dangerous. At the last 
second, however, I succeed in controlling my fear, i. e. controlling my running 
away; I manage to look in the air calmly as I have been told to do in such 
circumstances. This action of looking in the air is not directly linked to my 
registering the roaring lion, for it is mediated by the procedure I have been told 
to follow in the situation. This further mediation, I want to argue, rules out on 
the present account the resulting bodily response from being an emotional 
valuation. It is only because I am endowed with inferential capacities linked 
with the application of principles relative to the correct behaviour in the 
presence of lions, that I succeed in remaining calm in the situation. Most 
probably I continue to emotionally value the lion as dangerous, whilst I evaluate 
that the lion is not dangerous as long as I do not move. This example reminds us 
of course of Montaigne's philosopher. 
Now, it is important to realise that the notion of a v-value is much too 
coarse, i. e. is much too encompassing, to account for the complexity of the 
structure of the emotions, even at the basic level with which I am concerned. A 
familiar and important distinction in the literature on the emotions between the 
ject or formal object target of the emotion (what causes the emotion) and its ob 
(what the emotion is about) should be brought to bear on the present exposition 
if we want to be faithful to the phenomena. 113 In fact, more often than not, our 
emotions are triggered by signals or cues of what we v-value (the target of the 
emotion), and not directly by what we v-value (the object of the emotion). That 
noise might trigger my fear, but my fear is about the elephant that makes that 
noise, not the noise itself; that smell triggers my joy, but my joy is about the 
lasagne, not its smell; that face of yours might make me feel uncomfortable, but 
my discomfort is about us being unwelcome at the party, not about your 
113 In fact, distinguishing between the target and the object of the emotions is only a first step in 
the possible relevant distinctions that might be brought to bear on the discussion. One can 
distinguish between the proximal target and the distal target, between the illusory target and the 
real target. Second, one can distinguish the object of the emotion, e. g. my friend Jeremy, and the 
focus of my emotion, e. g. his eating habits. One can distinguish between the focus of the 
emotion, e. g. his eating habits, and theformal or evaluative property this habit instantiates, e. g. 
the disgusting. The notion of a v-value attempts to capture the latter notion. But v-valuing, 
rather than being the application of a formal concept, e. g. 'this is disgusting! ', is to be in a 
specific motivational state prompting one to act in certain ways, e. g. 'expressing disgust'. See 
e. g., de Souza (11987), Chap. 5, for a full layout of the complexities associated with the objects 
of the emotions. 
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grimace. Even more problematically, unrest or fear might, for example, be 
triggered by the absence of what we care about. When the wild-beast notices 
that her offspring is not under the tree where she left it, her unrest is triggered 
by an empty space, whereas her unrest might be thought to be explainable only 
by reference to her progeny. In all these cases, it might be argued, the formal 
object of the emotion (what I called v-value) is different from its target (the 
causal factor signalling the presence or absence of what is v-valued). What is 
important to note is that cues or signals do not have, from the point of view of 
the creature experiencing the emotion, an existence independently of what they 
are cues for, or signals of. Cues and signals are internally related to what they 
are cues for or signals of, and certainly in human creatures, both the cue and 
what the cue is a cue for are salient to them. If this is correct, the content of an 
emotional valuation always contains their v-value in the sense of being salient to 
creature having the state with this content. 
113. From emotional valuation to emotional evaluation 
In the previous section, I have suggested that what is salient to a creature 
experiencing a basic emotion is -some - object, event or process as 
having a v- - 
value. When I experience hate towards someone, what is before my mind is a 
hateful individual. Many aspects of the basic emotions are not salient to me. 
The bodily changes that I experience while the episode of hate occurs are, in 
fact, chief among the aspects of the emotion which are not salient to me. In this 
respect, ordinary language is particularly deceiving. For most properties which 
are presented to us via our emotions bear names that refer implicitly to the 
feelings accompanying the emotions that reveal them. "Hateful", "admirable". 
"funny", "amazing", seem to be, in ordinary language, the evaluative properties 
corresponding respectively to the emotions of "hating", "admiring", "having 
fun", "being amazed at", etc. But those, I wish to argue, are only the concepts 
corresponding to the v-values of these emotions, not what is salient to the 
creatures experiencing these emotions. When I experience hate, the bodily 
changes I go through are not part of the content of my present intentional state. 
Hate is the perception of the possibility of a violent action, admiration is the 
perception of the possibility of reverence, etc. "Fear" is the perception Of the 
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possibility of avoiding a danger, not the perception of the frightening, as Brewer 
seems to believe. This is to say that ordinary language registers the concepts 
corresponding to the emotions, what I call the e-values, i. e. the objects of our 
emotional evaluations, and not the v-values, the objects of our emotional 
valuations. Growing up, we learn to pay special attention, or reflect upon what 
reveals the object of our emotions. We learn to pay special attention to, or 
reflect on, the vehicles of our emotions, i. e. the special feel of hate, the bodily 
changes accompanying fear, etc. By doing this we make salient what is not at 
the level of emotional valuation. We also learn to apply special abstract labels to 
the objects of those emotions, labels whose linguistic roots C'hateful", 
"shameful") remind us of the feelings that reveal them. We are taught about the 
typical causes of such episodes, and we learn to discriminate the interests, 
needs, and wants, which have to be present for the emotions to take place. 
Learning this is learning to be a creature capable of emotional evaluation, that 
is, learning to be a creature capable of learning about her mental states 
themselves, and how they present the world to be. This is the first step in the 
learning of what Brewer has in mind when he talks about leaming to apply 
-emotional concepts, 
to one's self and to others, the first step that will lead to the 
capacity of, more generally, becoming a competent Folk Psychologist. It is also 
the first step in learning to control our emotions, and inhibit the natural bodily 
reactions accompanying them. 
I will soon return to this line of thought. For now, let me just say that this 
capacity for emotional evaluation, I conceive of as the capacity to adopt what I 
called the intellectualist attitude towards emotions, i. e. the capacity to 
discriminate between the different ingredients involved in emotions, the 
capacity to reason inferentially on the basis of these discriminations for the 
planning and the execution of specific projects involving negotiation or 
interaction with our fellow human beings, and much more. This contrasts with 
another capacity that infants and higher animals also have, the pragmatist 
attitude, which does not involve the capacity to make any of these 
discriminations, but that, nevertheless, allows for a transparent awareness of 
other creatures' emotions, or so I shall argue in the second part of this chapter. 
If I am right, the conceptual capacity that Brewer has in mind, therefore, is 
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based on a more primitive capacity that alone allows for this conceptual 
capacity to emerge in human beings. 
111. The transparency of emotions 
Case study 1: 
Barnab6 and his wife Kundgonde are on the 
beach, sitting on the sand, facing the sea. They are 
talking departmental politics. In fact, Kun6gonde's 
upper body and head is turned toward her husband. 
She sees his profile only, for he keeps an eye on their 
child, Anatole, who is crawling in the water some 
thirty yards away. A drama is about to unfold. 
Anatole's little head disappears from the surface of 
the water. BarnabCs whole body suddenly stiffens 
with fear, something his wife notices immediately. 
Her arms are already lifting her body from her sitting 
position when her eyes reach the sea and start to scan 
the water for a sign of little Anatole. When, one 
second later, she is up on her feet, she can see her 
husband entering her field of vision; he is running 
towards the water, and jumping in order to have a 
better view of the surface of the water. She herself is 
already running and jumping. 
Case study 2: 
Kun6gonde is a single mother on the beach 
watching on her son, Anatole, who is playing in the 
water. Raymond is the local resort 'geezer' 
determined to have a good day with female tourists. 
He spots the lonely Kundgonde on the beach and, 
without asking permission, sits next to her. As he sits 
down, he sees fear on her face. He immediately turns 
his eyes in the direction of the water, and spots the 
little Anatole in deep waters. Right away, not 
believing his good luck (opportunities for being a 
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hero are rare), he runs to save the little child from 
certain drowning. 
Case study 3: 
Gwendoline is Bamab6 and Kun6gonde's 
babysitter. While distractedly watching the little 
Anatole playing in the water, she lets herself be 
courted by Raymond. Suddenly she can't see Anatole 
anymore on the surface of the water. Immediately she 
feels Kun6gonde's panic even though Kun6gonde is 
not even present. 
1. From sensations to emotions 
It is now time to bring together the two themes developed so far in this chapter, 
i. e. the structure of emotion learning and the structure of the emotions on the 
one hand, with the main claim of this chapter concerning the transparency of the 
emotions at the level of basic emotions on the other hand. I will argue that it is 
because emotional valuations of others can be transparent to us that we can learn 
to be competent in the capacity of emotional evaluation, the capacity to apply 
emotional concepts to ourselves and others. Our first task is, therefore, to argue 
for the transparency claim. To that purpose, I will attempt to exploit the strategy 
developed in the second chapter concerning sensations and apply it to the 
emotions as conceived here. For those readers who have the second chapter still 
firmly in mind, it should be apparent how the notion of a motivating bodily 
response as not being in any way constituted by either uniquely first or uniquely 
third person access to them on the one hand, and the distinction between vehicle 
and saliency on the other hand, will now be put to use for the defence of the 
transparency claim with regard to the emotions. 
Let us remind ourselves of the bare bones of this strategy. I started by 
insisting that perception in general was integrative in at least three ways: first, 
perception is sensitive to and acts upon invariants of the sensory field, second, 
perception is cross-modal, and third, perception delivers both world and sclf 
specifying information. I then argued that the objects of such perceptions so 
construed included sensations. I remarked as well, that whether or not we accept 
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that perception in general is integrated in this sense, there is prima facie a 
marked difference between the perception of my own sensations on the one 
hand, and sensations of others on the other hand. For, whereas the possibility of 
seeing a tree from a different angle from that which I actually see it is a real 
possibility, the possibility of seeing your sensation from another angle from that 
which I actually see it, in particular the angle you have on it 'from the inside', is 
not a real possibility. 114 
In the second chapter, I argued that this is, in fact, only a prima facie 
difference, which is wholly dependent on a specific view of the perception of 
our own sensations -a view that is certainly questionable. This view, often 
attributed to Wittgenstein and explicitly defended by Shoemaker, has it that 
there is a necessary relation between the sensation and its perception on the 
first-personal case, which makes it a very eccentric case of perception, if 
perception at all. And if, the argument continues, this is the canonical way we 
get to know about our own sensations, then it is difficult to see how it can be of 
any help for the perception of other people's sensations. 115 By contrast,, 
however, if it can be shown that there is no such intimacy between perception 
and sensation, i. e. that the structure of first-person and third-person PerceDtion is 
the same, and that integration of these two angles, or poles of the perception of 
sensations is the canonical way we get to know about them, then there is 
absolutely no reason why it cannot be used to perceive other people's 
sensations. In fact,. if this is so, I remarked, we face somewhat the converse 
problem. It appears now that the sensations of others can be felt by me as if they 
were my own, or perhaps more alarmingly, as if they did not belong to 
anyone. 116 The solution to that, I suggested, consisted of bringing to bear an 
important distinction between what is salient in such perceptual episodes, and 
the vehicle of such episodes. I remarked that we can learn to pay special 
114 This is what prompted Husserl at the last moment to re-introduce the notion of analogy. See 
Chap. 2, sec. 111.2 above. 
See Chap. 2, sec. 11.3 above. 
116 This was the main worry against Scheler's account of empathy. See Chap. 2, sec. 111.2 
above. 
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attention or reflection to the vehicles of these perceptions, i. e. their sensory 
basis, and that questions of ownership got resolved in that way. 117 
If the premises of this argument are correct, i. e. (1) there is no structural 
difference between first and third person perception of sensations that makes 
such perceptual episodes uniquely first-personal in such a way that they cannot 
be accessed to from the third person point of view, (2) that ownership can be, 
nevertheless, accounted for by distinguishing between what is salient in having 
a sensation and the sensory vehicle of this sensation, then we have 
supplemented Brewer's account with the necessary glue between 'inside' and 
'outside' which alone can account for the way my own experiences 
(reinterpreted as integrated perception) can be the basis on which I learn to 
ascribe experiences to others, without compromising irrevocably the distinction 
between having a sensation (first person perspective) and observing one (third 
person perspective). But, Brewer is talking about emotions, not sensations. My 
duty now is to convince you that this strategy can be applied to emotions as 
well. 
The basic difference between sensations and emotions is to be found in 
the location of their typical objects. Whereas sensations are only felt in bodies, 
either in one's own body or, as we just reminded ourselves, in the body of 
someone else, the object of an emotion can also be felt outside the body. In fact, 
the objects of the emotions are to be found mainly outside the body; however, 
this is just a statistical fact, not a logical one. If the object of an emotion might 
be anything that one v-values, then it can be anywhere, and of course there are a 
lot of things that I might v-value in my body or in other's people bodies. Chief 
among the objects that I v-value, we find the emotions of others or the v-values 
these emotions signal or are cuesfor. 
So emerges the intriguing thesis, according to which basic emotions in 
others are typical objects of ý our basic emotions. Basic emotions, the 
phenomenon I cashed out under the label of emotional valuation is, I claim, a 
means by which I get informed about someone else's emotional valuations. This 
merely follows from what has been said so far. Let us recap. Emotional 
valuations are responses to what one v-values. Emotions of others are typically 
117 See Chap. 2, sec. 111.4 above. 
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things that one v-values. But a basic emotion, as construed here, is a motivating 
bodily response. So chief among the objects of basic emotions we find 
motivating bodily responses. For A to v-value B's emotion is for A to be aware 
of (to bodily respond to) the motivating bodily response B is undergoing. If this 
is true, an episode of A's v-valuing B's emotion is for A to be aware of a great 
deal of B's current psychological life. Or is it? I take it that if the two conditions 
for transparency are met, then A will, indeed, be aware of great deal of his 
current psychological life, although of course, this will not amount to a full- 
blown conceptual capacity with respect to the emotions. It is possible to say, 
though, that A's motivating bodily response to B's is both a case of sharing and 
recognising. 
Let us now turn to our case studies for purposes of illustration, which I 
take to be typical examples of v-valuings of other people v-valuings. First, these 
stories illustrate why other people's emotions are typical objects of v-valuings. 
This is the case for many reasons: (1) interactions with others involve 
expectations as to how we want the immediate or less immediate future of our 
dealings with them to progress. Keeping an eye on the figure and posture of 
others is to be informed about what happens to them relative to what we need 
from them. For, we might want to keep them happy, we might want them to feel 
threatened, guilty, etc. (2) It is a means by which we can gather information 
about those bits of the environment that we v-value and of which we are not 
directly aware, for example, because it is not directly in our visual field as in the 
first case study. Kundgonde can watch the sea, where she knows little Anatole 
is, by watching her husband. (3) It is a means by which we can gather 
information about bits of the environment that we might potentially v-value, 
even in the total ignorance of what this environment contains with respect to our 
interests. Raymond, in the second case study, appears to become aware of a 
danger just by looking at Kunegonde even though he doesn't even know about 
Anatole's existence. (4) Gwendoline, in the third case study, appears to ascribe 
an emotion to Kundgonde, although in her absence, just by realising that 
Anatole has disappeared. 
Most of these cases, at the level of description they have been presented,, 
I will argue, can be explained by means of our capacities for emotional 
valuation alone. That is, those examples are typical cases in which the emotion 
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of someone else is transparent to one in the sense defended here. In most of 
these stories, although at varying degrees, the other person's emotion is both 
shared and recognised. I will argue that it is shared in the sense that, for each of 
the two protagonists involved in each of these scenarios, the object of their 
emotions, what they v-value, is the same. I will argue that it is recognised by the 
witness protagonist in each of these stories because the target of their emotion, 
what triggers it, is the motivating bodily response of the protagonist in which 
they witness the emotion. The rest of this chapter should make this complex 
claim clear. 
What I have done so far is outline the key elements that we should focus 
on in our attempt to exploit the argument concerning the transparency of other 
people's sensations in order to defend the same argument in the case of the 
emotions of other people. What we have seen is that, given the complex 
structure of the emotions even at the basic level with which we are concerned, 
the perception of those in others is going to be even more complex, as we have 
just seen. Despite that, however, I believe emotional valuation alone can explain 
what happens in these different stories, or at least in the first two. I shall focus 
on the first case study first. 
111.2. Barnabe, Kunegonde and Anatole: dissecting the drama 
Let us see how an account of our little tragedy (first case study) would be 
accounted for in terms of emotional valuation. A friend of explanations in term 
of emotional valuation will say that Barnabd directly bodily responds in the way 
he does because something he cares about and of which he is perceptually 
aware, Anatole, has been affected in a way that, to say the least, displeases him. 
The first element that we should sort out is the context in which Bamab6 finds 
himself. Now this question does not make sense in the abstract. A context is 
always a context relative to an answer to a specific question; it depends 
crucially on what we want to explain. Although the brand of the towel on which 
Barnab6 sits might be part of a description of the situation in which he is, it 
might not be relevant to why he jumps to his son's rescue. But even when we 
exclude obviously irrelevant parameters in the explanation of BarnabCs 
response, we might still wonder whether, for example, the fact that he is a 
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responsible father, or the fact that he lost his mother at sea should figure in the 
explanation. The only possible way of answering this question is by determining 
further the question we are looking for. In accordance with my account of 
emotional valuation we should only appeal to minimal content in terms of 
saliency - that which directly explains his emotional response as a satisfaction 
of a motive. Those elements that are going to be appealed to, I claim, are also 
the minimal ingredients needed for making sense of the way his wife will bodily 
respond to his motivating bodily response. In short, these are the minimal 
conditions for adopting the pragmatist attitude toward Barnabe. These 
ingredients will form what I called the v-context, and is the only thing we need 
consider. In this perspective, the context in which Barnabd's reaction of fear 
takes place is one that involves the perceptual awareness of the surroundings in 
which his son chiefly figures. It includes, too, the fact that he is responsible for 
the safety of his son. Barnabd emotionally values the situation in which his son 
is as fairly dangerous. This is what is salient for him. And this is all we need 
take into account to explain, again on the pragmatist mode, his emotional 
valuation. Moreover, I will argue, it is all that is needed to explain Kundgonde's 
emotional response to that of her husband. For the relevant context that explains 
her emotional response is the same as the relevant context that explains hers. Let 
us see why. 
Her perceptual awareness before the drama reaches its climax is one in 
which the posture and figure of her husband chiefly figures. By hypothesis, she 
is as much as her husband concerned with the safety of her son. Now, things get 
a bit complicated, for we have here three possible descriptions of her emotional 
state. First, we can describe her, during this lapse of time, as emotionally v- 
valuing her husband's bodily posture and figure as one of v-valuing his son's 
situation as fairly dangerous. Second, we can describe her as v-valuing the face 
and posture of her husband as fearful. Third, we can describe her, as her 
husband, as being in a state of v-valuing the situation of her son as fairly 
dangerous. The first description ascribes to her a meta-representation, she 
represents to herself the way her husband represents to himself his surroundings. 
In the second description we avoid such ascription. Both the target of her 
emotion and the object of her emotion are different from the target and the 
object of his emotion. In the third description, we account for the difference 
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between their two situations simply by noticing that their respective emotions 
have different targets, despite having the same object. If I were forced to 
describe her situation in the first way, then my account fails, for reasoning from 
meta-representations entails exercising inferential capacities, i. e. entails 
adopting the intellectualist attitude. If I were forced into the second description, 
my account would fail for a different reason. For, how could I say that she feels 
his emotion, i. e. shares it, when both the target and the object of her emotion are 
different from the object and the target of his? Hopefully, I am not forced into 
either of these descriptions, for the third description, one that neither requires 
meta-representation, and thus inference, nor excludes the possibility of 
Kundgonde genuinely sharing her husband's emotion, while also recognising it, 
is available to me. That this option is open to me should be made clear in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
111.3. The transparency of emotions 
The questions we now have to answer are: First, how can the argument for the 
transparency of sensation be exploited for the development of the same 
argument concerning the emotions, given that the objects of the emotions, as 
opposed to the objects of sensations, are v-values outside the body? Second, 
how will the transparency claim resolve Brewer's problems concerning the 
possibility of learning to be competent attributers of emotions? 
In the first place, we ask ourselves whether emotions are such that they 
allow the two steps argument leading to the favourable conclusion reached for 
sensations. In other words, first, can it be said of emotions that access to them is 
not uniquely first personal to the extent that third-person access to them is 
impossible? Second, does the distinction between saliency and vehicle apply to 
basic emotions in the relevant way? Most of the material needed to answer these 
questions has already been expanded upon. But let us see now how it compares 
with sensations. We remember that our chief reason for denying that part of 
what it is to be a sensation was for it to be perceived in a uniquely first person 
way, was that we saw no reason why sensations like regular perceptions should 
not be construed as intentional states. Now, although there might be 
controversies as to whether sensations can be construed as intentional states, this 
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is not the case with emotions that are generally regarded as intentional states, as 
we have argued at length in the third chapter. We might be concerned, however, 
for another reason. If we think that the emotions we experience are directly 
dependent on the particular beliefs and the particular desires we have, then there 
is a clear sense in which emotions are first personal in a sense that sensations 
are not. For, whereas your pain is in general there for me to see, your belief, for 
example, that all the croissants have been sold, which is why you are now sad, is 
nowhere to be seen. The first thing to note is that the sense in which emotions 
might be thought to be first personal in this instance has nothing to do with the 
sense in which sensations might be thought to be uniquely first-personal. 
Although, of course, you might lie to me about your beliefs, there are no reasons 
why I should not be, in principle, capable of knowing about your beliefs in the 
same way that you know about them. 118 So the difference with sensation here 
remarked upon is not the relevant one. Second, if there are such things as 
emotional valuations, which, to recall, do not involve any propositional 
attitudes, then the objection is anyway outside the scope of my claim. My claim 
is about emotional valuations, not about emotional evaluations, which are 
clearly not things one can perceive directly. The upshot is that there is no prima 
facie reason, at least not on the line pursued here, why the way I have conceived 
of first and third person perspective on the emotions should in any way 
constitute a barrier for the development of the parallel argument I am seeking 
for emotions. It remains to be seen, however, whether and how both the 
recognition and sharing components of transparency are satisfied by episodes of 
v-valuations of other people's v-valuations, and, in particular, whether the 
recognition is such that, as in the sensation case, other people's v-valuations do 
not present themselves as owned, i. e. do not present themselves as mine rather 
than yours? 
Basic emotions are motivating bodily responses to some v-value that is 
presently salient to a creature. These responses are cases of integrated 
perception in the sense of being both a proprioceptive and exteroceptive 
I 18 This statement presupposes that not only have I no immediate knowledge of the content of 
my beliefs, but that I do not have immediate knowledge of my beliefs either. That is, I can lie to 
myself about what I believe. This is not to imply, however, that I do not have immediate 
knowledge of what I currently believe I believe. 
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awareness of what one is doing with respect to some perceived v-value of an 
object or situation. Reflection on the phenomenology of these episodes, what is 
salient in them, shows that the content of these episodes does not seem to make 
any explicit reference to the creature having the emotion. Reference to the 
creature experiencing the emotional valuation, as in the case of sensation, 
seems, in the ordinary case, only implicit. Fear, for example, is the experience 
of 'that danger to be avoided' not the experience of 'my motivation to avoid the 
present danger', nor 'this is a danger to me'. Of course, what is salient to the 
creature appears to have a direct effect on the creature's behaviour - it is her 
body that she moves away when in fear - but this behaviour and its motives are 
not represented explicitly by the creature as being her own. To convince oneself 
of this phenomenological claim, one should think of how it feels to experience 
someone else's emotion, e. g. fear, in the ordinary case. Witnessing the fear of 
someone else in the ordinary case is also a case of v'-valuing the situation as 
being potentially dangerous. The object of both creatures' emotions, the one 
experiencing the emotion in the first place, and the one witnessing it, is the same 
v-value. It is an experience of 'that danger to be avoided', not 'your motivation 
to avoid danger' or 'this danger to you to be avoided'. Describing Kundgonde's 
emotional response to the fear of her husband in the first case study as an 
experience that refers to Barnab6's motivation to avoid danger just 
misrepresents the content of her experience. What is salient to her is the danger 
to be avoided. Her emotional valuation is, in all relevant respects, qualitatively 
the same as that of her husband. This, I suggest, is reflected in the following 
description of the climax of our little drama. Although the TARGET of their 
respective emotion is different, the object of their respective emotion is not. 
Barnabe's bodily response (triggered by ANATOLE'S DISAPPEARANCE) is 
- and strikes Kundgonde as such -a motive to keep Anatole safe. Kundgonde's 
bodily response (triggered by his BODILY RESPONSE) is a motive to keen 
Anatole safe. 
The second case study - where the witness protagonist, Raymond is 
ignorant of what the second protagonist, Kundgonde, v-values - can be 
described in more or less the same way, although the degree to which they share 
the emotion is less. Although the TARGET of Kundgonde's and Raymond's 
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respective emotion is different, the obiect of their respective emotion is not. 
Kunegonde's bodily response (triggered by ANATOLE'S DISAPPEARANCE) 
is a motive to keep Anatole safe. Raymond's bodily response (triggered by her 
BODILY RESPONSE) is a motive to keep someone or somethin , safe. 
Raymond, not knowing of Anatole's existence, of course, cannot share 
completely Kun6gonde's emotion, but can certainly share its main ingredient, 
which is a danger to be avoided, or something to be kept safe. 
If this is a correct description of what happens when Kun6gonde 
responds to her husband's response, or when Raymond bodily responds to 
Kun6gonde's bodily response, then I have shown that the first step of the two 
steps strategy that applies to sensations, applies to emotions as well. That is, I 
have shown that at least one of the two components which I claimed constituted 
transparency, namely, the sharing component, is present in the case of 
awareness of others people's basic emotion. If their respective emotions have 
the same object, they v-value the same object or the same aspects of a situation, 
then they clearly have the same emotion type, or more or less the same emotion 
type, even if, of course, they are numerically different. 
It will be objected, however, that the second condition for transparency 
is not met, i. e. that there is no clear sense in which Kundgonde recognises her 
husband's emotion. That this is the case can be illustrated by the following 
thought experiment. If it were a mirror, rather than her husband's motivating 
bodily response that was the target of Kun6gonde's emotion, i. e. it was a mirror 
that was signalling to Kun6gonde the disappearance of her child as opposed to 
her husband's bodily response, then again we would have a case where the 
targets of Kunegonde's and Barnabd's respective emotions are different, but the 
object of their respective emotions is the same. In this instance, however, we 
would not be tempted for one second to say that she recognises his emotion, 
even if their emotions have the same object, - i. e. even if they would be sharing 
the same emotion type - for by hypothesis in this case, his emotion is in no way 
part of her field of consciousness. But where is the difference, the objector will 
ask, between the normal case and the mirror case? In other words, what is it that 
makes Kun6gonde's emotion not only qualitatively identical to that of her 
husband, but makes it also a case of recognition of her husband's emotion. 
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What the objector presupposes is that for it to be a case of her 
recognising his emotion, she has to recognise it as his emotion. In Shoemaker's 
terms, what the objector wants is not only the satisfaction of the property 
identification component condition - in this case the identification of Barnabd's 
bodily response as indicating danger, but also the satisfaction of the reference 
identification component condition, in this case, Barnabd as Barnabd, however 
we need to cash that out. In other words, the fact that it is his emotion should, 
according to the objector, be salient to her. Is that true? I do not see any reasons 
why this should be the case. It is sufficient that she bodily responds to his 
motivating bodily response for it to be a case of her recognising his emotion. 
This is enough for the satisfaction of the reference identification component 
condition, and the fact that the referent is Barnabd's bodily response as 
indicating danger is sufficient for distinguishing this case from the case where 
she bodily responds to Anatole's disappearance via the mirror. For although his 
motivating bodily response is not salient to her as belonging to him, as owned 
by him, the motivating bodily response itself is certainly salient to her, not the 
mirror. Again, the objection would go through if it were the case that 
experiencing a bodily response was fundamentally either first personal or third 
personal, for in this case, we would want to say that Kundgonde does not have 
at all Barnabd's first person perspective on the danger. But, as I hope to have 
shown, this distinction so understood is not available. If that is correct, then the 
second component of transparency, i. e. recognition, is now satisfied, and we 
therefore have an understanding of what it means for someone else's emotion to 
be transparent. Both the sharing and recognition conditions are met in emotional 
valuations of other people's emotional valuations, although the recognition 
component is such that the ownership intuition does not get decided at that 
level. But remember, this is exactly what was expected if the emotion 
recognition case is, indeed, parallel to the sensation recognition case. 
As for the third case study, the situation is more complex, as Kundgonde 
is not experiencing any emotion to which Gwendoline might be said to respond. 
At the hour of the drama, Kun6gonde is yet ignorant of what happens, and the 
case can only be described as Gwendoline imagining Barnabd's motivating 
bodily response. The issues of sharing and recognising here of course do not 
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make sense, as there is no emotion to be shared or recognised. The interesting 
question here is, in the hypothesis that Gwendoline herself does care about the 
fate of Anatole outside of her awareness of his parents caring for him, there is a 
sense in which her panic is also the panic of Anatole's parents. She might be 
said to share their concern in the sense of having made it hers, but without 
representing this concern as being Bamab6's or Kunegonde's. This kind of case 
deserves much more attention than can paid to it here. 
Iff. 4. Transparency and learning to ascribe emotions 
If the objector accepts the argument about recognition of emotions not having 
contents representing explicitly their owners, she will still want to know how we 
end up ascribing emotions to specific people. In the story told so far nothing 
seems to explain that practice. Here, we reach the second step of our two steps 
argument; it is the point where we should bring to bear the distinction we made 
between saliency and vehicle in the case of emotions, as we did for the case of 
sensations, and use this distinction to explain the question of the ownership of 
the emotions. It is also the point in the discussion at which the distinction 
between emotional valuation and emotional evaluation should become 
completely clear, and the point where a final explanation of the general structure 
of the process by which children learn to apply emotional concepts to 
themselves rather than to others, or the reverse, should be given. We remember 
as well that this was Brewer's chief concern. 
Basic emotions are direct bodily responses to what a creature v-values. 
But it is equally true that, as far as humans are Concerned, we are taught to 
pause and pay special attention or reflect on these basic v-valuations. We are 
taught to pay special attention to the vehicle of the emotion: the sensory basis 
that discloses to us the world as being inhabited by v-values. That is, we can 
adopt the intellectualist attitude and attempt to decompose the different elements 
of the situation that might explain, alter, refocus the emotion we are 
experiencing. We can focus on how it feels 'from the inside' or 'from the 
outside' by shifting our attention to the one or the other. If I am frightened, I 
might focus my attention on the knot in my belly in order to relax, or focus on 
the expression on my face in order not to betray my state to an enemy. By the 
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same process of attention, I will learn to label what I v-value by reference to the 
vehicle of the emotion. I now am capable of labelling the lion as frightening, 
although what was salient for me in the first place was just a danger to be 
avoided. One of the many aspects that might now become salient, apart from 
those aspects just mentioned, when paying special attention to the sensory 
vehicle of my emotional valuation is the owner of the emotion. Although 
Kundgonde recognised the emotion of her husband, his emotion was not salient 
to her as his in the first place. In this scenario, questions of ownership did not 
arise at all, for both Kun6gonde and Barnabe generally share the same motives 
in respect of their son. She did not perceive him as a full-blown centre of 
consciousness with his own perceptions, with his own agency, with his own 
emotions. But, learning to ascribe emotions to others or to oneself in the full- 
blown sense is precisely to learn that different people have different interests 
and motives. In the ordinary case, questions of ownership of emotions emerge 
when it is realised by the witness, reflecting on the situation, that she does not 
have, or should try not to have, the same interests, motives, as the person she 
witnesses. That is, to make an attempt at making an emotional evaluation of the 
situation, distinguishing between the desires and the beliefs that are in play in 
the circumstances, and ultimately making full-blown attributions of emotions to 
oneself and others, the contents of which will then explicitly represent the 
owner of the bodily response as a distinct psychological being from oneself. 
Learning to appreciate horror movies, for example, is the process of getting the 
balance right between who has what motives. As a spectator, if I take the 
motives of the protagonists on the screen as being systematically my own 
motives, the fear I experience is simply intolerable. If, by contrast, I manage 
total detachment, i. e. if the result of paying special attention to or reflection on 
my situation as opposed to that of the protagonist in the film results in my 
separating completely what my motives of my mental set are by contrast with 
the motives of the protagonist's mental set on the screen, then I won't 
experience the thrill for which I was in the cinema in the first place. 
Reverting now to the question of learning and the concerns of Brewer 
that started this discussion, I wish to close this chapter with the following 
concluding remarks. Brewer was right to point at what the emotions are about, 
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i. e. what elicits the emotional response as the mind - independent ground upon 
which depends the capacity to ascribe emotional concepts to oneself and others. 
This was to constitute the first step in a strategy that was to provide a public 
condition for the application of emotional concepts, a condition that was not 
either fully first-personal and therefore logically not sharable, nor a condition 
that was fully third-personal and therefore resulting in a psychologically 
implausible picture of ascription. I expressed doubt, however, as to whether 
Brewer's analysis of the emotions as indexical thoughts referring ultimately to 
the expressive behaviour of the emotions was by itself capable of providing that 
public condition for our capacity to learn to ascribe emotional concepts which 
were not ultimately as faulty as the mentalist and behaviourist picture it was 
meant to supplant. I argued that it is only by showing how this emotional 
response was not more pure feeling than pure behaviour, i. e. not more 
something defined purely in terms of first personal access than something 
defined purely in terms of third-personal access, that these two pitfalls could be 
avoided. When this was understood and established, however, we seemed to 
loose one important component of what we set ourselves to explain, Le. the 
manner in which we appear to be ascribing emotions to specific creatures. 
Blurring the distinction between the first-personal and the third-personal we 
succeeded in extracting ourselves from the conceptual problem of other minds, 
but potentially at the cost of not being in a position to say who has which 
emotion. I suggested, however, that the distinction between emotional valuation 
and emotional evaluation, between what is salient to us in our basic emotions 
and what might become salient when paying special attention to the vehicles of 
these basic emotions, questions of ownership could be (and generally do) 
become resolved. 
CHAPTER 5: EmOT I ONAL VALUATION AND THE 
UNDERSTANDING OF OTHER PEOPLE'S EMOTIONS 
1. Introduction 
I concluded the first chapter of this dissertation by postponing the very 
important question of the 'richness' of the deliveries of our so-called direct 
perception of other people's experiences. The worry was that, although one 
might admit that 'some' information might be gathered by perceiving an 
emotion conceived on the perceptual model defended in this thesis, this 
information so gathered cannot be equated with a full-blown attribution of an 
emotion, i. e. it is not 'rich' enough. One way of putting the point is to say that 
perceiving an emotion is not understanding it, and understanding is what we 
should be after. It is now time to take up this worry. 
Goldie has recently considered head on the question of what it means to 
understand someone else's emotion. 119 This chapter uses his conception of 
understanding emotion as a starting point, shows how emotional valuation falls 
short of counting as understanding emotion a la Goldie, but how it does meet 
the conditions of a conception of understanding emotions which is less 
demanding, although I argue, no less cog' ent, than that proposed by Goldie. 
The more general aim of this chapter is to assess the importance of 
emotional valuation as conceived in this thesis in the broader context of the 
literature on mind reading. In philosophy, questions surrounding the nature of 
mind reading take place in the very fashionable theory-theory vs. simulation 
debate, 120 after having been the object the 'problem of other minds' for a few 
decades. Most of the protagonists of the contemporary debate appear to agree 
that the debate is ill defined. This is the case for at least the two following 
general reasons. First, it is not obvious that the two theoretical alternatives are, 
119 Goldie (1999). 
120 For introductions to the mains issues of the debate, see Davies (1994), Davies & Stone 
(I 995a), Introduction; Heal (1994); Stich & Nichols (1992); Stone & Davies (1996). 
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in fact, competing explanations of the same phenomena. Someone else's 
sensations, feelings, sentiments, emotions, propositional attitudes, dispositions, 
character traits, moods, behaviour, action, etc., might all come into play in an 
episode of mind reading, and n-dght all be things that we 'read' in others; and 
second, the two theoretical alternatives seem to subdivide in so many sub- 
theoretical options where the differences between them seem often much more 
interesting than their commonalities. Goldie, for example, is one such 
philosopher who has shown how simulating other people's minds and actions121 
can take many different forms and shapes. He individuates not less than the 
following: emotional contagion, emotional identification, emotional sharing, 
central imagining, acentral imagining, peripheral imagining, in-his-shoes 
imagining, empathy, and sympathy, and he articulates why these different ways 
of simulating are not necessarily competing accounts, but different ways of 
'getting in touch with', or 'thinking of, other people's mental states suitable in 
different contexts for different interpretative projects. This chapter proposes to 
go over these different alternative interpretative projects and how they relate to 
emotional valuation. 
A more specific problem with the literature on mind reading, and the one 
which is going to occupy my attention in this chapter, is not so much related to 
the kind of phenomena it tries to cover, but the kind of interpretative feat an 
account of mind reading should sanction. Awareness of, recognition of, 
attribution of, prediction of, explanation of, and understanding of, other people's 
mental states can all be conceived of as mind reading feats. Which of those is a 
theory of mind reading supposed to account for? My view is that mind reading 
theory should not force itself to choose between those, but recognise that 
although related in interesting ways, these are variously called for depending on 
the real context of interpretation. Now, the context of interpretation is precisely 
what is not taken into account in the literature on mind reading. Philosophers 
choose one sort of example, stick to this sort, and use them to test the alternative 
theories. As I shall try to illustrate, the example chosen, naturally and without 
121 The early and best-known formulators and advocates of Simulation theory are Gordon 
(1986,1992,1996,2000); Goldman (1989,1992a), Heal (1989,1996,1998a, 1998b), currie 
(1996). The discussion of Simulation theory to come will follow closely Goldie's paper, and 
will only tangentially touch upon the contributions of the philosophers just mentioned. 
Emotional valuation and the understanding ... 155 
ftirther questioning, establishes which kind of interpretative achievement among 
those possible is the central focus. I presume Goldie would follow me in this 
diagnosis, but he, nevertheless, appears to privilege the notion of understanding 
construed in a specific, particularly demanding, way. This I shall challenge. 
In the first part of the chapter, I illustrate how the choice of examples 
constrains arbitrarily the way we theorise about mind reading by looking at the 
theory-theory side of the debate, and the manner in which the responses that this 
side of the debate - be it from simulation theory, or from more ecumenist 
approaches - fail to question what kind of interpretationist achievement a theory 
should sanction. Although independent of my argument against Goldie, this first 
part of the chapter helps explain where I am coming from. In the second part of 
the chapter I set up my case against Goldie. 
He argues that the means - associated, one way or another, with the 
various trends of simulation theory - by which we might be said to recognise 
that someone else is experiencing a given emotion are, taken by themselves or 
together, neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding that someone else is 
experiencing a given emotion. In other words, simulation, however construed, is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding emotions. In this chapter, I 
argue that both the necessity and the sufficiency claims have two possible 
interpretations. On the first of the two possible interpretations of Goldie's 
theses, both the necessity and the sufficiency claims are trivially true, whereas 
on their second non-trivial (interesting) possible interpretations, both claims are 
false. That is, I shall argue that emotional contagion and empathy, two of the 
main ways which might be thought to yield understanding of others people's 
emotions are respectively necessary for the acquisition and the manifestation of 
the capacity to understand other people's emotions (the non trivial necessity 
claim), and sufficient in themselves to count as instances of genuine, even if 
limited, understanding of someone else's emotion (the non-trivial sufficiency 
claim). Not surprisingly, I conceive of understanding - as it figures in these 
claims - on the model of the transparency claim I developed in the previous 
chapter. 
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L 1. Explaining, predicting, attributing and being aware 
Imagine you are told, without any more particulars, that some soldier fled away 
in the course of battle. On hearing this, you might decide that he fled out of fear. 
In this example, obviously not a perceptual one, it is not clear that you came out 
with an attribution of emotion rather than an explanation of a piece of 
behaviour, or both. It is a matter of controversy here which of the two comes 
first - if any. You might think that it is a case of explanation rather than a case 
of attribution. You explain the flight of the soldier by recourse to the fact that he 
was afraid. Alternatively, you might think that it is a simple case of attribution. 
Flight is the expression of fear, a bit like perceiving a table is a sign of its 
presence. No explanation takes place, you just establish what. is the case by 
means of signs which you know are reliable indicators of what is the case; 
which of course, might now serve as the beginning of an explanation, if one 
were needed. But whether or not we want to call this a case of explanation 
rather than a case of attribution, the reverse or both, the point is that the very 
example chosen favours the explanation/prediction model over the attribution 
model. One is told via some description of a certain behaviour what is the case 
in the physical world, and one is then, so to speak, asked to deliver an informed 
guess as to what mental episode lies behind the physical facts. Those examples 
whereby one is told that a certain behaviour, for instance, looking outside from 
a window, rubbing one's arms energetically, or perceiving a snake, is followed 
by, respectively, taking one's umbrella, closing the window, running away, etc., 
render the "theory" approaches to psychological interpretation almost 
irresistible. These simple examples have prompted philosophers to propose 
complex but neat hypotheses as to how we reach psychological interpretation of 
the agents figuring in them. A reminder of these complex hypotheses can be 
profitably summed up with the following dialectical intention in mind. First, I 
hope to illustrate how a theory which is set up for the sole purpose of explaining 
phenomena as they appear in a very limited set of examples should not be 
thought to be extendable to account for other phenomena it cannot explain, and 
second, why this very fact has generated so much dissatisfaction with these 
theories, a dissatisfaction, in fact, unrelated to any inherent flaws in the theories 
themselves. Here is an early version of a hypothesis - which might not have 
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many partisans nowadays122 - devoted to the explanation of the sort of examples 
listed above- 
Theory-theory (personal): It is the hypothesis according to which human beings 
intemalise a theory for the purpose of the interpretation of other people's mental 
life and actions. The theory consists of rules connecting bodily manifestations 
and behaviour with their typical mental causes, rules that are used by subjects 
for understanding and predicting behaviour and/or mental states of their fellow 
con-specifics. On this hypothesis, the subject is thought to be particularly active 
in the process of building up the theory, and thus has full access to its content. 
The useful metaphor here (although how much those endorsing this theory 
really think it is only a metaphor, I am not sure), is that of the scientist testing 
theories generated by her observations and refining them in the face of their 
respective verdicts. 123 Three main features characterise the central version of 
this hypothesis: (1) The theory is thought to be exploiting concepts that are 
mastered by the subject (those of Folk-psychology), even though the subject 
might not be very good at articulating the theory. (2) The theory is, by and large, 
acquired thanks to a subject actively involved in experimenting with the 
psychological and social world around her. (3) The theory is non-modular in the 
sense that it uses ingredients that are handy for purposes other than 
psychological explanation. Consequently, it is open to information and 
modification emanating from other capacities the subject uses in its interaction 
and negotiation with her enviromnent. 
Without reviewing the battery of specific objections against the theory- 
theory (personal level) hypothesis as an account of how we come to be aware of 
other people's mental states or action, 124 it has from the start been thought to be 
badly wrong, because it appears to concern itself with the life of creatures and 
122 But see in particular Gopnik &Wellman (1992,1994), Gopnik (1993,1996), Wellman 
(1990,1993). 
123 "Indeed, we would say, not that children are little scientists but that scientists are big, and 
relatively, slow children. The historical progress of science is based in cognitive abilities that are 
first seen in very young children" (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). 
124 See e. g. Hobson (1991), Morton (1991,1996), Russell (1992,1995). 
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their development that are just not those of the animals we are familiar with. 
Whereas it is true that we sometimes systernatise our psychological knowledge 
for the purpose of understanding, explaining or predicting the mental 
states/behaviour of others, the hypothesis seems to be just the wrong description 
of the manner in which we access other people's psychological states in 
ordinary cases. Before I say what sort of interaction with other people's 
psychological states seems not to be accounted for by this model, and why this 
might be due to the set of examples that motivate the theory, I wish to present 
another version of the theory-theory which is altogether different, given that it 
situates itself at a completely different level. This is the sub-personal version of 
the theory-theory. 125 
Theory-theory (sub-personal): the hypothesis according to which human beings 
are naturally equipped with, or naturally internalise (or both) a theory for the 
purpose of the interpretation of other people's mental life and actions. The 
theory consists of rules connecting bodily manifestations and behaviour with 
their typical mental causes that are used by subjects for understanding and 
predicting behaviour and/or mental states of their fellow con-specifics. In 
contrast with the personal model of the theory-theory, the three following 
features characterise the central version of this sub-personal version: the 
concepts used by the internal(ised) theory are not those of any natural language 
mastered by the subject once she has reached adult life, and consequently, the 
subject has very little access to the main rules building up the theory; (2) the 
theory is 'hard-wired', either as a totally inborn mechanism or as a mechanism 
that reaches full capacity after suitable maturation of the brain given normal 
stimulation by the environment; (3) the theory is modular in the sense that it is 
domain-specific: the theory cannot be used for purposes other than the 
interpretation of others, and is not penetrable by higher cognitive states. 
The general dissatisfaction with this version of the theory-theory126 is that 
it just does not address the question that philosophers of an interpretationist 
125 See e. g. Perner (1991,1992), Fodor (1992), Carruthers (1996), Leslie (2000). 
126 The distinctions between modular -vs. - non-modular, innate -vs. - non-innatc, conceptual 
vs. - sub-conccptual are all orthogonal to one another. 
This means that there are, in fact, many 
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bent are concerned with. 127 An interpretationist will not content herself with an 
exclusive focus on the sub-personal level. 128 Unless told and convinced that the 
sub-personal level is the implementation of the personal level, and that there are 
nomological relations holding between the two levels, these philosophers are 
bound to be dissatisfied. For, if there are no nomological (or quasi-nomological) 
relations between the two levels, then these philosophers will not be happy to 
consider the one as an explanation, or even an illumination, of the second. 129 
This being said, some philosophers and psychologists are confident that an 
illuminating bridge between the two levels is bound to be found, and, thus are 
happy to view the sub-personal version of the theory-theory as the 
systematisation of Folk Psychology. 130 It is not the place here to argue against 
these hopes. In the rest of this thesis I will presuppose, with a good proportion 
of the philosophical community, that the normativity of everyday attribution, 
explanation and prediction of mental states remains unaccounted for in 
computational models of the mind of the kind Leslie and Fodor encourage us to 
endorse. 
This being said, at a more general level, the dissatisfaction with both 
versions of the theory-theory can be put down to the fact that they both ignore 
that we are creatures with feelings, emotions and imagination, all elements that 
appears to us to play a role in the ways we notice and come to view others as 
psychological beings. This is perhaps the main motivation, behind the 
simulationist attack on theory-theory. Although varying importantly in many 
more possible theories-theories than the two presented here, and some of them are actually 
defended. It is the case, however, that these two options exemplify the main combinations of 
views in the literature. 
127 See Chap. 3, sec. 11.2 above. 
128 Here is how Goldie (1999) expresses the same idea: "When we think third-personally about 
another person, we can do it in at least two ways. First, we can think of him as a person, like me 
having a point of view, capable of feelings like me, and like me capable of thoughts and actions 
that are guided by normative principles. Secondly, we can think of him objectively without any 
special point of view, to be considered as an appropriate object for scientific study, having 
responses that are subject to causal laws of the sort usually appealed to by the theory-theorist of 
a functionalist benf'(p. 399). Whilst Goldie sees himself as defending a resolutely normative 
third-personal approach, as the interpretationist would do, he rejects what he calls the objective 
approach endorsed by the theory-theorist (sub-personal level), and I follow him on this. 
129 For the best known attempt to reconcile interpretationist concerns with physicalist ones, see 
Davidson (1963,1970). For important worries with regard to Davidson's program, see e. g. 
Stoutland (1986), McDowell (1985b). 
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respects, the central thought underscoring the family of theories grouped under 
the umbrella term of simulationism is the following. Far from being natural 
scientists applying theories of the mental to understand our fellow human beings 
and pets, what we actually do is just to wonder how it would be for us - how we 
would feel, what we would think, how we would reason, how we would act, etc. 
- were it the case that we were in their circumstances and not in ours. It is 
interesting to note that early Simulationists who were fundamentally dissatisfied 
with the theory approach to interpretation felt, nevertheless, compelled to 
discuss the same examples, probably with the intention of being seen as 
devising an alternative explanation of the same phenomena. It took a long time, 
and a massive quantity of articles, books and reviews defending the respective 
merits and superiority of the two rival explanations of the empirical data, before 
most came to the conclusion that the two approaches were not necessarily 
competing accounts, but different tools that we have at our disposal to make 
sense of other people psychologically. It took as much time to agree on the fact 
that we do not face two competing accounts, but a plethora of different ones on 
both sides of the debate. I have already presented two possible theory-theories, 
and I am now going to present a number of means by which we might be 
thought to simulate others. 
The ill-defined nature of the debate has prompted some, and Goldie is a 
prime example, to turn away from the one-dimensional examples that have 
generated the explanation/prediction approaches to Folk psychology, as well as 
its simulationist answers which saw themselves as addressing the same 
questions linked to explanation and prediction, to consider much more 
sophisticated and complex ones. This is how some have started to look at 
examples of the type psychoanalysts or literary critics tend to discuss. Why on 
earth did Raskolnikov react the way he did at that stage of his life? Why did 
Lucien de Rubemprd commit suicide in his cell? Was Tess seduced into sinning 
with d'Aubervilles, or did he rape her? Why does Rick (Humphrey Bogart) let 
Ilsa (Ingrid Bergman) leave with her husband, Victor Lazslow (Paul Henreid), 
at the end of Casablanca? These kind of questions, because of their complexity, 
that is, because the amount of parameters of a very different nature that will 
130 E. g. Fodor (1988,1992) and certainly Leslie (1993). 
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have to be factored in for any satisfactory verdict to come out, are hard to 
answer on either the theory-theory model or the simulationist alternative, and 
thereby tend to suggest how neither of these models can ultimately be the 
answer to the way we come to interpret others. But most remarkable, if we look 
at Goldie's take on this issue for example, is that the notions of explanation and 
prediction have been dropped as being apparently ill-suited for what is at stake 
when answering the questions raised by those examples, and have been 
substituted by the single notion of understanding. Again, it appears to me that 
the choice of examples here determines what it is that we are doing when 
attempting to interpret others. The all-encompassing notion of understanding 
seems to match the complex and varied things that we seem to be doing when 
interpreting others. Understanding is potentially reached at via different routes, 
so are the ways in which we interpret others: the notion of understanding others, 
and the idea offolk-psychologising, in the light of the examples chosen, seem to 
be made for each other. 
The danger with this different and much more open way of approaching 
the question of mind reading in general is that it is not clear anymore which 
interpretationist feat we are trying to account for. We have stepped away, and 
rightly so, from the explanation/prediction model, and replaced it with the all 
encompassing understanding model, and it is not clear now where progress lies. 
In particular, I cannot see how this move will help with getting a grasp on how 
we do ascribe emotions in the perceptual case. Whilst I agree that taking into 
account the examples mentioned above is interesting and complex, that it 
requires many different practical and theoretical capacities, as well as the 
gathering of different types of information, I do not see how providing an 
answer to the question raised by those examples can be a substitute to questions 
concerning the simple attribution of an emotion in the perceptual case. After all, 
in most day-to-day attributions, we either do not know the history of the person 
we are interpreting, or if we do, we just do not have the time to take it into 
account. 
The notion of understanding is very vague. For example, what is 
cognitively required to understand a person, in contrast to what is required to 
understand, say, a word or to understand G6del's theorem, are in all likelihood 
very different things that the mind (or some minds) may achieve. One pressing 
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question, among others, is whether understanding should be conceived on the 
model of knowledge, i. e. on a model that views truth and/or justification as 
central to the question of whether one might be said to understand something, 131 
or whether we should think of the notion of understanding more as the 
psychologist would do, i. e. with a crossbreed conception according to which, in 
our interpretations of others, there are a lot of things that we do that fall short of 
truth and justification, but that we, in fact, use for the purpose of interacting 
fruitfully with others. The philosopher is trained to favour the first approach, but 
the question is whether she would not gain by separating clearly the two I issues: 
the psychology of interpretation on the one hand, and questions related with our 
knowledge of other's psychological states on the other hand. As a general 
strategy in this thesis, I have abided by the principle that we should separate the 
two issues as much as possible, and as long as it is theoretically sound to do so. 
In what follows, I shall argue that while Goldie is right about the descriptive 
psychological aspects of emotion interpretation, the way he ultimately construes 
the notion of understanding is too close to that of the knowledge model. That is, 
he arbitrarily, and without argument, mixes up the psychological waters with the 
epistemological ones. 
To sum up before we move ahead, I wish to stress the following: whereas 
the move away from the over rigid examples that have fostered the popularity of 
theory approaches to psychological interpretation should be welcomed, we 
should avoid going to the other extreme of choosing very complex examples 
which might occlude the fact that very different capacities might be at stake in 
the general endeavour to understand others psychologically, and that these 
different capacities help to achieve very different goals, among them, the 
perception of emotions in others. 
II. Understanding other people's emotions 
In his recent article, Goldie justifiably moves away from the simplistic examples 
of early theory-theorists, but I believe that he ultimately falls into the trap I just 
warned against. Goldie defines his project in the following way: "I want to show 
131 See e. g. Evans (1982, pp. 305-42) who believes that 'understanding' is like 'knowing' 
Emotional valuation and the understanding ... 163 
here that there are a number of distinct ways in which we are able to think about 
other's emotions which are often not properly or sufficiently distinguished in 
the debate between theory-theory and simulationists [ ... ]"(p. 395). Although I 
think that this project is valuable in itself, as I just emphasised, and although I 
believe he is doing a very good job at carrying it through, he fails to see that 
these "distinct ways" correspond to distinct activities, with different end-results. 
Attribution, explanation, prediction and understanding are distinct things that 
we can achieve, and the category of "being able to think about other's 
emotions" which encompasses all these feats is too liberal to be of real interest - 
or so I shall attempt to show. 
11.1. Understanding another person's emotion 
The main candidates associated with the theory of simulation that Goldie 
individuates for the understanding of emotions in others include: emotional 
contagion, emotional identification, emotional sharing, central imagining, 
acentral imagining, peripheral imagining, in-his-shoes imagining, empathy, and 
sympathy. Prior to any inquiry into whether Goldie is correct in stating that 
none of these are necessary or sufficient for emotional understanding, we first 
need to have a grasp of what he means by understanding emotions. Let me 
reconstruct, in a schematic form, Goldie's 'understanding' of what 
understanding someone else's emotion involves: 
Understanding another's emotion: this is done from a non-objective third- 
personal point of view. 132Three fundamental stages are involved in emotion 
understanding, though in a non-specific temporal order. (1) a. We read the facial 
expression/expressed behaviour of the interpretee which is recognised as one 
aspect of an emotion. b. This prompts us to look for the object of the emotion by 
roaming into the interpretee's perceptual field for salient features of the 
inasmuch as they are both 'success' verbs. 
132 'Objective' in Goldie's terminology covers those theories that view the relation between 
mental states and their manifestations as a causal one, as theory-theory conceives of it for 
example. 'Non-objective' theories view the same relation as a normative one. By 'third- 
personal', Goldie means that he is not buying into any Cartesian picture of the mind, that is, 
understanding emotions is not a process that starts from what a creature feels to how these 
feelings manifest themselves, as conceived by the 'reflection analogy' theorist for example. 
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environment; (2) a. We try to decide what general state of mind he is in (moods) 
and how they could contribute to his emotion. b. We bring to memory the 
person's long-standing character traits, or dispositions, and we consider what is 
distinctive about his history. c. We consider whether or not our own moods are 
possibly interfering with our interpretation; (3) The manifested behaviour/facial 
expression, the possible objects of the emotions and the procedures described in 
(2)a to (2)c create a token narrative of the person who is being interpreted, as 
well as a token characterisation of this person133; these then constitute inputs 
into the knowledge we have of paradigmatic narrative structures of emotion 
types; if everything goes well the 'function' delivers a value: the emotion the 
interpretee is in. The final understanding can be enriched during or after the 
process in many ways, using some of the capacities (soon to be examined), 
namely, emotional contagion, emotional identification, emotional sharing, 
central imagining, acentral imagining, peripheral imagining, in-his-shoes 
imagining, empathy, and sympathy. 
The schematic fashion in which I present Goldie's view on understanding 
emotions is unfair, as he is very careful not to present it as a strict procedure, a 
formula or a recipe that we apply (he speaks of hermeneutic circles). 
Nonetheless, I believe it captures well the thrust of what he has in mind: going 
through this complex 'procedure' yields understanding of other people's 
emotions. 'Understanding', we agreed, is a loose term, and as Goldie does not 
specify precisely what it amounts to, we should try to gather what it means from 
his rich and lengthy description. Understanding is clearly richer than simple 
attribution. It appears to be orthogonal to prediction, and perhaps quite close to 
what we would do if we were to look for an explanation of what is emotionally 
happening in front of us. I am saying this for, from reading Goldie, it appears to 
be the kind of project that we engage in voluntarily at a conscious personal 
level. Indeed, it requires taking into account as much information as is available 
133 On the distinction between characterisation and narrative, Goldie writes: "Although there is 
not necessarily a sharp dividing line between characterisation and narrative, the essential 
distinction can be captured as follows: facts which form part of the characterisation will not also 
be part of the narrative unless the narrator [the person interpreted] is to be imagined as himself 
currently conscious of those facts"(pp. 411-412). 
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about the interpretee's life, his narrative situation, the narrative and 
characterisation of oneself as interpreters, as well as the capacity to indulge in 
different interpretative techniques. All this appears to be necessary for reaching 
understanding. Although Goldie never says it, it strongly suggests that 
understanding a la Goldie is an epistemological project, in the sense that 
nothing less would yield a situation in which the interpreter could be said to 
have knowledge about the other's emotion. It is difficult not to read Goldie as 
saying that; for, although any step in the procedure might yield verdicts, the 
truth of which the interpreter might feel pretty confident about, nothing else 
than the whole package will place her in a position where she cannot be said to 
be a reckless folk-psychologist from the point of view of the theory of 
knowledge. 
Whereas I believe that understanding as conceived by Goldie is the kind 
of project people often indulge in, especially for those of us who have had the 
privilege of superior education in the Arts, it will not do as a description of day- 
to-day attribution of emotion in the ordinary case. It is interesting to note that 
Goldie does not devote more than a paragraph to attribution of emotion in the 
perceptual case. Here is what he says: 
There is often an apparent immediacy and reliability with which we grasp another's 
emotions, and to a lesser extent, their mood or character, through observation of their 
expressions of emotion, including facial expressions and intonation of voice, and of 
their observable bodily changes and states; these are often the first elements of the 
narrative which we grasp. On such occasions, it is natural to think and say that we 
perceive embarrassment in the blush, fear in the trembling, anguish in the sob, and so 
forth .[... I This phenomenological point seems to me to be uncontroversial, and J. L. Austin is quite right to say that we do not speak of expressive actions or bodily 
changes as 'symptoms' or 'signs' of anger, except when meaning signs of rising or 
suppressed anger. To talk of a bodily change as a 'symptom' is thus not to talk of the 
symptom of feeling, of something about which we observers can make inferences but 
to which we have no access. 134 
This passage, apart from stating that Goldie does not view emotion attribution 
as an inferential process from publicly observable effects to unobservable 
mental causes, falls short of being a characterization of what it consists of, for 
example, to see the embarrassment in the blush. Whereas I agree with his 
134 Goldie (1999, p. 400). 
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endorsement of Austin's remarks, I wonder why he seems to think that this is 
unworthy of elaboration. 
Furthermore, Goldie's far-reaching and subtle characterisations of other 
means by which we 'get in touch' with other people's emotions, as I will 
discuss below, cannot be seen as other ways by which we realise the first stage 
(I a) that will eventually lead to understanding, for he explicitly says that they 
are not necessary. 135 Nor are they sufficient for that matter, as it is clear enough 
that it is only by going over all the stages described above that an interpreter 
might be said to reach understanding. Whilst I think that this last point is 
correct, I also believe that it is a trivial consequence of the far too demanding 
conditions he puts on understanding. Of course, simple perception of emotion, 
as empathy or in-his-shoes imagining - whatever that means at this stage - is 
not necessary for emotion understanding. For example, I could understand the 
emotion of someone by examining the report of his psychoanalyst, and exercise 
none of these capacities while yet having been said to understand what this 
person emotionally experiences. (It is interesting to note in passing that Goldie's 
main example is, in fact, based on understanding reached through fiction 
reading. Of course, my judgement as to Prince Andrew's emotions in War and 
Peace does not rest on my capacity to perceive emotions in his face or in his 
behaviour. As we will see, Goldie's exploration of how we think about other 
people's emotions seems to always take place in the absence of the interpretee. ) 
The non-necessity claim, interpreted strictly, is therefore trivial. The interesting 
question is the role those capacities have in the development of our ability to 
understand other people's emotions. Are they necessary in the genetic sense? 
A structurally identical argument applies to the sufficiency claim. of 
course, none of the means described by Goldie, or emotional valuation as I 
elaborated it in the previous chapter, are enough for understanding emotion if 
the conditions for meeting the latter are as demanding as Goldie suggests. Most 
of those means by which we think of other people' emotions are rough and 
ready, and will not meet the conditions for understanding a la Goldie. I shall 
135 A possibility here is that none of them are necessary in isolation for the realization of the 
first stage of the procedure leading to understanding, although Goldie might say that at least one 
of them has to take place to realize this first stage of the procedure. This is an open question, as 
nothing in the text suggests that this may be one way or the other. 
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conclude therefore that the non-sufficiency claim is trivial. Is there, however, a 
less demanding, but still interesting, notion of understanding that those 
capacities exemplify such that we could argue that these capacities are sufficient 
for understanding emotions? 
To anticipate the dialectics of what is to follow: I agree with Goldie on the 
following: (la) None of the means that he describes (emotional contagion, 
emotional identification, emotional sharing, central imagining, acentral 
imagining, peripheral imagining, in-his-shoes imagining, empathy, and 
sympathy), are necessary for the exercise of emotion understanding as he 
conceives of it. This, I explained, is trivially true. (2a) None of the means that 
he describes are sufficient for the exercise of emotion understanding as he 
conceives of it. This, I argued is the trivial consequence of the too demanding 
constraints he puts on what counts as an instance of understanding. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I wish to argue for the following. (lb) 
Some of the ways distinguished by Goldie through which we come to think of 
other people's emotions are necessary for the acquisition and the manifestation 
of the capacity to understand other people's emotions, as opposed to 
understanding in a particular case. More specifically, I will argue that some of 
those ways presuppose emotional valuation, or consist of emotional valuation, 
and that emotional valuation, therefore, is necessary for the acquisition and the 
manifestation of emotion understanding. (2b) Emotional valuation is enough for 
understanding, conceived of on the lines of the transparency claim defended in 
the previous chapter, and as opposed to understanding a la Goldie. If that is the 
case, then the ways by which we think of other people's emotions that 
presuppose emotional valuation are enough for understanding in my sense as 
well. 
Let me now substantiate these claims by examining in turn the main 
means characterised by Goldie by which we can be said to 'think of' other 
people's emotions. 
H. 2. Emotional contagion 
Here is how I comprehend Goldie's conception of emotional contagion: 
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Emotional contagion: instances in which a subject is 'catching' or being 
'infected' by the emotional state in which someone or some people are in, in the 
vicinity of the subject. This, Goldie says, certainly exists, but is neither 
necessary, nor sufficient for understanding other people's emotions. 
Given Goldie's owns constraints on understanding, he is surely right to 
think that emotional contagion is neither necessary nor sufficient for counting as 
an episode of understanding someone else's emotion. We have already seen 
why that is the case. Gordon, making more or less the same point, gives the 
following example: "If a mother is smiling because she is pleased about her 
promotion, the sight of her smile might produce a smile in her infant, which 
may in turn produce pleasure in the infant. But it will not be pleasure about 
anything in particular, certainly not about her mother's promotion". 136 
Goldie distinguishes two other phenomena which are often confused, 
according to him, with emotional contagion, which he calls emotional sharing 
and emotional identification: 
Emotional sharing: instances in which a person has the same emotion as 
someone else towards a numerically identical object, event, process, etc., or 
numerically distinct object, event, process, etc. In emotional sharing, the fact 
that the other has the same emotion as me is wholly independent of my having 
the same emotion. 
r'... 
Emotional identification: I emotionally identify with someone else when the 
sense of my own identity merges with the identity of the other in a way that 
seems to blur my own cognitive and emotional identity. 
That none of these is necessary for the exercise of understanding other 
people's emotions in a particular case is, as already argued, trivially true. Is it 
non-trivially true, however? That is, is it the case that those capacities are 
necessary for the acquisition and manifestation of the capacity to understand 
other people's emotions? Second, is the exercise of these capacities sufficient 
136 Gordon (1996, p. 167). 
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for being episodes of understanding other people's emotions in my conception 
of what understanding means? 
Let us start with the sufficiency claim. It will allow me to introduce what I 
mean by a non-trivial conception of understanding, and will, therefore, put the 
necessity claim in context. That is, we will be in a position to wonder whether 
emotional contagion, sharing, and identification are necessary for 
understanding, conceived on either of the two conceptions of understanding at 
issue in this chapter. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that any account of our direct perception 
of other people's emotions - my version of which is emotional valuation - was 
non trivial only if it involved both recognition and sharing. Now, at first blush, 
it appears that neither emotional contagion, nor emotional sharing or emotional 
identification instantiate both sharing and recognition. Emotional sharing lacks 
the recognition component (think of the 'mirror case' in the fourth chapter), and 
so does emotional identification where it would be stretching our intuitions too 
much to say that the interpreter is aware of someone else's emotion. 137 'Ibings 
are more complicated with emotional contagion, however. In this case, we want 
to say that both sharing and recognition takes place, but that the recognition 
component is so 'poor' that it cannot count as a genuine case of recognition. It is 
'poor' for potentially two reasons. First, as in Gordon's example, the object of 
the emotion, i. e. the fact that the mother has been promoted, is not part of the 
content of the child who is being infected by her mother's pleasure. Second, it is 
feeble because the sense in which the daughter recognises the emotion of the 
mother as being that of her mother is not clear at all. Is the child aware of her 
mother as a different centre of consciousness to herself, and/or as being affected 
by qualitatively but numerically different emotions? 
Are those considerations enough to dismiss the case as not being one of 
recognition as Goldie would have it? In line with my elaboration of the 
transparency claim in the fourth chapter, I am committed to say that it is 
enough. To refresh your memory: although the child is not aware of the target 
of the emotion, she might very well be aware of itsformal object. Although she 
does not know which object, fact, event, etc., is pleasurable, she is aware of the 
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fact that it is about the pleasurable. It is indeed perfectly sound to imagine the 
child wondering as to what her mother is happy about after having been 
'contaminated' by her happiness, and this, I claim, is only possible, if she has 
recognised the emotion of her mother as a case of happiness. As to the second 
question, I argued at length in the fourth chapter that although, in this case the 
child might not be aware of her mother as a different centre of consciousness, as 
a creature being an agent with her will, perceptions and emotions, the child's 
emotional valuation has her mother's bodily response as target, and this is 
enough to distinguish this case from the mirror case. 138 To recall the end of my 
argument in the previous chapter: although the satisfaction of the reference 
identification component condition is not such that it fulfils the ownership 
intuition, it is sufficient for being a case of recognition of her mother's 
emotion. 139 
Now, if I am right to think that emotional contagion is, in its most 
ordinary manifestation, both a case of sharing and a case of recognition, - and 
that, therefore, it can be construed on the model of emotional valuation - the 
question remains whether it constitutes a case of understanding someone else's 
emotion in any interesting sense. For, of course, recognition might still not be 
enough for understanding. We have already agreed that it will not constitute a 
case of understanding in Goldie's sense, but we will see very soon that it does 
so on a perfectly respectable sense of understanding. As for the non-trivial 
necessity claim, given that I identified emotional contagion with emotional 
valuation, the question becomes whether emotional valuation is non-trivially 
necessary for understanding that someone else is experiencing a given emotion. 
With a bit more patience the reader will get an answer to both questions. 
137 See Scheler's problem, Chap. 2,111.2 above. 
138 Note that I do not mean to say that all episodes of emotional contagion are, in fact, episodes 
of emotional valuations. In particular, very early in life, being infected by someone else's 
emotion does not put the infant in any intentional state, and thus cannot count as a case of 
recognition of anything. 
139 See also Chap. 4, p. 148 ff above, and Appendix 2, particularly the discussion of the 
empirical evidence on imitation on p. 225 below. 
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IIJ Empathy and in-his-shoes imagining 
Goldie devotes a section to the clarification of the difference between empathy 
and in-his-shoes imagining, two distinct ways by which we can come to think 
about other people's emotions, ways that simulation theory has systematically 
confusedl'O- 
Central imagining (empathy): enacting in imagination a psychological 
gnarrative' from the point of view of a certain person other than yourself of 
which you have a certain 'characterisation'. Central imagining necessarily 
involves awareness of a centre of consciousness other than you, a substantial 
characterisation of this centre of consciousness, and a narrative (perceptions, 
thoughts, feelings and emotions) that you imaginatively, in a non-propositional 
(imaginistic) manner, enact. In central imagining, the crucial point is that it is 
impossible for the imagined narrative to include something of which the 
creature doing the imagining is not aware. If I centrally imagine myself walking 
in a Bavarian forest at night, it is not the case that the narrative can include a 
troll unseen by me hiding behind a tree, even if of course I can centrally imagine 
in this narrative that a troll is going to appear from behind a tree. 
In-his-shoes imagining: the fact of enacting in imagination the train of thoughts 
and feelings of someone other than you by putting yourself in his situation. The 
140 To be more accurate, Goldie distinguishes between four types of what he calls 'imaginative 
projects' (Acentral imagining and Peripheral imagining in addition to the two mentioned in the 
core of the text) which can be used for the purpose of getting in touch with other people's 
emotions. He believes that one of these four means by which we think about other people's 
emotions is generally and arbitrarily elected as being what simulation consists of, thereby 
neglecting the other means. Though I recognise these forms, I will not discuss them here. 
Acentral imagining: enacting in imagination a psychological situation from no specific point of 
view of a person other than you, of which you have a certain characterisation. By 'no point of 
view' here, I mean that there is no specific centre of consciousness in the situation (i. e. the 
person imagined, or some other person in the situation) through which the situation is imagined. 
In Acentral. imagining, there is no obstacle to the possibility of imagining something happening 
to the person imagined unbeknownst that person. 
Peripheral imagining: enacting in imagination the psycho-physical situation of a certain person 
other than you of which you have a certain characterisation by centrally imagining it from some 
other specific point of view of the situation. 
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difference between this kind of imaginative enactment and central imagining is 
that the way in which you are the other person during the enactment is limited to 
the pre-fixation of certain parameters of the other's situation, be it the specific 
physical/environmental of the other, or some desires and beliefs you know the 
other to have. But when this is done, you run the enactment by letting yourself 
be the initiator of and reactor to the imagined elements populating the imagined 
scene. In-his-shoes imagining is the sort of project one would engage in as an 
attempt to answer the question "What would I do if I were in Bush's situation? " 
The difference with empathy lies, therefore, in the type of 'characterisation' of 
the creature one enacts, characterisation of which we can say that it Will include 
a mixture of 'information', some of which is related to the creature imagined, 
and most of which will simply be the parameters one would take into account 
were one in the situation. 
I wish to offer some general comments on how I understand Goldie's 
characterisation of these two cognitive capacities with which we are endowed, 
in relation to what I called emotional valuation, before carrying MY argument 
against Goldie to an end. 
Goldie introduces his section on empathy and in-his-shoes imagining by 
saying that he "will indicate the place empathy and in-his-shoes imagining have 
in the prediction of the emotional responses of others" (p. 408). Empathy, 
according to Goldie, as an enactment of a non-propositional imaginistic project, 
can lead to prediction when the project is carried over from the initial 
characterisation and narrative of the person empathised with. But, it seems to 
me that empathy, perhaps by opposition to in-his-shoes imagining, is not 
naturally associated with prediction at all, and is not an activity we indulge in to 
achieve prediction. Whereas I agree with Goldie that "there is little agreement 
amongst psychologists and philosophers as to exactly what empathy is", and 
that thereby a degree of stipulation in defining the concept is unavoidable, I 
cannot see any theoretical gain in seeing empathy as being, first of all, an 
imaginative project with prediction as its goal. On the contrary, the focus on 
empathy as a project leading to prediction severs an intuitive association 
existing between empathy and perception. It seems to me that one is not 
stretching the concept of empathy too much -I would even claim that it is a 
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central case of empathy - in putting forward the idea that I can empathise with 
someone who is in my field of vision and the focus of my attention in a process 
which is entirely perceptual and not at all imaginative, at least in some standard 
acceptance of the term 'imagination'. 
Again, it is possible that Goldie's characterisation of empathy is 
constrained by his choice of examples and the literature he consults, rather than 
drawn from any intuitive grasp of the meaning of the term. Wollheim (1984) 
and Walton (1990), from whom Goldie extracts several di stinctions, are 
interested in the process by which humans come to have aesthetic experiences 
as a result of engaging with the representational arts. In all the examples chosen 
by Goldie, empathy always takes place in absentia of the people that are 
empathised with. From trying to understand experiences undergone whilst 
reading books, going to the cinema, or thinking imaginatively about how 
someone else would react were that person present, it is not surprising that 
distinctions involving different types of imaginings are likely to be at the core of 
any such understanding. Though these classifications are certainly illuminating, 
it is perhaps a mistake to start assessing what empathy is by considering our 
attitudes only towards fiction. This narrow focus results in the overemphasis of 
the idea that we need a 'narrative' and a 'characterisation' of the person being 
empathised with. 
In any case, the worries I just raised are likely to be answered by saying 
that the disagreement is verbal; and again, I partially agree. I do not wish to 
deny that there is a certain type of thinking about other people's emotion which 
involves central imagining, and I believe that central imagining is what Gordon 
has in mind when he speaks of radical simulationl4l: "[It] typically involves an 
imaginative shift of the reference of the indexicals. There is a character in the 
dramatis personae who becomes in imagination the referent of the pronoun 'F, 
and his time and place become the referents of 'now' and 'here"1.142A bit later, 
he insists, as does Goldie with reference to what he calls empathy, that the shift 
is a radical one, involving imagining being someone else "as if this person was 
me": "What triggers the action or the emotion is the lion coming towards me, 
141 Gordon (e. g. 1995b, 1995b, 1996). 
142Gordon(I 996, p. 17 1). 
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the meeting I am supposed to be at now, the insult directed to me, the award 
being given to my child" (p. 172). The important point here is that empathy a la 
Goldie, or radical simulation ii la Gordon do not involve a two stage process 
whereby an inference is being made from one's own case to the interpretee's 
case. And this contrasts with another type of simulation, let's call it standard 
simulation, which is particularly associated with Goldman, 143 and that Goldie 
calls in-his-shoes imagining. Radical simulation should be distinguished from 
standard simulation, because the latter, as opposed to the former, "does involve 
an inference from me to you", to borrow an expression from Gordon. 
This being said, whereas I recognise that these phenomena, whatever we 
call them, exist as distinct phenomena, and that they can, indeed, be used in 
prediction, they should not be confused with another phenomenon which shares 
with the former - but not the latter - the property of not being a two-staged 
inferential process, but which is not, as opposed to both of them, an imaginative 
project. Of course, I have in mind the phenomenon of emotional valuation. 
Before I discuss these two phenomena in the context of emotional valuation, let 
me close one of the doors I opened earlier in this thesis: it will be useful at this 
juncture to recall Stein's theory of empathy or perception offoreign experience. 
For, as we have seen, she is as anxious as Goldie to distinguish between 
imaginative projects in which the creature imagined in the imagined scene is 
such that the person doing the imagining fuses with it - in Stein's terminology, 
the creature imagined is given to the person doing the imagining primordially - 
and imaginative projects in which the person imagined remain foreign to the 
person doing the imagining, i. e. is given to this person non-primordiallY. And 
the latter is, according to Stein, and by contrast with Goldie, empathy. 
Moreover, the description she gives of the empathetic experience as involving 
typical sequencing of which the second stage she calls 'fulfilment of the 
tendencies of the content of the experience' appears to confirm that what she 
calls empathy is what Goldie calls in-his-shoes imagining. The tendencies of the 
scene imagined that are fulfilled are the different elements in the narrative 
which guide the empathiser in his enactment until, in the last and third stage, he 
comes up with a verdict as to what experience the other creature has been 
143 Goldman (1992a). 
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undergoing. I have little doubt, therefore, that Stein would be today considered a 
standard simulationist. But, as I said in the first chapter of this thesis and re- 
emphasise here, whether we follow Goldie or Stein in their respective 
characterisation of empathy, there are, I claim basic ways in which we 'think of' 
other people's emotions which are not covered by either phenomena. 
Pursuing the dialectics of this chapter, the questions are now the 
following: is emotional valuation necessary for the acquisition and 
manifestation of empathy and in-his-shoes imagining as characterised by Goldie 
(the non-trivial necessity claim), and is it the case that either of them is 
sufficient for understanding in the non-trivial sense (the non-trivial sufficiency 
claim)? I shall proceed to answer these questions in the following way. I will 
argue, first, that emotional valuation is necessary for the acquisition and 
manifestation of empathy (as opposed to in-his-shoes imagining); and, second, 
that emotional valuation is sufficient for understanding in the non-trivial sense. 
If both these claims are correct, then, by transitivity, empathy is sufficient for 
understanding. By contrast, in-his-shoes imagining, I will claim, is not rooted in 
emotional valuation, and in agreement with Goldie, I will claim that it is not 
necessary for understanding in the non-trivial sense. 
As we have seen, empathy is a non-propositional imaginistic project. This, 
I presume, roots empathy a la Goldie in perception. This is to say that it is hard 
to conceive of a creature devoid of any perceptual capacities being capable of 
learning to indulge in any imaginistic project of the kind ordinary human beings 
normally indulge. Being capable of imagining a creature other than oneself in 
particular circumstances on the radical simulation model, that is, being capable 
of going through the feelings and thoughts of someone else in imagination, must 
be learned one way or another via past experiences of being perceptually 
acquainted with creatures in circumstances similar to the imagined one. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, being capable of basic emotions, i. e. 
emotional valuation, is the route by which we learn to ascribe emotional 
concepts to ourselves and others, i. e. the route through which we learn to 
become competent in emotional evaluation. And there is even more reason to 
believe that for biological organisms of our type, the learning of these emotional 
concepts is reinforced by our capacity to re-enact in imagination episodes of 
emotional valuation. Empathy a la Goldie should be, therefore, genetically 
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explained partly by means of a perceptual model of awareness of other people's 
emotions, and I have argued at length in the previous chapter that the model of 
emotional valuation is the best available. Whether or not this last point is true, I 
believe I have said enough in favour of the view that something along the lines 
of the transparency claim which emotional valuation instantiates is necessary for 
the acquisition and manifestation of empathy a la Goldie. 
In the third chapter, I said that for a system to master a concept was for it 
to be capable of entertaining a content in which this concept figures as one of its 
constituents (Peackoke, 1983). 1 argued that this capacity was instantiated in a 
system when this system is such that all of the combinatorial properties of the 
constituent were exploited by the system to negotiate its environment. Of the 
possible combinatorial properties of the concept I have distinguished the 
epistemic, logical and semantic types (Crane, 1992). 1 insisted, however, that 
'global recombinability' (Bermfidez, 1998), i. e. the operation of all the 
combinatorial properties of a given constituent, was not necessary for being a 
system with this constituent as part of its content. I emphasised the fact that only 
those epistemic relations underscoring the recognitional capacities of the 
system, that is, the capacity for detecting a feature of its environment in 
subsequent experiences of this feature as being the same as the ones 
encountered previously, was enough for crediting the system with an 
operational mastery of it. The question is, of course, whether this mastery of the 
epistemic relation characterising a concept is sufficient for crediting the creature 
with an understanding of it. Let me formulate this same point in more intuitive 
terms. What we are after is an answer to the question as to whether it is 
sufficient to have only the recognitional capacities associated with a given 
concept to be credited with an understanding of it. The answer, I believe, is 
positive for the following reason. It is sufficient because the capacity to 
recognise the conditions of what we would count as the central case of a range 
of possible evidence in favour of its instantiation - and in the case of a 
observational concept, the recognition of being 'here' and 'now' acquainted 
with its instantiation - is precisely, on the interpretationist approach that has 
been mine throughout this dissertation, the kind of evidence a witness would use 
to credit the creature with an understanding of the concept. 
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And I believe that this thought is particularly cogent in its application to 
the case of emotional valuation. Although there are many means by which I can 
come to make a judgement (an emotional evaluation) as to the fact that someone 
instantiates a certain emotion - reading about it in a novel, seeing traces of tears 
on a letter, listening to my patient, indulging in some in-his-shoes imagining, 
etc. - emotionally valuing someone as being in a certain emotion is the most 
basic/central means by which I do it. That is, the capacity to share and 
recognise which is involved in becoming aware of someone else's emotion in 
emotional valuation constitutes the central/basic ability that a creature has to be 
able to manifest in order to be credited with understanding a given emotion in a 
specific instance. Of course, this capacity by itself is not enough for a full 
mastery of the concept, which would also require emotional evaluation, i. e. the 
capacity to assess the emotional situation with all the parameters - most of 
which figure in Goldie's description of what understanding emotion consists of 
- that might be relevant in a claim to knowledge concerning the emotion of 
someone else. But if we resist the identification of understanding and knowing, 
then it seems to me that there is no reason to deny that emotional valuation, and 
consequently the exercise of emotional contagion and empathy, are sufficient 
for understanding another person's emotion in my restricted sense! And this 
puts an end to my appraisal of Goldie's general conception of the role of the 
different means by which we think of other people's emotions for 
understanding emotions. But, before parting with the psychological aspect of 
our awareness of other people's emotions to investigate, in the next chapter, its 
bearing on its epistemological aspects, let me briefly comment on another 
fascinating phenomenon we might be thought to be very similar to my 
emotional valuation. 
IIA Sympathy 
The last capacity Goldie distinguishes is sympathy: 
Sympathy: an instance of reacting emotionally to a recognised negative 
emotional situation of someone other than yourself by an emotional reaction 
characterised by the desire to alleviate the negative emotional situation of the 
other. Sympathy is an emotional experience, not an imaginative project, and 
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does not involve an emotion akin to the emotion experienced by the person 
there is sympathy towards. 
Goldie takes on board a very intuitive aspect of the ordinary notion of 
sympathy; he writes: "Sympathy involves recognition that another person is, in 
some way, in difficulties", and further in the text, "[sympathy involves] desires 
whose content will also have reference to the alleviation of the other's 
difficulties" (p. 419). Goldie is certainly correct in his characterisation of the 
concept as it is usually understood. I am not sure, however, how it fits in with 
the rest of his classification. 
Here are the two main issues arising from this characterisation. First, note 
that this characterisation of sympathy excludes the following case as being an 
instance of sympathy. My reacting happily to your happiness cannot be a case of 
sympathy, for obviously your happiness is not a 'difficulty', and thus would not 
be - notwithstanding some perversity on my part - something I would want to 
alleviate. This consequence, however, might be undesirable, since there are 
good reasons to think that there is a phenomenon which closely parallels the 
sympathy model, but which involves the recognition of positive emotion. That 
is, many would want to regard the 'happiness case' on the basic model of 
sympathy. A second, related and more pressing issue, is the following: Is 
sympathy a primary or a secondary means by which we come to get in touch 
with other people's emotions? If the latter, then sympathy starts to operate only 
in a second stage, i. e. only after the emotion of the other person has been 
recognised; if the former, however, then sympathy is a genuine means of 
recognition of other people's emotions in itself. The natural reading of Goldie9s 
suggestion is that one first recognises the emotion and in a second stage one 
sympathises with the person having it. If Goldie, indeed, favours this route, then 
he has to tell us what recognition of the emotion in the first stage consists of. is 
it emotion understanding? As we have seen, understanding emotion is a 
complex, conscious and voluntary process according to Goldie, and so much 
should not be required for coming to sympathise with someone, or the latter 
would be very rare. 
I see two possible alternatives to conceiving what understanding emotion 
as a component of sympathy consists of. One possibility is that the first step of 
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the procedure yielding emotion understanding (la), i. e. the step which consists 
of reading an emotion into someone's face/behaviour, is sufficient in itself to 
trigger sympathy. That Goldie might have this in mind is supported by the fact 
the he explicitly says that "it is associated with facial expression and expressive 
action" (p. 419). If this is what Goldie has in mind, then again, he owes us an 
explanation of the nature of this first step in the procedure, which I argued in 
this chapter, was less than satisfactorily given. The second possibility is the one 
already envisaged: sympathy is a fundamental and primary means by which we 
recognise other people's emotions. One way of unfolding the idea in the 
perspective of Goldie's characterisation goes like this: sympathy is a direct 
means through which I get acquainted with someone else's negative emotion. 
The recognition of the others' negative emotions would be an integral part of 
the fact that I sympathise with this person; or perhaps it is even through my 
sympathising with this person that I recognise her emotion -I recognise her 
suffering through my pity. Apart from the fact that there is very little trace of 
this position in Goldie's paper, it would be inadequate. There is no empirical 
data to suggest that we have special direct means to get acquainted with other 
people's negative emotions, rather than positive ones. If there is a case for the 
direct perception of emotions - and, of course, I think there is - there is no 
reason to think that it has anything in particular to do with the phenomenon of 
sympathy as a desire to alleviate others' difficulties. 
Here are the lessons we should draw from this brief discussion of the 
phenomenon of sympathy. Sympathy is either primary or secondary. If it is the 
latter, i. e. if it takes place only after recognition of the other person's emotion, 
then it has no direct bearing on the nature of our awareness of other people's 
emotions. Indeed, the criteria that will ultimately differentiate between a case of 
compassion towards someone's suffering (clearly a case of sympathy according 
to Goldie) and a case of anger towards someone's suffering (clearly not a case 
of sympathy according to Goldie) will have to draw on issues unrelated to the 
domain of our becoming aware of other people's emotion. The conception of 
sympathy as secondary is interesting because of its links with ethics and perhaps 
the philosophy of sociology, and not because it constitutes a special means by 
which we become aware of other people's emotions. If, by contrast, sympathy is 
primary, in the sense that it is a means by which we can recognise someone 
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else's emotion, then the fact that the concept is naturally associated with 
4scnsibility to other people's suffering' should be viewed as a side-issue at best, 
or at least a side-issue when concerned with the question of our awareness of 
other people's emotion. For, if there is something like direct access to other 
people's emotions, it will be access to positive as much as to negative ones, and 
consequently we had better drop the label all together, as it is naturally 
associated with compassion towards other people's difficulties. 
In conclusion, Goldie's brief section on sympathy suggests that he 
conceives of sympathy as being divorced from the most pressing questions in 
the domain of the ways in which we become aware of other people's emotions, 
and is fundamentally a notion that belongs to ethics. But it seems clear to me 
that there is an aspect of my second interpretation of what sympathy consists of 
that is left out of Goldie's paper; and that is our capacity to directly and 
emotionally recognise that someone is in a certain emotion, a picture that can be 
seen to be inspired by the sympathy model. 
111. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to assess the role emotional valuation plays in our 
multifarious capacity to 'think of other people's emotions. The idea was to 
calm the worries of someone sympathetic to the idea that we might be capable 
of emotional valuation, but doubtful about the scope or richness of this capacity 
in our daily interaction, negotiation and co-ordination with others, insofar as 
they are subject to emotions like ourselves. In other words, emotional valuation 
could be to understanding other people's emotions what eyes are to seeing: 
necessary but far from enough. 
I began this chapter by observing that there are many aspects that could 
come into play when thinking of other people's emotions that we might want to 
privilege. Being aware, attributing, explaining, predicting, understanding, are all 
such that one of them might be thought to be of central importance in our 
dealings with other people's emotional lives. I have tried to illustrate the manner 
in which the emphasis on any of one of these aspects is likely to derive from the 
choice of examples we test our theories against. While this is not dangerous in 
itself, I argued, it can become so when the devised theory is then claimed to be 
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true across the board. For example, I showed how some examples made the 
theory-theory very attractive, even if not at all compulsory, but that it made very 
little sense when applied to other cases where explanation or prediction were not 
at stake. I argued that, although it was possible to explain simple awareness or 
attribution of emotion on the theory-theory model, those capacities should be 
first analysed in their own right, separated from epistemological concepts such 
as explanation and prediction. 
I introduced Goldie's approach to issues concerning our approach to other 
people's emotional life as being one that has sidestepped the narrow focus of 
previous attempts to deal with these issues in the framework of the theory- 
theory versus simulation debate. In particular, I praised Goldie's way of 
enlarging the pool of cases and examples to be accounted for, as well as his 
careful classification of the various means by which we might get in touch and 
react to other people's emotions, all of which might come into play to explain 
what happens in these cases and examples. 
Now, although encouraged by the shift from epistemological concerns 
having to do with explanation and prediction to descriptive psychological 
concerns having to do with understanding, I expressed worries that 
understanding a la Goldie was still very much embedded in the theory of 
knowledge. More particularly, I suggested that Goldie's conception of what 
understanding someone else's emotion consists of is so demanding that this 
conception justified itself only if the ultimate aim was to set the conditions 
under which someone might be said to know that someone else experiences a 
certain emotion. If, however, we separate questions related to understanding 
from questions related to knowledge, it becomes possible to think of 
understanding in a much more psychologically hospitable and realistic way. 
In this light, I have argued that most of the means by which we think of 
other people's emotions according to Goldie, in particular emotional contagion 
and empathy - and by contrast with his own view on the matter - were 
sufficient to count as instances of understanding other people's emotions on a 
conception of understanding parallel to that which I developed in the fourth 
chapter with regard to emotional valuation. Although falling short of being the 
sort of understanding that emotional evaluation or understanding a la Goldie 
provides, notions that are both rooted in the theory of knowledge - as we shall 
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discover in the next chapter - emotional valuation of someone else's fear, for 
example, counts as understanding fear, because being capable of emotionally 
valuing fear is the recognitional capacity associated with the concept of fear. 
Now, because being capable of emotionally valuing someone's emotion is the 
core of the mastery of the concept of that emotion, I argued that emotional 
valuation is necessary for acquiring and manifesting understanding of the 
concept of the emotion in question 
CHAPTER 6: EmOT I ONS AND KNOWLEDGE 
1. Speculative anthropology of the 'epistemological problem of other 
minds' debate 
Awareness of other people's emotional states has always constituted a 
privileged terrain for philosophers interested in the theory of knowledge and a 
particularly fertile one for those keen to vent their sceptical tendencies. Their 
mantra: "I never know what is really behind the surface of this body". This 
slogan has generated a fair deal of literature under the label the 'problem of 
other minds' which is, in fact, the 'epistemological problem of other minds' 
and, of course, it has succeeded in setting for itself some real opposition that 
keeps the issue alive and thriving. Needless to say, the acute concern with the 
intricacies of the epistemological problem of other minds has always been 
proportional to the lack of concern with the intricacies of the detailed working 
of mind. At the risk of caricaturing a little, the grounding and little challenged 
assumption of the whole debate has always been that whatever else emotions 
may be, they are primarily and constitutively things that are privately felt. Until 
very, recently, Dummett and Wright, 144working with this same assumption, 
would have been regarded as the contemporary heirs of the sceptical branch of 
this debate concerning other minds, despite having re-framed the questions in 
terms of their own general agenda, and despite their acute awareness of what the 
opposition had to contribute to the debate. In their theoretical framework, 
statements concerning other minds would be typically seen as forming a 
'domain of discourse' particularly receptive to questions regarding verification 
transcendence, bringing about worries concerning bivalence, and thus a 
welcoming terrain for an anti-realist kind of scepticism 
The leadership of the opposition to the sceptical side of the debate has 
been occupied by Wittgenstein145 and his followers146 from the forties to the 
144 See Durnmett (e. g. 1976); Wright (e. g. 1987, Introduction; 1992, Introduction). 
145 Wittgenstein (1969). 
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fifties, as well as - although to a slightly different tune - by Austin147 during the 
same decades. These philosophers, like those they opposed, have not added 
much to our understanding of the emotions and their perception. Instead they 
have developed -I am thinking particularly of Austin - the use of the 'Problem 
of other minds' as a paradigmatic example, a way of thinking of knowledge that 
shifted the focus of the main worries in epistemology. Instead of asking 'Can I 
really know thatT Austin asked 'When is it that I can say 'I know of S, or 'I 
know that p' and have people around me feeling happy with my claim to 
knowledgeT These kinds of questions and the answers offered to them in the 
last decade or so have been prevalent in a sub-domain of the theory of 
knowledge known as contextualism where the key focus has been on the 
pragmatics of knowledge attribution, the concept of relevance, the idea of right 
contrast', etc. Interestingly enough, those philosophers who inherited Austin's 
sensitivity to the importance of contextual and pragmatic issues in the 
philosophy of knowledge are also those philosophers who have insisted on the 
need to integrate the theory of knowledge with the natural world, a move that 
certainly neither Wittgenstein nor Austin ever made. In short, and jumping 
quickly to the conclusion, contextualists today are also exterrialists with respect 
to the theory of knowledge and have, thus, severed quite radically their ties with 
their ancestors, whose preoccupation was chiefly with the 'grammar, of 
knowledge talk. Externalism also amounts to fighting 'chauvinism' with respect 
to knowledge, i. e. opens the door to the possibility of creatures without 
linguistic abilities and, thus, without sensitivity to the 'grammar' of words, 
being such that they can know things. 148 
Despite the appearance to the contrary, there is not much real controversy 
between the two camps of the debate, since, although both camps appear to 
reach contradictory verdicts concerning the possibility of knowing something 
about other people's emotions, this apparent contradiction simply arises because 
146 E. g. Malcolm (e. g. 195 8,197 1). 
147 Austin (1946). 
148 This marriage between contextualism and externalism is in no place more apparent than in 
the choice of articles made by Dretske and Bernecker in a reader they edited together 
(Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, 2000). Austin is introduced in this 
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both camps construe knowledge in radically different ways. As far as I can see, 
they are both right in their conclusions assuming the truth of their respective 
premises concerning the nature of knowledge. Making real headway in the area, 
therefore, requires taking up directly issues concerning what we want a theory 
of knowledge to do. This is not, however, something that can be done in a thesis 
that is not about knowledge, but about the nature of our awareness of other 
people's emotions. Having said that, it is impossible to truly engage with the 
epistemological problem of other minds, but more importantly to defend the 
claim that knowledge of other people's experiences is possible, without, at 
certain key points in the discussion, taking sides or making background 
assumptions in the theory of knowledge. I shall, thus, not refrain from that, as I 
will defend two claims, the second of which requires getting one's feet wet. I 
shall argue that (1) the perception of the 'psychological' and the perception of 
the 'physical' pose the same sceptical threats, no more and no less (if any) for 
epistemology, irrespective of one's own inclinations in the theory of knowledge. 
And I shall argue for the stronger claim that (2) knowledge of other people's 
experiences is possible. 
I start by contrasting the views an internalist and an externalist approach 
to knowledge is likely to take towards perceptual experience of the external 
world in general. I go on to contrast these two views and to show how, with 
some key externalist assumptions in the theory of knowledge, together with 
some semantic assumptions with respect to the individuation of the content of 
experience, it is possible to defend a non-classicalfoundationallsm with respect 
to perceptual experience. The foundation in question is semantic rather than 
epistemic, but given the externalism, I suggest it has epistemic consequences as 
well. 
Before turning to the application of this epistemological model to the case 
of emotional valuation of other creatures' experiences, however, I argue for my 
first claim, i. e. that emotional valuations of other people's emotions do not pose 
any special sceptical threats which ordinary perceptions of physical objects do 
not pose, whatever standpoint one occupies in the theory of knowledge. This is 
reader as the father of epistemological contextualism, and seems to mingle there pretty well with 
most contemporary externalists about knowledge. 
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the outcome, I shall claim, of construing access to the inner and the outer in a 
similar fashion, i. e. the outcome of the structural parallel we have found to hold 
in the second and third chapters between first and third perspective at the level 
of emotional valuation. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for my second 
claim, i. e. that knowledge of other people's emotions is possible. I begin by 
showing how non-classical foundationalism, with respect to experience in 
general, applies to the case of emotional valuation of other people's emotions in 
the framework of two remaining epistemological problems associated with the 
awareness other people's psychological states. I first show how non-classical 
foundationalism dissolves the problem of deception, which is, of course, a 
problem specific to the case of the perception of other minds. Second, I deal 
with the question of how justification should be understood in the 
epistemological picture I am putting forward. Having adopted a broadly 
externalist strategy, and this being the case, having taken on board the 
possibility that young infants and animals are entitled to knowledge, I argue that 
the intemalist preoccupation with justification has to be taken into account when 
knowledge is attributed to human adults. This is to say that we would doubt that 
someone knows that someone else experiences a certain emotion in cases where 
this person was entirely incompetent with respect to all the possible ways in 
which support for such attributions might be gathered, i. e. incompetent with 
respect to emotional evaluation. For this reason, together with the fact that many 
aspects of a full-blown emotion ascription are not resolved at the level of v- 
valuation - in particular the question of ownership -I argue that the reflexive 
level of emotional evaluating is part of the evidence package - together with 
one9s emotional valuation - one might bring in support of one's final emotional 
evaluation that someone is currently experiencing a given emotion. This is to 
say that when the context is such that the level of justification required for 
knowledge is very high, for example in a seminar on scepticism, I argue that 
Goldie's model of 'understanding emotions' construed as a quest for knowledge 
constitutes the right model. 
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II. Non-classical foundationalism 
Those who have read the four chapters leading to this one will have realised that 
I have been interested mainly in reconciling two intuitions concerning the 
psychology of emotion perception, which appear to pull in opposite directions: 
what I called the 'transparency intuition' and the 'ownership intuition'. The first 
intuition has it that there is absolutely no problem is seeing that someone other 
than me is angry. The second intuition has it that it is awfully hard to see that 
someone is angry. People we deal with often strike us as open books which are 
very easy to read, but they also often strike us as hermetic shells whose inner 
'feely' content is forever inaccessible. Of course, we do not have these 
intuitions together. The general line I have tried to press is that these radically 
opposite intuitions concerning our possible access to others was to be attributed 
to fundamental structural differences in the different kind of focus or attention 
exhibited by our constant endeavour to be in touch with what other people feel 
and think. I distinguished between what an experience might reveal to us about 
other people's emotions, i. e. what is salient in v-valuing some one else's v- 
valuation, from what might be revealed to us when paying special attention to 
the experience that reveals this emotion to us, i. e. what might become salient 
when focusing on the bodily changes that have revealed the other person's 
emotion in the first place. The latter practice and its verdicts, which are 
grounded in part in simple v-valuation, I called e-valuations. 
Now I hope it is clear how and why emotional v-valuation sides with the 
first intuition and how and why e-valuation sides with the second intuition. 
Those intuitions cease to pull in different directions when the kind of 
phenomena they appeal to are seen for what they are, two very different things 
that minds do, v-valuing (which explains, among other things, transparency) 
and e-valuing (which explains, among other things, ownership). To refresh your 
memory of the fourth chapter: at the level of v-valuation, I argued, emotions do 
not present themselves to those who experience them as belonging to anyone, 
and, as such, it is difficult to see what kind of obstacle would prevent me at this 
level to recognise angriness: hence the transparency. At the level of e-valuation, 
however, i. e. on occasions in which I focus my attention upon all the ingredients 
involved in an emotional situation in the hope of assessing by means of folk 
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psychological tools who-feels-what-towards-what and for what reasons, then 
issues of ownership arise, and serious obstacles seem to obstruct the way to 
sound and easily reachable verdicts. Focusing my attention upon my bodily 
changes has the consequence of revealing to me that I cannot do the same with 
anyone else, i. e. I cannot focus my attention upon the bodily changes of anyone 
but me. 
Hopefully the dialectics of my argument are already apparent. I want to 
show how Philosophical sensitivity to either one of these two human practices, 
as opposed to the other, will have a strong bearing on how much of a sceptic 
one ends up being about the possibility of knowing about other minds. Let us 
see why this is at least primajacie the case. 
(1) The epistemological problem of other minds, with its sceptical 
conclusions, stems from philosophical reflection on the practice of emotional e- 
valuation. This should not come as a surprise. Traditional epistemology, with its 
emphasis on the key notion of justification from the point of view of the 
individual whose entitlement to knowledge is in question (henceforth 
Justification with a capital "J"), what is known nowadays as internalism with 
respect to knowledge, will, with good reason, not see how issues concerning the 
possibility of knowledge might arise at all at the level of v-valuation. For, at this 
basic level, creatures do not reflect on the ways the world is revealed to them in 
experience, rather their focus is entirely directed at what those experiences are 
about. This is the reason why the internalist will focus his attention solely on 
emotional e-valuation. And emotional e-valuation is, at first blush anyway, the 
terrain of the sceptic; he will emphasise the point I drew attention to above: 
"Focusing my attention on my bodily changes has the consequence of revealing 
to me that I cannot do the same with respect to anyone else, i. e. I cannot focus 
my attention on the bodily changes of anyone else but me", which is enough, it 
seems, for generating the epistemological problem of other minds and its 
sceptical conclusions. 
(2) If, however, one relaxes the conditions for knowledge, in particular by 
shifting the emphasis away from the notion of justification, which is known in 
contemporary epistemology as an externalist move, then v-valuation might be 
thought of as a domain in which epistemology can have a hold. In this trend of 
the theory of knowledge, creatures incapable of e-valuation, young children or 
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animals for example, might be now credited with knowledge. The level of v- 
valuation would strike the externalist, at first blush anyway, as 'fit' for 
knowledge. The extertialist might motivate her view in many different ways, 
one of which would be simply to point out that she does not see why one has to 
know that ones knows in order to be a knowing creature. She might motivate 
this attitude by adding that in the ordinary world, as opposed to the 
epistemology class, we do not wait for a subject to have justified the rules of 
justification she is using to confer knowledge to her. She might also draw our 
attention to the fact that each context sets its own standards of justification. 
Very little justification is needed in some contexts for us to be prepared to 
confer knowledge to someone who claims it, and some contexts require more 
justification and of a different kind - in the sciences, for example. But what is 
sure, the externalist might say, is that she does not see why the level of 
justification demanded by the sceptic should be the one imposed on her. In other 
words, an externalist of that 'kind believes that issues of justification are 
interesting and should be studied in the different contexts in which they occur, 
but that it is an issue quite separated from the study of the circumstances in 
which creatures are so positioned towards the world that knowledge to these 
creatures cannot but be conferred to them, even if they are totally incapable of 
even conceiving about the idea of justification. 149 This line of thought canvasses 
the way in which extemalists and contextualists in epistemology become 
bedfellows. 
As my introductory remarks to this chapter have emphasised, I do not 
believe that there really is much of debate between the externalist and the 
internalist. For example, one might be very sympathetic to, and even accept, all 
of the externalist points about the importance of context in setting up standards 
of justification, and nevertheless insist that the context that should be of chief 
concern to the epistemologist is the one advocated by the sceptic. This 
interesting controversy I will not explore any further here, as my chief concern 
in this chapter is to show that scepticism with respect to the psychological is not 
less acute than scepticism about the physical, and this point, I claim, is 
149For standard sources on contextualism in epistemology, see e. g. Lewis (1996), de Rose (1992,1999). 
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independent of how the dispute between the externalist and the internalist is 
going to be resolved. Having shown, however, that perception of the 
psychological does not pose more of a sceptical threat than perception of the 
physical, I propose to show that, from a broadly externalist approach to 
perceptual experience, together with a particular view on how the content of 
experience should be individuated, it is possible to defend a non-classical 
foundationalist view of the perception of other people's emotions. 
III. From experience grounding judgment to v-valuation grounding e- 
valuation 
So, let me spell out the way in which an epistemologist might want to exploit 
the structure of my picture of the psychology of the perception of other people's 
emotions for his own purposes. The overall structure of my account is likely to 
be viewed, at least from the point of view of traditional epistemology, in the 
following way. I have experiences of other people's emotions, what I called v- 
valuations. Those experiences are the basis on which, together with perhaps 
other ingredients, I come to the conclusion that these people are presently 
instantiating a certain emotion, a kind of assessment that I called an e-valuation. 
The metaphor of 'v-valuations basing e-valuations' invites us to regard the 
relation as, among other things, an epistemological one. There is nothing 
particularly original in this, as the idea that our experiences of the world 
constitute the main reasons, justifications, and evidence for our judgements 
about the world, has always been at the centre of the theory of knowledge - 
whatever sub-theory of it one might endorse. Traditionally, disputes start when 
the question shifts to: are we justified in our thought that these experiences 
justify, are evidence for, constitute reasons for, etc., the judgements based on 
them? In truth, this question is likely to be at the centre of the internalist 
concerns, given his preoccupations with justification. As we have already seen, 
the extemalist might want to offer arguments to bypass this question. 
Let me try to explain this more fully: imagine that v-valuings are such that 
it is reasonable to question whether or not they have what I will call epistemic 
import. By something having epistemic import, I mean that it is the kind of 
object that can confer the status of knowledge to a mental state. Note the modal 
clement here. I do not mean to say that an object that has epistemic import 
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confers knowledge to a mental state, only that it might, provided that it is the 
suitable kind of object. For example according to Davidson150 and McDoweI19151 
f raw$ experiences, i. e. something devoid of intentionality - the retinal image for 
example - are not the kind of things that can have epistemic import, for they are 
simply not the kind of objects that can serve as justification from the point of 
view of the individual whose entitlement to knowledge is in question. The best 
way to understand this is to compare it to something that definitively has 
epistemic import according to these philosophers. The kinds of objects that are 
undisputedly thought of as having epistemic import, according to them, are 
beliefs. Beliefs have epistemic import because they are the kind of things that 
can Justify my judgements. The relevant property that beliefs have, but that raw 
experiences lack, according to Davidson and McDowell, is that they can enter 
into inferential relations to which the subject whose entitlement to knowledge is 
in question might have access. For these philosophers, the only criterion for 
epistemic import is, in fact, the capacity to enter into inferential relations in that 
way. Of course, there is no a priori reason for thinking that other properties of 
objects might not confer epistemic import to raw experiences, even from a 
Justificationist point of view. And, of course, it will be the point of the 
externalist that experience has epistemic import independently of the question as 
to whether or not experiences Justify, or even justify, judgements. Now, there 
are two possibilities: either perceptual experience has epistemic import or it 
does not. Depending on whether one answers positively or negatively to this 
question, one will be naturally drawn towards two traditionally opposed families 
of views in epistemology, both on the slippery slope leading to scepticism, 
respectively, coherentism andfoundationalism. 
If experience is regarded as having no epistemic import, for example 
because experience is thought of as not having correctness conditions, or not the 
right kind of correctness conditions, or because it does not have an inferential 
structure, or because it is not something that can be accessed from the point of 
150 Davidson (1986). 
151 McDowell (1994b). 
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view of the subject having the experience, 152 then coherentism becomes the 
natural fallout option. Coherentism, in one way or another, forgets about the 
world and the possibility of the content of our thoughts corresponding to what is 
in it. It swaps the vertical correspondence relation thought-world for the 
horizontal coherence relation thought-thought. For the coherentist a belief is a 
piece of knowledge at time t, if it holds the right kind of inferential relation - 
logical, semantic, 'grammatical', etc. - or, in other words, if it coheres with 
other beliefs that a subject having it also has at time t. Experience of the world 
in this picture, because it does not have epistemic import, gives rise to beliefs 
that have exactly the same status as all the other beliefs that a subject might 
have. 
Imagine, however, a philosopher who does believe that experience has 
epistemic import. Philosophers of this bent are likely to favour a foundationalist 
approach to beliefs grounded in experience. A classical foundationalist will say 
that experiences are such that they can confer knowledge to the judgment made 
on their basis because they are apt to provide the kind oflustification a sceptic is 
looking for. This is because the mental states that are rooted in perception, 
according to the foundationalist, have the special status of being self- 
justificatory. All beliefs a subject might have ultimately answer to the 'tribunal 
of experience' that have the special power of justifying 'for good' all other 
beliefs than one might have. 
I will not dwell here on the classical problems encountered by these two 
families of views, nor will I dwell on the sceptical fire with which they play. 
What I wish to do is to explore the possibility of a foundationalism, that is not 
intemalist in spirit, what I will call non-classicalfoundationalism. Imagine for a 
moment coherentism and f oundationalism. coupled with a disjunctiviStIS3 
individuation of the content of experience. 
Picture a disjunctivist coherentist. A strange animal? A coherentist of this 
kind is no more optimistic about what can be done with the vertical 
152 The reader should rccognise here the crucial issues regarding content, which I explored in 
the third chapter. There, I argued, with Peacocke (1983), that a state can have content in the 
absence of the bearer of this state being capable of appreciating how the content of this state 
represents the world as being. See Chap 3, sec. III above. 
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correspondence relation between thought and world for the purpose of 
epistemology than the simple coherentist is. Rather than abandoning the world 
completely, however, he proposes to do the best he can, provided experience 
does not have epistemic import. The disjunctivist has a particular view on the 
manner in which the content of experience should be individuated that he can 
exploit for the purpose of staying in touch with the world. According to him, 
veridical experiences, as opposed to illusory or hallucinatory ones, are direct 
openings to the world, hence its disjunctivism: there is nothing in common 
between the veridical on the one hand, and the hallucinatory or illusionary case 
on the other hand, that should encourage us to specify the contents of these 
respective kind of states in the same way, as the conjunctivist would have it. The 
content of veridical states is specified, at least in part, and by contrast with 
hallucinatory or illusory states, by what they are about. In the lucky case of a 
veridical experience, says the disjunctivist, although I cannot be said to have 
knowledge - for that would require experience to have episternic import - there 
is a sense in which I am really in touch with how the world really is; and this is 
at least part of what we are after when we are asking whether or not we know 
about some aspect of our environment. Note, however, that for a coherentist to 
be a disjunctivist is no help at all for the purposes of epistemology, as far as he 
is concerned. Indeed, there is no way to tell from the point of view of the subject 
having the experience whether she is hallucinating or not. And this is the reason 
why the coherentist became a coherentist in the first place. ' 54 
Now, what if our foundationalist becomes a disjunctivist? Well he is 
likely to be a non-classical foundationalist. The non-classical foundationalist 
believes that experiencing something entails being in a state with veridical 
content, this is his commitment to disjunctivism. Now, like our coherentist 
disjunctivist, the non-classical foundationalist does not believe that there are any 
independent means, from the point of view of the subject, to establish that she is 
in a veridical state. The difference, however, between the non-classical 
153 On disjunctivist theory, cf. Hinton (1974), Snowdon (1988), McDowell (1982) and Child 
(1994, esp. Chap. 5). 
154 1 mention this position because I believe it is McDowell's. Although by no means a 
coherentist, McDowell is a internalist with respect to knowledge (1994) and a disjunctivist with 
respect to content (1982). This is how he finds himself in this bizarre position. 
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foundationalist and the coherentist disjunctivist is that the former does not 
believe that this clause concerning what or what not the subject is capable of 
establishing from her point of view, is necessary for crediting the subject with 
being in a state with knowledge. 
Let us remind ourselves the reason why our coherentist disjunctivist 
would not believe that v-valuings have epistemic import whereas our non- 
classical foundationalist would. The coherentist disjunctivist will emphasise 
again that experiences are not such things that can enter into inferential relations 
with other experiences or with beliefs - or at least not such things that can enter 
into the relevant kind of inference - and, thus, cannot by definition constitute 
justification for our judgements. This is because, for the coherentist, inference is 
the only model we have for justification, and justification is the central issue a 
theory of knowledge has to account for. The non-classical foundationalist will 
certainly agree with his opponent's diagnoses about experiences, that is, he will 
agree with her that experiences do not have the kind of inferential structure 
upon which we can construct an epistemological theory based on the inferential 
knowledge model, but he will deny that it deprives experiences from having any 
epistemic import. The non--classical foundationalist will typically have, in an 
extemalist spirit, either a counterfactual analysis of knowledge155 or a 
rellabilist'56 one. If the former, he will say that an experience is a piece of 
knowledge if, were it not for the world being the way it is, th6 creature would 
not be having the experience he is having. If the latter, he will say that an 
experience is a piece of knowledge if the causal circumstances are such that the 
worldly circumstances that brought it about are normal (i. e. normal lighting, 
normal perceptual system, etc. ). I should add that there isn't much of a 
difference between these two accounts for my purposes, as the counterfactualist 
will sooner or later have to tackle issues concerning 'normal circumstances', or 
the meaning of 'right kind of causal processes', etc. 157 The important point is 
that neither the counterfactualist nor the reliabilist are likely to insist that it is 
155 Cf. Dretske (1971); Nozick (1981), for early characterisations of knowledge in 
counterfactual terms. 
156 Cf. Goldman (1979), for an early version of Reliabilism. 
157 See Gettier type counter-examples below. 
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necessary, in order to credit the creature with knowledge, that the creature have 
any power to ascertain that the causal circumstances which brought about her 
experience are normal. That would be a non-starter for obvious reasons. The 
latter point is the expression of the non-classical foundationalist's externalism 
with respect to knowledge, but is not yet the expression of his motivations for 
thinking that experiences have epistemic import. The externalist, unfortunately, 
does not have much of an argument for his motivations in this area. She just 
points out that she does not see why inference and justification should be the 
only model of knowledge, and why, for example, the counterfactual. analysis 
could not be cashed out in terms of the idea of 'right kind of causal processes'. 
She might also try to motivate her views, as we have seen, by appealing to the 
contextual and the pragmatic determinants of what should constitute the right 
level of justification in varying circumstances, and attempt to discredit, on the 
basis of these considerations, epistemologists' fascination with the kind of 
justification prevalent in undergraduate seminars in the theory of knowledge. 
The reason our non-classical foundationalist is non-classical, therefore, is to be 
traced back to the fact that she has given up the Justificationist perspective that 
characterised her position in the early days. 
Before going into more details into how my account of the relation 
between v-valuing and e-valuing could be exploited by the non-classical 
foundationalist, let me conclude this section with the following. The coherentist 
might have lots of reasons as to why he sticks to the model of inference in the 
knowledge business, but chief among these reasons is the claim that inference is 
surely something that at least can be such that creatures might be indulging in at 
the personal level. Sticking to inference is a way of sticking to the intemalist 
key intuition. When we give up the intemalist intuition, reasons for sticking to 
the inferential model are much less compulsive. And the wish to abandon it 
might be reinforced by the reckoning that the coherentist has not much to say 
about the relation between the world and the thoughts we might have about it. 
The inferential model, after all, has the only consequence of severing the link 
between world and thought, and this is the beginning of the slippery slope to 
scepticism. 
In what follows, I show how the broadly extemalist, non-classical 
foundationalism outlined here can be applied to the case of v-valuation of other 
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people's emotion in the framework of the classical epistemological problems 
associated with it. I start by showing how our awareness of other people's 
emotions poses no more and no less a sceptical threat than our awareness of 
ordinary objects, irrespectively of any assumptions made in the theory of 
knowledge, and go on to argue for the further claim that knowledge of other 
people's emotions is possible in the framework of non-classical 
foundationalism. 158 
IV. Those feelings that lurk behind the body 
It is now time to tackle head on the issues that made the awareness of other 
minds so popular a topic for the theory of knowledge in the first place. My 
exposition of the different options in the theory of knowledge concerning 
perceptual knowledge so far was divorced from my picture of the relation 
between v-valuation and e-valuation. Experiences of other people's 
psychological properties have always been thought of as adding a layer of 
problems on top of the problems we have already looked at concerning 
experience. 159 We are familiar with the thought that the only thing I can 
experience when I see someone else in an emotional state is how she looks 
when having it, i. e. I cannot experience the emotion itself One typical way of 
understanding this thought - to which we have already alluded in this chapter - 
is by thinking of emotions as referring to the bodily changes affecting those 
having the emotion, or as referring to the phenomenology of the emotion, the 
'how it feels like' to have it. Understood like this, although not a compulsory 
reading, it does not come as a surprise that philosophers have thought that 
emotions of others are not such that we can experience them. Similarly, if we 
were to have a more sophisticated or/and a more contemporary understanding of 
the emotions, for example, as cognitive states whose object(s) are constitutive of 
the emotions, then again, it might be thought of as something I cannot 
experience. For the objects of other people's emotions are rarely there in front 
158 My non-classical foundationalism finds its original sources in the writings of McDowell 
(1982), Bonjour (1985), Plantinga (1993) and Audi (1999), although I would not want to hold 
them responsible for any of the particular claims I make here. 
159 See especially Dretske's (1973) excellent characterisation of the 'extra problem' that other 
people's minds is alleged to create for the theory of knowledge. 
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of me to be seen, and other people's cognitive states, i. e. propositional attitudes, 
are not obvious candidates for my direct experience of them. 
We have seen in the third and fourth chapter why neither of these ways of 
understanding emotions is satisfactory, although they certainly capture some 
typical features of what is involved in experiencing emotions. The first way of 
understanding the nature of emotions just mentioned, I have argued, just 
misrepresents the phenomenology of emotions by artificially drawing a line 
between first and third person experience of the emotions. I will not return to 
this argument here, but once this premise is shown to be unwarranted, then the 
conclusion concerning the impossibility of experiencing other people's 
emotions no longer follows. The second way of conceiving emotions, as 
cognitive states made up of propositional attitudes, and the sceptical conclusion 
naturally following from it can also be put into question when it is understood 
that what is in question in this case is the experience of other people's v- 
valuations, not the perception of their e-valuations. I accept the conclusion of 
the sophisticated and contemporary approach to the epistemology of emotions 
as far as emotional e-valuations of other people are concerned. Those are the 
kind of things that I cannot experience (as opposed to trees, say). 
I take it that these few remarks, together with my elaboration of the 
distinction between v-valuation and e-valuation in the fourth chapter, are 
enough for concluding that the epistemological problem of other minds in its 
simple form does not get off the ground in my picture of the basic perception of 
other people's emotions. The relevant first and third person asymmetry on 
which the 'problem of other minds' industry rests is not available at the level of 
v-valuation. As long as we admit that the level of v-valuation has epistemic 
import, then there is no reason to think that access to the psychological aspect of 
others poses more of a challenge for epistemology than access to the physical 
aspect of the environment. This is the first important conclusion of this chapter 
and is wholly independent from the considerations I made so far. 
What I still have to do, however, is show in more detail how this 
psychological picture might translate to the framework of the theory of 
knowledge in the light of the following problems: (a) Although one might 
accept that there is no sharp distinction between first and third person access to 
emotions, it is still the case that people deceive, lie, hide, etc., in ways that trees 
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do not. Is it not the case that nothing so far in the discussion addresses this 
important feature of our dealing with others? (b) Full-blown emotional e- 
valuation of other people's emotion ascribes emotions to particular individuals. 
That is, at the level of e-valuation, questions of ownership are resolved in a way 
that they are not at the level of v-valuation. Is it not the case, therefore, that 
some kind of inferential process of the kind the internalist recommends will 
eventually be required. Consequently, is it not the case that, ultimately, 
reverting to the old 'inference+analogy picture' is forced on me? 
The phenomenon of deception, which constitutes our first problem, is 
what is left of the epistemological problem of other minds when it is understood 
that there is no logical structural difference between first and third person access 
in v-valuation. This leftover is nevertheless serious for it still constitutes an 
extra layer between the potentially knowing subject and what she is supposed to 
know about. It reminds us that although I might mistakenly take the tree to be a 
cactus, as I can mistakenly take your embarrassment for anger, there is an extra 
mistake that I can make in the latter case that I cannot make in the former, 
which is that you might have intentionally deceived me in thinking that you are 
experiencing something that you do not experience. 
I will now address both of thqe worries in the process of laying out my 
non-classical foundationalist picture of our perception of other people, s 
emotions. Here is the structure of the argumentation again: what I have shown 
so far is that scepticism has prima facie no more or no less bite in the case of 
our awareness of the psychological that it has in the case of our awareness of the 
physical in emotional valuation. What I want to show now, in the context of 
remaining epistemological issues, is that knowledge of the psychological is 
possible, and that non-classical foundationalism would make this the case. 
IV 1. Knowing other people's emotions 
Let us refresh our memory again: in the ordinary case, becoming aware of 
someone else's emotion is a case of v-valuing someone else's v-valuing. 
Kundgonde becoming aware of Barnab6's emotion is a case of her fearing with 
him the object of his fear (sharing) via her recognition of his bodily response's 
type. The natural way of reading this scenario with an externalist epistemology 
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in mind is the following: (1) Kunegonde's v-valuation of her husband's fear is a 
state of knowledge, if and only if it is the case that Barnabe is in fear, and she 
would not be in the state of v-valuing her husband's bodily response as fear, 
were it not for the fact that he was in fear. If, however, we are internalists, and 
borrowing from an existing and familiar tradition in the epistemology of the 
emotions, 160 we might want to characterise knowledge in the present scenario in 
the following way: (2) Kundgonde's e-valuation that her husband is in fear is 
knowledge, if and only if her v-valuation of her husband's fear justifies her e- 
valuation that he is in fear, and he is in fear. 
The first marked difference between the two characterisations is the 
mention in (2) of the notion of justification, one which is absent from (1). This 
is an important difference indeed - the key element distinguishing internalist 
and externalist epistemologies. The second and directly related difference lies in 
the fact that in characterisation (2), knowledge is a property of e-valuations, not 
of v-valuations. The reason for this, in turn, is to be attributed to the fact that 
justification, in this tradition, requires the possibility of reflecting on the ways in 
which one kind of entity is capable of supporting, constituting evidence or 
reason for, another kind of entity from the point of view of the creature whose 
entitlement to knowledge is in question. In (1), for reasons already expounded, 
no such thing is needed. This puts an end to the easily identifiable differences 
between (1) and (2). Note that for (2) to work, v-valuations will have to be 
regarded by the internalist as having epistemic import, which, on her 
interpretation of my account, they do not have. Recall that, according to me, 
although v-valuations are structured and recombinable, whereas 'raw' 
experiences are not, they are not conceived of as composed of inferentially 
relevant constituents in a sense that would satisfy the interrialist. 161 At this stage, 
we have, thus, already left behind any philosopher who does believe that v- 
valuation has no epistemic import. 
Having, thus, committed myself to a broadly externalist approach to 
knowledge, I wish to express the sense in which I am sympathetic to some 
160 Meinong (1917), and more recently, McDowell (1985a), Wiggins (1987), de Souza (1987), 
Mulligan (1998), have all endorsed versions of this model. See also Chap. 4, sec. 1.1 above. 
161 See Chap. 3, sec. 111, esp. 111.4 and 111.5 above. 
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aspects of the intemalist preoccupations with justification. I agree with the 
internalist that the concept of knowledge, as attributed to human adults, also 
involves attribution to them of an insight into how the kind of knowledge that is 
attributed to them is standardly supported. That is, for a creature capable of 
emotional e-valuation, we would have doubt as to whether one of her e- 
valuations constituted knowledge, if this person did not have a clue as to why 
she thinks it appropriate to hold the e-valuation in question. Now, of course, this 
is not to surrender to the internalist, as I do not believe that for each particular e- 
valuation, one has to have for it some particular item of evidence for this e- 
valuation to count as an item of knowledge. The person whose entitlement to 
knowledge is in question has to be capable of manifesting competence in the 
standards by which we generally assess the truth or falsity of this kind of 
statement. Now, not only does this person not need to be capable of having 
particular evidence for particular e-valuations, she does not need to have, from 
her point of view, evidence of the kind that would necessarily make true her e- 
valuation, and so guarantee that her e-valuation is a piece of knowledge. For this 
is what the internalist, raised in the fear of the Big Sceptic, might want. This 
kind of reassurance, I am afraid, I cannot offer, if only for the following reasons. 
Neither of the two characterisations above will do for those who have 
particularly conservative ideas about what constitutes knowledge, for both are 
open to Gettier type counter-examples. Consider definition M. Let us say that 
Barnabd is in fear. His virility, however, forces him to hide it from Kunegonde, 
and he shows a lack of care upon his face. Unfortunately, he is not a very good 
actor and ends up presenting a look upon his face which is phenomenologically, 
from the point of view of his wife, indistinguishable from when he is in fear. 
Consequently, Kundgonde v-values him as being in fear. In this improbable 
scenario, all the conditions for knowledge according to (1) are satisfied, but it is 
not certain, however, that we would want to say that her v-valuation is 
knowledge. The same kind of counter examples will bite for definition (2) as 
well; consequently I am not likely to satisfy the Sceptic, but hopefully it will not 
matter, given the scope of this thesis. Let me explain: I have accepted that a 
human adult has to have insight into which kind of evidence counts in favour or 
against a particular type of judgement, and this makes the case that, for human 
adults, questions related to knowledge of other people's emotions arise at the 
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level of e-valuation. (As we will see, when discussing our second worry the fact 
that such questions arise at the level of e-valuation is anyway forced on me, as 
questions of ownership are not resolved at the level of v-valuation. ). Having 
conceded that, to the internalist, I side entirely, however, with the exterrialist in 
my understanding of the role justification should play in the theory of 
knowledge, if any. Each context determines what 'knowledge' in the context in 
question involves, and of course, being externalist, no knowledge as to whether 
these standards are justified is a necessary condition for ascribing knowledge to 
the creature whose entitlement to knowledge is in question. This is why, for 
example, I have no qualms about attributing knowledge to infants or animals, 
even though they do not have any insight into what kind of evidence they might 
appeal to as reasons for entertaining the contents they do. 
This being said, I will now focus on the elements that we would want to 
figure in the conditions for knowledge about emotions when the creature under 
investigation is capable of e-valuation. In the light of these brief remarks 
concerning our two initial characterizations, we might want to say that (3) 
Kundgonde's e-valuation that her husband is in fear constitutes knowledge if 
and only if (a) she is capable of regarding her v-valuation of Barriabd's bodily 
response as constituting, for her, a prima facie reason to e-valuate that he is in 
fear, and (b) she would not be v-valuing her husband in that way were it not for 
the fact that he was in fear. 
This characterisation of Kundgonde's knowledge captures, first, my 
understanding of the internalist intuition according to which the creature to 
whom knowledge entitlement is in question has to be capable of pointing 
towards the kind of thing that supports her specific claim to knowledge. Second, 
the fact that Kundgonde's e-valuation is defeasable neutralises the sceptic by 
acknowledging that it is impossible to exclude Gettier types of situations from 
the point of view of the subject doing the e-valuing. From a broadly extemalist 
perspective, this is just what one would expect. Third, it captures the main 
externalist intuition with foundationalist tendencies according to which the 
essential ingredient for conferring knowledge credentials to a thought is that the 
thought would be presenting the world in the way it does because the world is in 
that way and for no other reasons, and all this independently of what the 
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creature having the thought thinks about the relation in question. This leads to 
another commitment, to disjunctivism. 
IV 2. The non-bipolarity of v-valuations 
Disjunctivism is a claim about the content of experiential states and their 
individuation. It has it that there are good reasons to individuate the content of 
perceptual experiences externally, that is via what they refer to, when those 
experiences are veridical, and differently, perhaps internally, when they are not, 
i. e. when they are illusory or hallucinatory. First note that the way the labels 
'internally' and 'externally', as they are used here, point towards semantic 
notions, not epistemic ones, and should, thus, not be confused with internalism, 
and externalism with respect to knowledge. Second, note that veridical 
experiences are very bizarre kinds of states for, not only are they true, but they 
could not be otherwise. I am not asserting a tautology here. A true belief is 
trivially true of course, but its content could have been false. Veridical 
experiences are not trivially veridical, for there are no circumstances in which 
their content could be false, by contrast, for example, with the corresponding 
belief. Now, v-valuations, I claim, are such that disjunctivism applies to them. 
When I am lucky, the content of my v-valuing fear in you is individuated 
directly via your fear, and there is no gap there for falsity to crop up. For this 
reason I call v-valuations, for example my v-valuation of you as in fear, noll- 
bipolar states. They cannot take either the value 'true' or 'false', they do not 
have two poles. By contrast, I call bipolar a mental state that can be either true 
or false, as, for instance, the belief that you are in fear. 
Before expanding further on how I characterised the way knowledge of 
other people's emotions should be understood, in particular, on the ways in 
which v-valuations constitute reasons for e-valuations, I am in a Position to 
provide the necessary tools for dispelling the first of the two worries I need to 
dispel, i. e. the phenomenon of deception. For disjunctivism can be put to use 
here too. The idea, which we owe to McDowell, 162 is that, in the same manner 
in which we might want to individuate hallucinatory experiences and veridical 
162 Cf. McDowell (1982), in its original source. 
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ones differently - although they might be indistinguishable from the first person 
perspective - so we might want to individuate real emotional experiences from 
fake emotional experiences differently, even though they are indistinguishable 
from the third person perspective. That is to say that, if I have a veridical 
experience of your fear, then necessarily it is an experience of your fear and not 
of you attempting to make me think that you are in fear. In the latter case, I 
would be experiencing your fake fear, not your fear. The content of my 
experience of your fear cannot, by definition, thus be false, although of course, I 
might experience you as if in fear (when you fake, or when I hallucinate), or I 
might come to believe that you are in fear, on the basis of some experience, and 
the latter can be false. 
Equipped now with the understanding of disjunctivism and its possible 
uses, it is possible to understand the work it is supposed to do as far as the 
theory of knowledge is concerned. Individuating content disjunctively the way I 
did, I gained necessary truth very cheaply, as it were. This, I take, is not 
controversial. What is controversial is whether there are (i. ) good motivations 
for disjunctivism concerning the content of experience, and of course (ii. ) the 
question of what use this form of externalism with respect to content might be 
for the theory of knowledge. As for the first worry, here is unfortunately not the 
place to dispel it. I will, therefore, satisfy myself with a conditional claim whose 
antecedent rests on the truth of some form of disjunctivism suited for the 
content of v-valuations. As to the second worry, here are the considerations I 
want to make: what we gain by defining the content of v-valuations 
disjunctively is a guarantee that if the content of my v-valuation is true, then it is 
necessarily true simply in virtue of being acquainted with its content. What we 
do not gain, however, is the possibility of this fact, i. e. the content of the v- 
valuation being necessarily true in virtue of being acquainted with its being 
ascertainable with certainty by the creature having the v-valuation in question. 
For, of course, it is in the nature of hallucinations that they do not reveal to 
those who have them that they are hallucinations, at least not hallucinations of 
the kind philosophers have in mind. In short, one has no way of saying from 
one's standpoint whether one is hallucinating or not, or if one is being deceived 
or not, for it all looks the same from the standpoint in question (or so is the role 
of hallucination and deception in epistemology); the only thing one knows from 
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one's standpoint, if one is a creature capable of e-valuation, is that if one is not 
hallucinating and one is not being deceived, then the way the world seems to be 
to one is in that way necessarily. Those consequences might be thought to be 
unbearably disappointing until, perhaps, we press the fact that it at least confers 
to the thoughts of those subjects whose claims to knowledge are in question, 
real anchorage in this world about which they claim to know something: the 
mind-independent anchorage of the kind Brewer defends in the context of the 
emotions. 163 Indeed, if they do know something, then it will not be by accident, 
it is not because my thought happens to be satisfied by the way the world is that 
I know what I know. This is the spirit of non-classical foundationalism. 
I started this section by showing how, equipped with a correct 
understanding of our awareness of other people's emotions - which, I argued, is 
parallel in all relevant respects with our awareness of objects in the physical 
world - there was no reason to suppose that the former poses any more sceptical 
threat than the latter at the level of v-valuation, irrespective of one's favourite 
theory in epistemology. I remarked, however, that other people were capable of 
deceiving us in ways that ordinary objects were not, and showed how non- 
classical foundationalism proposed to deal with this problem. In this light, I 
argued that, given a certain form of externalism - one which presupposed the 
claim, defended in the third chapter, according to which v-valuation has 
epistemic import, but did not reject outright the preoccupation of the internalist 
who still wants to talk about justification - non-classical foundationalism, with 
respect to the possibility of knowing about other people's emotions, was 
defensible. 
Now, some, however sympathetic to what has been said so far, might still 
object that the knowledge about emotions that is here claimed to be possible, is 
not the kind that we should be interested in. The complaint here is not that the 
kind of knowledge claimed to be possible does not satisfy the scepties 
Justificationism, but that the kind of contents under investigation, i. e. v- 
valuations, do not ascribe the emotion to any particular owner. This is our 
second worry, the one we should now take up. 
163 Brewer (200 1), and see Chap. 4, sec. 1.1 above. 
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IV 3. Knowledge and the question of ownership 
What the objector has in mind is probably the following. When wondering 
about whether knowledge of other people's emotions is possible, we are 
wondering whether the person whose entitlement to knowledge is in question 
really conceives of the person to whom she ascribes an emotion as a person. 
That is, as an entity distinct from oneself but similar with respect to, for 
example, being a creature capable of having emotions like oneself. Whatever 
conceiving someone as a person ultimately entails, the objector claims, v- 
valuations are not the kind of thing that is going to ground a full-blown e- 
valuation of a person, whether we construe 'grounding' in internalist or 
extemalist terms. The objector will point to my repeated claims in the fourth 
chapter that v-valuations do not make ownership salient. She might as well 
conclude that if she is right in her diagnosis, the upshot is that what is going to 
ultimately ground a full-blown e-valuation to a person of an emotion is some 
form of reasoning by analogy from one's own case. 
Let us go slowly over the objector's diagnosis. In truth, what she asks is 
for clarification of the sense in which emotional responses to other people's 
emotional responses justify judgements concerning the kind of emotional 
experience they are having. Or, in an externalist spirit, and in the framework of 
my account, the question becomes: in what sense might v-valuings of others 
people's v-valuings confer knowledge to e-valuings concerning their v-valuings 
and/or e-valuings? Let me answer this question as it is formulated by the 
intemalist, given my admission that justification should play a role in conferring 
knowledge to e-valuation for creatures capable of e-valuation -a role which is, 
to recall, restricted to a general competence in providing an insight into which 
varying standards count for or against a certain claim to knowledge. 
Here is then the objection in more detail. V-valuing someone else's v- 
valuing is structurally complex. When the object of my emotion is your 
emotion, I experience (your) bodily response [target] as being about its typical 
v-value [formal object], whether or not the target of your v-valuing features is in 
the field of my awareness (recall case study 1 and 2 in the fourth chapter). When 
Kun6gonde experiences the fear of her husband, she recognises (his) bodily 
response as being- about some danger. The parentheses around the personal 
206 Chapter 6 
pronoun in the descriptions indicate the fact that the bearer of the emotion 
experienced is not salient in the content of the experience. Not salient either, are 
the bodily changes that constitute the vehicle of my experiencing your v- 
valuings, unless I choose, or I am instructed, to shift my attention to these 
bodily changes for the purpose of e-valuation. What is salient in an episode of 
v-valuing is the (other's) bodily response itself (e. g. fear) and its formal object 
(danger). This being the case has the following consequences. If my experiences 
of v-valuings of other people's v-valuings are going to justify at all e-valuings 
concerning other people's v-valuings, they will do so only in part. For, a full- 
blown emotional e-valuation will have to mention the bearer of the emotion 
ascribed and, arguably, the targets of the emotion as well - all things that are not 
salient in the experience of the other person's emotion. But emotional e- 
valuation will have to contain these elements, for, as my objector would say, 
what we are looking for is what justifies our attributions of emotions to 
individual people as people, and if this the case, then v-valuings alone cannot 
justify our individual attributions. 
Let me illustrate the objection. Remember our first case study in the fourth 
chapter? Imagine the same circumstances, but instead of Anatole being in 
danger of drowning, it is Barnab6's model boat that is in the verge of sinking, to 
the disappearance of which he reacts with total panic. Kunegonde, who, 
needless to say, is totally ashamed of her husband's pastime on the beach, and 
could not care less about the toy's fate, reacts nevertheless, exactly in the same 
way as she did earlier in the day when Anatole was on the brink of drowning. 
Her husband's panic is transparent to her. This time, however, the first fright 
over, she stops, and ponders over her reaction. She comes to the conclusion that 
she did not panic, but her husband did. She is pritnafacie justified in believing 
that there was panic. This is the case because, assessing her own reaction - from 
the bodily changes she went through to the salient aspect of her own experience 
- it is how she v-valued her husband's bodily response; and as far as she can 
say, nothing of relevance in the context defeats her conclusion. The 
contribution, therefore, of Kun6gonde's v-valuation of her husband's bodily 
response in conferring knowledge to her belief is limited to the kind of emotion 
involved and stops short of supporting a full-blown individual ascription. How 
then did she get from "there is panic in the air", to "my husband panicked"? This 
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is the point at which we should consider the other elements that come into play 
in justifying her emotion ascription. The route from the former to the latter is 
the realisation that his wants and hers are at odds. She does not care at all about 
the model boat, he does. The bodily response, therefore, is motivating for him, 
not for her, and this is what justifies her in ascribing the panic to him 
specifically. Ownership is thus - and the objector is right about this - resolved 
at the level of e-valuation. 
As we have seen, the objector draws even more alarming conclusions 
from this initial diagnosis. Indeed we have to ask ourselves whether she is 
correct in her further belief, according to which this fact entails retreating to the 
reflection+analogy model? Well, it is true that Kundgonde's e-valuation of the 
situation will start by reflecting on her own bodily changes and what triggered 
them. It is doubtful, however, that the process of assessment in which she 
engages has anything to do with the simple application of rules connecting 
feelings and behaviour that she once gathered on the basis of her own case. 164 
Kun6gonde's e-valuation in the present context might involve, on her part, all 
sorts of techniques, competences, and factual knowledge which will help her to 
reach the right verdict. It might involve appealing to facts she knows about her 
husband, it might involve imagining or simulating situations in which she 
experiences loss, etc., it might involve reflecting on bits and pieces of 
psychological principles, or rules of thumb, with which she is familiar, etc. It 
might involve too, pondering on her own reaction, given her mood, character 
traits, etc. In other words, she might go through some or all of the procedure 
Goldie labels 'understanding emotions', and through this, come up with a 
verdict in relation to her husband, as to what he feels, and what she feels. But 
again, she might not. 
What we want to know first, is whether the objector is right in thinking 
that knowledge requires as much as e-valuation, given that ownership is 
resolved only at that level, and second, whether she is right to believe that this 
would entail reverting to the reflection+analogy model. 
There are many ways to answer the first question, depending on one's 
perspective in epistemology, several of which have been already outlined. Given 
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the broadly externalist and contextualist picture I have espoused in this chapter, 
here is how I think I should answer. Ownership is one of the many elements that 
the process of emotionally e-valuating a situation involving basic emotions will 
deliver. Often, depending on the context and the kind of questions one is 
interested in with regard to the another person's emotional experience, 
emotional e-valuation, as we have seen, will involve setting the v-valuation 
against the background of other facts known about the person: his moods, 
character traits, interests, fancies, etc.; will involve simulations of different 
kinds, will involve putting into application bits and pieces of psychological 
theories one is competent in. The role of the context, when wondering about 
whether or not a specific attribution of emotion to someone else should be 
regarded as knowledge, is at least double. This assessment depends, first, on the 
kind of creature whose entitlement to knowledge is in question, i. e. we expect 
more in the way of bringing to bear evidence for one's commitments from a 
psychoanalyst or an epistemologist than from an elephant; and second, it 
depends on the circumstances of enquiry, i. e. the demands in terms of evidence 
that the specific circumstances makes on the creature whose knowledge is in 
question. In the theory of knowledge seminar the circumstances are such that 
nothing less than an answer to the sceptic appears to be required, or at least a 
verification procedure so tight that it would exclude the possibility of mistake. 
When emotions are concerned, the strict application of Goldie's model of 
understanding might be handy. Fortunately, however, in ordinary circumstances, 
the demands for knowledge are much lower, and v-valuation alone will 
constitute grounding enough for one's emotional e-valuation. 
Now, does the fact that ownership gets resolved only at the level of e- 
valuation really gives ground to the objector to think that I have reverted to the 
reflection+analogy model? I think the objector is largely correct, although he 
fails to recognise that the general suggestion of this chapter does not suffer from 
the shortcomings which prompted the rejection of the reflection+analogy model 
in the first place. To recall, what has always seemed wrong with this model is 
that, first, it just misrepresents the psychology/phenomenology of the way in 
which we ascribe emotions to others, and second, and more importantly, that it 
164 See the exposition of the 'reflection+analogy' model in the Introduction, sec. 11 above. 
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presupposes that subjects get to form a conception of other people's mentality 
on the strict basis of a conception derived from experiences enjoyed in one's 
own private phenomenological theatre. 
In answer to the first question, it suffices to say that my account of the 
way in which we become aware of other people's experiences at all levels is 
much richer and complex than the over-simplified way in which the 
reflection+analogy model construes it (or to be fair, the way I construed the 
reflextion+analogy model). Anyway, the objector is likely to accept that, and 
press her second complaint. To this, I answer that the key feature of my 
suggestion is precisely that there isn't such a thing as a conception of the mental 
acquired from oneself and projected onto others, at least not at the emotional 
valuation level. To caricature slightly, in my picture, the world is perceived 
cmentally' through and through, and made to be seen 'physically' little by little, 
whether the object of the seeing is I or somebody else. When this is understood, 
however, I have no problem in conceding to the objector that my model 
privileges those same features that are traditionally seen to trap one in the 
Cartesian quicksand. In this thesis, I have defended the view that my conception 
of others and of myself is, in large part, derived from the way the world is given 
to me in experience, material upon which, with the help of my fellow co- 
specifics, I attempt to make sense of our psychological interactions. 
Let me go over the dialectics of this chapter again, and clarify its 
conclusions. V-valuations of other people's emotions, I argued, do not pose any 
special sceptical threats which ordinary perceptions of physical objects do not 
pose, whatever standpoint one occupied in the theory of knowledge. This is the 
result, I claimed, of construing access to the inner and the outer in a similar 
fashion. I went on to defend the stronger claim that knowledge of other people's 
emotions was possible. I showed that this required adopting a broadly 
externalist strategy, and I argued that pursuing this strategy whilst assuming a 
disjunctivist account of the content of v-valuations, a non-classical 
foundationalism concerning v-valuations was defensible. On this account, 
experiencing v-valuation v entails that v is known. In the process of expounding 
on this possible account of our knowledge of other people's experiences, I 
showed how the disjunctivist claim allowed for treating the problem that 
deception poses to the epistemology of other people's experiences in a fashion 
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strictly equivalent to the problem of error. Having adopted a broadly externalist 
strategy and having, thus, taken on board the possibility that young infants and 
animals are entitled to knowledge, I argued that the internalist preoccupation 
with justification had to be taken into account when knowledge is attributed to 
human adults. This is to say that we would doubt that someone knew that 
someone else experiences a certain emotion in cases where this person was 
entirely incompetent with respect to all the possible ways in which support for 
such attributions might be gathered. For this reason, together with the fact that 
many aspects of a full-blown emotion ascription were not resolved at the level 
of v-valuation - in particular ownership -I argued that the reflexive level of e- 
valuating was part of the evidence package one might bring in support of one's 
e-valuation. When the context is such that the level of justification required for 
knowledge is very high, Goldie's model of 'understanding emotions' construed 
as a quest for knowledge, I claimed, is the right model 
The question for this chapter was whether the unorthodox account of our 
awareness of the emotions in others defended in this dissertation could help 
solve traditional problems associated with the epistemology of other minds. The 
answer is Yes, it can help solve them. It can provide essential premises for 
externalist and disjunctivist approaches to psychological knowledge, especially 
knowledge that a particular emotion is instantiated in a particular context. And it 
can provide a basis from which the much-derided 'reflection plus analogy, 





I. V-values and empirical data 
Is the idea that v-values are objects of our emotions a philosopher's fancy or 
does it make sense empirically? My account of our basic emotions derives, in 
part, from reading the empirical literature on emotions. 
The nature and the role of emotion in the interaction with the 
environment, and between members of a same or different species, is obviously 
not of interest for philosophers alone, quite the reverse. Indeed, it might be 
thought that what emotions are and how they work is primarily an empirical 
matter. I shall, thus, consider the important contributions the empirical sciences 
have brought to the topic. I suggest we consider evidence from experimental 
psychology, neurophysiology, evolutionary neuroanatomy, social psychology, 
which all appear - in one way or another - to support the kind of perceptual 
theory of affect I am defending in the third and fourth chapters. In the fifth 
chapter, I discuss theories of mind reading which are often presented as having 
to be tested against empirical data from developmental psychology, the theory- 
theorist and simulation theory, although I deal mainly there with the conceptual 
issues related to these theories. 
All the studies reviewed in this appendix operate from within different 
conceptual frameworks, approaching the problems from different angles and at 
different levels, making it difficult for the one who tries to compare the various 
results and draw general lessons, and for the philosopher to assess the specific 
import it has on philosophical problems. I shall, thus, briefly go over these 
various results, and comment upon them in a general form at the end of this 
appendix. 
L I. Zajonc 
Robert Zajonc has defended the claim that affect is an independent 
representational system, one which is demarcated and defined by its own special 
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representation categories and principles, and governed by its own special laws 
and regularities. 165 In his 1980 paper, Zajonc argues against the view that 
emotion is post-cognitive, as opposed to pre-cognitive. He takes the central 
claim of the post-cognitive view to be that experiencing an emotion consists of 
some kind of cognitive labelling of the physiological/phenomenological arousal 
that affects the subject. On the view criticised, arousal becomes the experience 
of a particular emotion only when some cognitive process acts as a 
differentiator. According to Zajonc, however, affect is pre-cognitive and 
constitutes an independent information processing system. He distinguishes 
between cold cognition on the one hand, the objects of which he calls 
discriminanda, and hot cognitions on the other hand, the objects of which he 
calls preferenda. Discriminanda are the standard posits of experimental 
psychology on perception: features such as mass, weight, geometrical shape, 
surface reflectance, brightness, hue, etc., the positing of which permits the 
generalisations made by the experimental psychologist on perception. 
Preferenda are the posits of the experimental psychologist working on affect. 
These are the features that need to be posited above and beyond discriminanda 
to make sense of the generalisations made by the experimental psychologist on 
affect. What preferenda are is not clear and seems to be largely determined 
negatively - as whatever accounts for well documented psychological 
generalisations concerning emotions that cannot be reduced to the standard 
perceptual posits of experimental psychologists. 
The strategy at work here is not difficult to identify and could be called a 
'transcendental argument from generalisation'. Certain regularities in the 
behaviour of a system can be accounted for only by the positing of certain 
features of this system's environment that it represents and processes in an 
orderly fashion. The strategy and the resulting model raises important 
ontological and epistemological questions, but constitutes a practice which is 
commonly accepted in the scientific community, and should not deter us from 
looking at the evidence ZaJonc brings in support of his conclusions. 
As examples of preferenda, ZaJonc cites colour preferences and facial 
recognition. In both cases, he argues, we cannot account for the subject's 
165 E. g. Zajonc (1980,1984). 
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behaviour by limiting our theoretical posits to such things as brightness, hue, 
and saturation. For example, the same face can be systematically picked out 
over others without any identifiable fixed set of physical features grounding 
those generalisations in the discriminanda that defines the face as a particular 
face. Preferenda are the properties that account for this capacity. The existence 
of preferenda, according to ZaJonc, is further supported by the so-called 
&exposure effect', which is the phenomenon of increasing preferences for 
objects that can be induced by mere repetition. He criticises earlier work on the 
phenomenon which all emphasise the role of full propositional recognitional 
judgement for the explanation of the phenomenon. According to Zajonc, the 
evidence shows that the preferences in the exposure effect do not arise from 
stimulus recognition of standard discriminanda through representation of a 
propositional order. In other words, recognition of the propositional order of 
judgement is not available, nor needed, to account for the regularities that define 
the exposure effect. The evidence mentioned in favour of the view (pp. 160-170) 
is diverse and impressive, involving preferences for auditory stimuli, facial 
expressions, colours and other phenomena. 
L2. Panskepp 
Panskepp argues that there are four different classes of primitive stimulus-bound 
affective behaviours in humans and other mammals. 166 These behaviours are 
held to fall, respectively, under the command of four distinct circuits originating 
in the limbic cortex and ganglia. The circuits are rage, panic, expectancy, and 
fear (pp. 411-412). The main evidence he cites in favour of this hypothesis 
derives from his research on how and where these circuits operate in the brains 
of rats. The relevance of these data to the affective life of humans lies on the 
fact that "the functional terrain of the sub-cortical limbic brain across 
mammalian species is remarkably similar, in kind if not in precise 
organisation7'. 167 Panskepp believes that these circuits constitute an independent 
affective representational system. Activation and responses of the system are 
said to be basic in both the sense that it is designed to operate unconditionally 
166 E. g. Panskepp (1982). 
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on stimuli that represent life challenging situations, and in the sense that it is 
genetically hard-wired. It appears crucial to Panskepp's argument that the 
affective system is representational in nature. Indeed, to the four-hypothesised 
basic affective categories, we have the corresponding affective perception of 
specific eliciting situation-types. These basic situation-types are represented in 
the affective category-types of the affective perceptual system ('rage eliciting'), 
'fear provoking', etc. ). Examples of basic situation types are things such as 
$social loss', 'threat', or positive incentives' of various kinds. The result of these 
genetically hard-wired mechanisms is the production of whatever evolution has 
selected as the more adapted response given the species the animal belongs to. 
Not surprisingly, followers of Panskepp and other researchers in the area 
have found it necessary to posit more basic affective circuits to account for the 
basic affective responses of higher animals. 
L3. Maclean 
Maclean's work lends further support to the view that affective perception 
might be governed by a relatively independent and anatomically distinct set of 
neuro-physiological mechanisms and structures168. The evidence for this view 
derives from his Triune Brain Hypothesis. Roughly, he identifies three cerebro- 
types in the forebrain which, despite being linked in remarkable ways, are 
radically different in chemistry and structure, and which correspond plausibly to 
different stages of our evolutionary history: the reptilian, the paleo-mammalian 
and the neo-mammalian. Each of them, according to Maclean, has its own type 
of intelligence, its own memory, its own sense of time and space, and its own 
motor and other functions. In this three-brain-in-one, the paleo-mammalian 
brain is held to conform to what is commonly called the limbic system. Maclean 
reaches four conclusions that are particularly relevant for our concerns. First,, 
that there is evolutionary evidence that affect might have been an independent 
representational system that might still operate independently today in normal 
adults. Second, many important dimensions of affect can be traced back to 
specific neural mechanisms and processes in the limbic system. Third, before 
167 Panskepp (1982, p. 407) 
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the neo-cortex and the higher cognitive capacities associated with it, the limbic 
system proceeded affective information of its own. And fourth, it could only do 
so with its own limited resources. 
L4. Elanan 
Ekman's work is particularly interesting for us as it focuses on affective facial 
expressions at all levels: their connections with the different emotions, their 
production as well as their recognition. 169 Ekman's main conclusion, as was the 
case for the last studies we surveyed, is that the affect is a non-verbal, non- 
propositional representational system. Ekman's main hypothesis is that there are 
universal forms of affective facial expressions in humans. How does one 
proceed to test such a hypothesis? Well, many alternatives are possible, but 
interestingly enough for us, it was recognition of facial expressions as 
expressing different emotions that was initially used to test the hypothesis. For 
example, some tests involved showing photographs of faces expressing typical 
emotions in our culture to remote cultures which have never been in contact 
with ours. 170 The result of the experiment widely confirmed the hypothesis, in 
that the subjects of these remote cultures associated the different types of faces 
with affective concepts in their language corresponding to the same affective 
concepts in our language. Ekman's own conclusion on the experiment is that the 
ways in which humans facially express their emotions are universal. But another 
conclusion, which could have been possibly drawn from the experiment, is that 
the ways in which human affectively classify facial expressions - by this I mean 
recognise a facial expression as instantiating a certain emotion-type - is also 
universal. In any case, Ekman's experimental apparatus and equipment, as well 
as the hypotheses selected for testing became more and more sophisticated over 
the years. He and his colleagues brought evidence that there exist autonomic 
individuating factors for the basic emotions. 171 They also devised a special 
measurement system for mapping the musculature of the face, thus providing an 
168 MacLean (1975) 
169 E. g. Ekman (1971,1980,1984 and 1986). 
170 Ekman (197 1). 
171 Ekman & Frieson (1986). 
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operationalised procedure for identifying affective facial types, and measuring 
deviations from them. Some recent work of Ekman indicates that there may be 
different neural mechanisms and pathways responsible for voluntary and 
involuntary facial expressions. 172 
According to Ekman the affective system works with what he calls an 
appraiser mechanism, the representations of which are non-conceptual, 
evidence of its operation having been demonstrated in animals incapable of 
conceptual abilities. The affective system selectively operates on certain stimuli 
that it is programmed to process. This appraisal mechanism operates very 
quickly and automatically, as many of our emotional responses are quick and 
immediate. Ekman calls the stimuli to which the affect system is sensitive, 
elicitors. The affect program reacts selectively to different types of elicitors: 
disgust elicitors, fear elicitors, sadness elicitors, etc. As for ZaJonc, Panskeep 
and Maclean, Ekman believes that the affect system is largely innate, although 
its outputs might be influenced by experience. 
15. Damasio 
Recently, Damasio has put forward a neurobiological theory of emotions, 
confirming and complementing some of the earlier findings we have reviewed 
here. 173 Damasio's main claim is that humans are endowed with two distinct, 
but interconnected, emotional systems. The primary emotion system - the 
operations of which are taken care of by components of the limbic system, in 
particular the amygdala, anterior cingulate and early sensory cortices - is 
believed to be largely innate, processing information in a pre-programmed, pre- 
organised and automatic fashion. According to Damasio, the primary emotional 
system does not only play an essential role in the basic biological regulation of 
the subject's body, it also processes representations of the external world that it 
classifies as "good" or "bad". 174 As in all the research on basic emotional 
responses we have reviewed, the features of the environment which the system 
processes are thought by Damasio to constitute specific categories that do not 
172 Ekman (1984, pp. 321-324). 
173 Damasio (e. g. 1990,1994,2000). 
174 Damasio (1994, p. 117). 
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map upon the traditional dimensions of perception. Examples of features of the 
external world that give rise to the categories are "size of animals", "large 
spans", "type of motion", "certain configuration of the body", etc. The system 
interprets these features as harmful, fearsome, dangerous, disgusting, happy, 
etc., for want of better words. Upon reception of these representations, distinct 
bodily response states are generated, as well as pre-set motor and musculo- 
skeletal dispositions. 175 Though it is difficult not to describe the operations of 
the primary affective system by means of our ordinary concepts, it is indeed 
plausible, as Damasio claims, that - given that the neural structures underlying 
the system's operations are shared between higher animals, infants and adults - 
the system processes representational categories of its own. 
The primary emotional system is not enough, however, to account for 
important dimensions of a human's emotional life. "In many circumstances", 
Damasio writes, "emotions are triggered only after an evaluative, voluntary and 
non-automatic mental process" and this is where the secondary emotional 
system becomes relevant. The two systems are individuated functionally, not 
physiologically, as the secondary emotional system uses in great part the 
mechanisms and pathways of the primary emotional systems. "Stimuli and 
situations are filtered by an interposed mindful evaluation" (p. 130) in creatures 
capable of conceptual abilities - in my terminology, creatures capable of e- 
valuations. What is involved is a cognitive evaluation of a situation, says 
Damasio, framed in terms of images, which in ttwn may be verbal or nonverbal. 
Verbal images involve "words, sentences regarding attributes, activities, names, 
and so on" (p. 136). These images activate various acquired dispositional 
representations stored in the networks of the prefrontal cortex. Those prefrontal 
responses are then signalled to the amygdala and anterior cingulate (parts of the 
primary emotion system), which then trigger "a massive response" that can 
involve everything from visceral, endocrine, and motor factors, usually all of 
them in concert (pp. 137-138). The last step in the process occurs when this 
collection of information regarding the organism's current body state is 
signalled back to the limbic and somato-sensory systems. 
175 Damasio (1994, p. 132). 
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Damasio's own gloss at a more abstract level, with regard to the manner 
in which his partition of the affect in two different systems underscores the less 
and more cognitive dimensions of our emotional life is not very illuminating. In 
particular, it does not provide the tools for a verdict as to how much alike his 
primary emotional system is to my emotional v-valuation on the one hand, and 
his secondary emotional system is to my emotional e-valuation on the other 
hand. The sole lesson that can be drawn, which is rýther weak, is that the two 
pairs appear to be made for one another, in the sense that my account might be 
one way of cashing out conceptually Damasio's findings at the (semi) empirical 
level at which he stands. This being so, I shall content myself with general 
remarks on the bearing of the different data that we have succinctly reviewed on 
my account. 
11. Making sense of the evidence 
Behind the varied terminology used by the authors we have reviewed, some 
key-features of their respective theories have been taken on board in my own 
philosophical approach to the topic, although I have systematically refrained 
from committing myself to any issues having to do with the level of 
implementation. Basic affective states are states with content. In philosophy, we 
would say that they have intentionality, i. e. they are directed toward, or about, 
objects. For all of our authors, the mechanisms that give rise to these basic 
affective representational states are largely innate, and their existence and 
workings are the result of evolutionary adaptation. Equally, it appears that for 
most of our authors, the operation of these affective states is not permeable to 
higher levels of cognitive activity. In this respect they are, at least in one sense, 
modular mechanisms. In addition, we find that they all insist that the content of 
these affective representations is not propositional, or language-like. But 
possibly of even greater interest for us are the ways in which these authors 
characterise the objects of the basic affective states. This is the terrain where 
terminology varies, and vagueness is most frequent. The first point to notice is 
that, as kinds of objects, preferenda, elicitors, values, positive or negative 
situation-types, do not appear to be easily reducible to any of the categories used 
in experimental psychology on perception, and it is a remarkable fact that most 
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of the studies we reviewed use evaluative terms to pick them out. Secondly, 
they all seem to fulfil the same function, i. e. they function like cues, indicators, 
or salient features of the environment which seem to be directly or indirectly 
connected to some course of action (from motor behaviour to practical 
reasoning). Those we have called v-values and the capacity to be sensitive to 
them, v-valuing. 
APPENDix 2 
I. Early imitation: the facts 
Long and detailed research on early imitation in very young infants has 
prompted Meltzoff and others to draw four conclusions with regard to the 
question of imitation176. (a) The capacity to imitate is innate. (b) It is not 
automatic but is under intentional control. (c) It is not completely rote, but 
reveals the infant's interpretations of social encounters. (d) It is mediated by an 
internal representational system which is cross-modal. Of particular interest for 
the psychologist and the philosopher, there is the capacity, in an infant as young 
as 42 hours old, to imitate specific facial expressions. This is of particular 
interest, for the possibility of the child producing her imitative behaviour 
through visual monitoring is impossible in the absence of mirrors or any such 
device. (a) This is powerful evidence for the suggestion that the capacity to 
imitate is innate. Meltzoff and Moore have shown that 12 to 21-day-old infants 
could respond differentially to behaviours such as tongue profusion, mouth 
opening, and lip protrusion, by re-producing these same behaviours. 177 They 
have shown that these responses are not automatic reflexes, as the imitative 
behaviour survives important temporal gaps between the perception of the 
behaviour and its imitation. (b) Meltzoff and Moore believe that early imitation 
in infants is intentional in the sense of being goal-directed. Infants make 
mistakes and then try to correct them, and even display frustration when they 
are not satisfied with the result of their effort. Even at this early stage, they seem 
to be capable of distinguishing between intentions and the consequences of 
these intentions. They thus show all the signs of someone trying to achieve a 
certain goal. The experimenters conclude that "infants differentiate between the 
representation of the target act derived from the external world and the 
representation of their own bodily acts. The intention is apparently to bring 
176 E. g. Meltzoff & Moore (1977,1995), Meltzoff (1993), Meltzoff & Gopnik (1993) 
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these two into congruence" (p. 52). (c) Meltzoff and Moore also believe that 
early imitation is interpretative in nature. The evidence for this claim is that the 
infant's imitative behaviour seems to be selective, creative and voluntary. 
Children appear to select different dimensions of the behaviour they set up to 
imitate, focusing on temporal or spatial dimensions of it, before eventually 
succeeding in their imitation. Their imitative behaviour does not always stop 
with the achieving of the target act, but seems to be extended in creative ways. 
The imitative behaviour appears to be voluntary in the sense that they often do 
not imitate the adult, or imitate faces imitated the day before, or even imitate 
someone9s face when viewing someone else. (d) The fourth and perhaps most 
significant conclusion of Meltzoff and Moore is that the representation of the 
movement of the adult imitated and the representation of the movement to be 
performed by the infant uses a common information code. This is what they 
mean by supra-modality, the idea being that the adult's act is registered so that it 
can be directly used for executing a motor plan. Supra-modality is meant to 
account for the fact that the infant needs to compare the pattern of the act 
perceived with the pattern of the act performed. And for the representation of 
two items to be at all comparable, the idea continues, it has to be couched in the 
same language. Meltzoff excludes the possibility of the existence of a 
translation device turning automatically the visual input into a 
motor/proprioceptive output. The voluntary nature of the response seems to 
indicate that the infant need not produce the movement perceived. The response 
does not pop out on the infant's seeing the act. The representation can be stored, 
and can be used at a later stage, which at least shows that the information gained 
is not automatically translated into a motor plan. Second, the infant's capacity 
for correcting his imitative efforts supports the claim that he is able to compare 
two representations, a fact which would not be easily accountable for on the 
direct translation story. Thirdly, infants enjoy being themselves imitated, which 
means that they must have access to a representation of their own body 
movements. 
177 Meltzoff & Moore (1977). 
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11. Early Imitation and v-valuation 
My concern with the phenomenon of early imitation is the same as Gopnik and 
Meltzoff. I want to know in what sense, if any, the infant can be said to 
recognise that someone else than she is having some distinct kinaesthetic 
experience or experiencing some distinct feeling. We have at least two questions 
here. The first concerns the capacity to discriminate the type of 
experience/feeling/emotion involved, and the second concerns the capacity to 
discriminate the owner of this experience. To answer these two questions, of 
course, we would need a theory, even a minimal one, of what counts as a 
capacity to discriminate, for prima facie, it might come in different degrees. 
How 'rich' does the conception of myself as a psychological being have to be, 
for a perception of someone other than me being a psychological being - in 
many ways similar and in many ways different to me - to count as a genuine 
recognition of someone else's emotion? Let me attempt to explain briefly how 
one might think that this the relevant question. 
There is no doubt that conceptions of others as psychological beings 
come in various degrees. The question is, where is the bottom threshold beneath 
which we would have doubts as to whether there is genuine recognition of 
someone else as a psychological being? I think we can satisfy ourselves with a 
very simple answer to this question in the context of our discussion of 
perception and affordance. The world, as I emphasised with Gibson, is not 
perceived as a confused bundle of sensations, but rather as a world composed of 
determinate and bounded objects, perhaps solid and more or less penetrable, and 
behaving in reasonably fixed and determinate manners. In this respect, there is 
no doubt that the infant perceives other people as objects in this restricted sense. 
But this is not all. These objects are also perceived as affording or excluding 
various types of action for the infant. In this sense, objects in the environment 
are discriminated in terms of the different possible moves and/or impacts they 
allow the infant who senses them. Is it possible that other people are such that 
they are manifestly perceived as allowing types of action for the perceiver that 
other kind of objects do not? If that were the case, it would encourage the 
thought that people are, in this minimal sense, discriminated as living creatures 
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rather than simple inert objects in terms of the specific actions, impacts, 
contacts, etc. that they specifically afford to the child. 
In line with what has been said all through this thesis, it should be clear 
that I do not believe that there is any sharp distinction to be drawn between 
seeing something as psychological and seeing something as physical. For one to 
understand that one is faced with either type of objects, one has at least to 
perceive them as bounded, as having causal powers of their own, as being 
internally causally connected, etc. One way of putting this point is to say that 
perceiving objects in that way is having implicit expectations as to how objects 
will appear to be in sub-consequent perceptions. 178 Moreover, understanding 
that one is faced with objects is to perceive them as si ni icant for oneself as a 9fn 
agent and as an emotional being. Objects afford actions of all sorts, as well as 
pleasures and pains to those who perceive them, and are perceived as such. In 
this sense, as already emphasised, objects are perceived as psychologically 
relevant for the perceiver. That all this is the case in young infants and animals 
is beyond doubt. Now, what other elements should the perception of living 
objects like persons, by contrast with perceptions of inert objects, incorporate to 
count as genuine perception of persons? Of course, as already emphasised., 
living creatures of the animal kind afford types of actions that other objects 
might not, simply in virtue of their size, their flexibility, their movements, etc. 
Other people might afford things being done to oneself - things like caressing, 
grooming, smiling at, etc. - that other objects generally do not afford, or not in 
the same way. This is a very importance difference between perceptions of 
living and non-living objects, but one that might not be enough for the former to 
count as a genuine perception of a person. A child can perceive both her father 
and the rug as affording caresses. What we really Want in order to count the 
child's perception of her father as a perception of another person is for her to 
conceive of him as a being, in some relevant respects, like her. And this seems 
to require that the child has a conception of herself as a specific kind of object, a 
psychological one, and is able to recognise her father as being of the same kind. 
For example, we might want the child to understand that her father is, like her, a 
178 On these topics which I cannot unfortunately give justice to in this thesis, see e. g. Campbell 
(1993,1994a, 1994b, 1995); Bermfidez (1998, esp. Chap. 8 and 9). 
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perceiver and an agent capable of emotions. And, I want to claim, this is exactly 
what early imitation shows. Of course the child does not conceptualise this 
identity. She does not conceive of her father and herself as instantiating the 
categories perceiver, agent, and emoter. In my own terminology, I would say 
that this conceptualisation happens at the level of e-valuation of the other 
person. The sense in which she perceives him as being like her consists of her 
treating him as a perceiver, an agent and an emoter. To put it again in terms of 
affordances, what early imitation shows is that the child perceives the caregiver 
as affording imitation, and this is no trivial affordance. The caregiver is 
perceived as the sort of thing that moves and acts in ways in which I can move 
and act myself. And if Meltzoff s cross-modal hypothesis is right, then the ways 
in which the caregiver is perceived as 'like me' encompasses the kinaesthetic 
and proprioceptive elements accompanying the doing. It is, thus, very difficult 
to resist the thought that, when the adult is imitating the child's gasp of 
pleasure, the child perceives the adult's gasps of pleasure as being the impact of 
her own gasps of pleasure on him, together with an awareness that they both 
experience the same feelings or kinaesthetic experience. 
I should not want, however, to exaggerate the level at which other 
people are conceived by the child as being 'like her'. The truth is that the only 
conclusions that the phenomenon of imitation supports is that caregivers are 
treated by the child as affording very special kinds of action and emotions 
which are experienced by that child as being replicated and replicable at all 
levels. This is only the beginning of a conception of others as persons, but one 
that is enough for the use I make of it in my characterisation of v-valuation. In 
the fourth chapter, I argue that for a v-valuation to count as a perception of 
someone else's emotion, both sharing of the emotion and recognition of the 
emotion had to be involved. What interests me here is the recognitional level. 
For an emotion to be recognised as being experienced by someone else it is 
enough that the bodily response of someone else be perceived as affording 
actions and emotions of certain types that other kinds of objects do not afford, 
i. e. those actions that are characteristic of our interaction with other living 
creatures. This, I claim, is more than enough for distinguishing a case when a v- 
value is perceived via the perception of someone else's emotion from a case 
when a v-value is perceived via another kind of target. As I have admitted, this 
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falls short of experiencing the emotion of someone else as being owned by him. 
That is, this falls short of recognising the emotion as affecting a centre of 
consciousness other than oneself, and not any other. Ownership, I agreed, gets 
fully resolved only at the level of e-valuation. 
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